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Abstract 
 
 
The Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) has become a forerunner in 
election observation, establishing globally recognized standards for observing participating 
States commitments to ‘free and fair elections’. 
Considering the conclusive link between election observation and the promotion of 
democratic values, this thesis will closely examine important aspects of election observation 
and how the OSCE has established the norm ‘free and fair elections’ among its participating 
States. It will also analyze the particular roles that are attributed to the respective OSCE 
institutions and on what the ‘standards’ of OSCE election observation are really based on.  
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Introduction 
 
Elections are important events in any country. In affirmed democracies such as in Western 
Europe, they are often perceived as a habitual system for the scrutiny or reaffirmation of the 
government in place, often marred however by both low voter turn out and an apathetic 
population. On the other hand in struggling democracies, often recovering from authoritarian 
rule and political conflicts, each election is perceived as a cornerstone and often a prominent 
indicator for measuring the countries consolidation process. Such elections are frequently 
regarded as an opportunity to make a new start and legitimate basis for a new government.  
The aim of legitimacy and consolidation within the population, and, vis-à-vis the international 
community, necessitates a conduct of the election in line with particular norms and standards, 
established over the course of many years though intense international and intergovernmental 
cooperation in conferences, organizations and institutions. The establishment of the norm for 
free, genuine and democratic elections was followed shortly by an elaboration as to how to 
observe the implementation of the norm in States who committed themselves to conduct their 
elections according to this norm. Whilst the establishment of norms and standards for free 
elections is also due to the promotion of particular democratic core values and former western 
values, the elaboration of standards for observing elections followed as an interesting 
instrument, providing a concrete basis as to how to promote these values.  
On another note, the establishment of such norms, standards and shared values is also due to 
the setting of common commitments in international relations. International organizations 
promoting such a development are active around the world. Prominent commitments in 
respect to elections and election observation were set within the United Nations, the Council 
of Europe and the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe. Interestingly and 
more recently, the Commonwealth of Independent States, in particular with its Convention on 
Standards of Democratic Elections, Electoral Rights and Freedoms, has also made important 
contributions to the establishment of the norm for free election among the CIS participating 
States. 
This paper, entitled ‘OSCE election observation – Challenging the Norm and Standards’, aims 
to examine how the establishment of the norm and standards for both – free and fair elections 
and election observation – has occurred in the Organization for Security and Cooperation in 
Europe. Introducing what in fact constitutes the norm free and fair election and standards in 
election observation, the main argument of this paper establishes that the OSCE set standards 
in election observation during the 1990s that encompass the complementary activities of two 
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OSCE institutions, the OSCE Parliamentary Assembly (OSCE PA) and the OSCE Office for 
Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (OSCE/ODIHR). In comparison to the common 
arguments found in election observation literature stating that the OSCE‘s establishment of 
worldwide standards in election observation is a result of the comprehensive approach of the 
Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights, this thesis instead contends that the role 
of the OSCE PA in election observation should also be attributed equal importance in the 
setting of these OSCE standards. Therefore, the focus of the analysis is not only based on a 
deliberation of the actual standards of OSCE election observation (in relation to the norm of 
free and fair elections), but also, why (in particular from the perspective of promoting 
democratic norms), these standards encompass a complementary role of both the OSCE 
Parliamentary Assembly and the OSCE Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights. 
 
 
Methodology 
 
This thesis was written using four types of sources. Firstly, a consideration of democracy 
theorist literature was useful for examining the relationship of elections and democracy with 
respect to the link between election observation and democracy promotion. Important sources 
of inspiration include Wolfgang Merkels’ ‘Embedded and Defective Democracies’, in 
particular, for analyzing the different regimes of democracies that would constitute a solid 
background for understanding the methodology of the OSCE Office for Democratic 
Institutions and Human Rights. At this point I would like to underline the importance of the 
paper by Guy S. Goodwin-Gill, entitled ‘Free and Fair Elections’, published in 2006 by the 
Inter-parliamentary Union, for establishing what constitutes the norm free and fair election. 
Secondly, an examination of election observation literature proved to be useful when   
attempting to define the exact nature of election observation. Of particular importance was 
Eric C. Bjornlund’s book entitled ‘Beyond Free and Fair – Monitoring Elections and Building 
Democracy’. Thirdly, primary literature such as Ministerial Council decisions, available on 
the OSCE website, proved to be useful for empirical analysis of both OSCE norms for free 
and fair elections and OSCE standards for election observation. Lastly, my personal 
experience in the organization’s Parliamentary Assembly Vienna Liaison Office as Research 
Assistant in the year 2007, and in particular my interviews with respective officials of the 
OSCE Parliamentary Assembly and the OSCE secretariat, contributed to the subject area of 
the thesis. 
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Chapter Outline 
 
 
This thesis is composed of five Chapters. Constituting a more general outline of the 
relationship between election observation and the promotion of democratic core values, 
Chapter Two considers what is in fact implied by the norm free and fair elections and how 
elections are interlinked with other aspects of democracy. In addition Chapter Two considers 
election observation as a form of both developmental and political cooperation along 
particular democratic norms and values. Finally, Chapter Two examines election observers 
themselves and the standards they have established over the years. 
 
Chapter Three considers the establishment of the norm for free and fair elections and their 
observation within the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe. Particular 
attention is paid to respective documents and participating States commitments for free 
elections and the invitation of elections observers. Furthermore, this Chapter focuses on how 
the collapse of the Soviet Union and the institutionalization of the OSCE resulted in the 
organizations most important activity of its third dimension of security. In this way the 
methodology and role of OSCE institutions deploying election observer are examined. Finally, 
Chapter Three also refers to the current problems and constraints of election observation 
efforts. 
 
Chapter Four was written to reflect important conclusions established in Chapters Two and 
Three. Accordingly, the case study of the observation of the extraordinary Kazakhstan 
parliamentary elections in 2007 considers the contextual importance of election observation, 
in light of Kazakhstan’s political dialogue with the OSCE and its bid for OSCE Chairmanship. 
Additionally, the case study closely examines how the OSCE election observation mission 
was composed and why OSCE election observation encompasses also in practice the 
complementary activity of the OSCE PA and the OSCE/ODIHR. 
 
Chapter Five concludes the thesis and explains what OSCE election observation standards are 
really based on and why they must encompass a complementary activity of the OSCE 
Parliamentary Assembly and the OSCE Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights. 
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Chapter Two:  
Election Observation – the Norm and Standards 
While democracy must be more than free elections, it is also true… that it cannot be less.1 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
1 UN Secretary General Kofi Annan, “Closing Remarks to the Ministerial” (Warsaw June 27, 2000) 
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Introduction  
 
 
Before analyzing how the norm ‘Free and Fair,’ election emerged in the Organization for 
Security and Cooperation in Europe and how its observation is deduced institutionally, I 
would like to introduce election observation in a more theoretical manner and from a 
democracy theorist perspective. Thus, the analytical focus lies on what constitutes the 
relationship between election observation and the promotion of values, in particular 
fundamental democratic values such as free and fair elections. In this respect, this chapter 
considers various questions: first, what is the role of the election in democracy? Can 
democracy be reduced to the holding of periodical, free and fair elections? And finally, what 
aspects are necessary in the composition of free and fair elections? 
This chapter therefore outlines the necessary elements for the holding of elections according 
to the norm free and fair. This includes aspects such as election laws, election management, 
electoral campaigns, the role of the media, and finally the Election Day itself. Interestingly, 
this examination implies to query further how election observers evaluate their assessment 
according to the norm. Therefore, considering the election observation endeavor as a tool for 
promoting democratic values and norms, the evaluation of an observation implies also a 
consideration of how the election itself contributes to the democratization process. In this 
respect, chapter two intends to understand election observation as an endeavor that has two 
main components: first, components of development cooperation and technical assistance 
when invited to do so, and second, international aspects of political cooperation and political 
pressure. This becomes especially visible when an election is evaluated according to the free 
and fair norm. 
Finally, this chapter provides a general outline of the comprehensive election observation 
methodology, as established by the OSCE, which became through many years and missions a 
model for other international organizations deploying election observation missions. 
Standards were set by the OSCE/ODIHR and OSCE Parliamentary Assembly throughout the 
1990s in the field of election observation. Since that time, many other international 
institutions have applied these standards as a model. In this regard, briefly, Chapter two also 
considers the role and the methodology of the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of 
Europe, of the European Union and the Inter-parliamentary Assemblies of the Commonwealth 
of Independent States. 
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Election Observation and the Promotion of Values 
 
 
The study of election observation implies a necessity to link this with the broader issue of 
elections and their role within democracy. Undoubtedly, elections are of fundamental 
importance in any democratic society. For the government it is a day of accountability. For 
the people it is the moment to express their will on their society's political direction.  
Genuine democratic elections are a requisite condition for democratic governance, because 
they are the vehicle through which the people of a country freely express their will, on a basis 
established by law, as to who shall have the legitimacy to govern in their name and in their 
interests. 2 In this regard, achieving genuine democratic elections is a part of establishing 
broader processes and institutions of democratic governance.3  
Studying the role of elections in democracies implies a belief in the general nature of 
democracy. Indeed, this begs the question as to whether democracy can simply be reduced to 
the holding of periodical, free elections. The NGO Freedom House for example, a preferable 
source of data about democratization for journalists, essayists and political scientists, 
understands free and fair elections as a minimum requirement for a state to be listed as 
democratic.  
 
 
      Source: Freedom House 
 
According to Freedom House, the world can be classified within the categories free, partly 
free and not free. The NGO implies therefore a political check list methodology. Regarding 
the electoral process, the main query is centered on the question as to whether or not the head 
of government or other chief national authority were elected through free and fair elections. 
Accordingly, the free and fair assessment of reputable national and international election 
                                                 
2 UN. October 27, 2005. Declaration of Principles for International Election Observation. P.18 
3 Ibid. 
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monitoring organizations is required.4 Thus, the minimum requirement for a State to be listed 
as democratic by Freedom House is that of so-called electoral democracy.5 
However, it turned out to be too narrow and problematic to assume that the minimum 
requirement of democracy is the holding of free and fair elections. First of all, as argued by 
Wolfgang Merkel in his article “Embedded and Defective Democracies”, it is very difficult to 
prove empirically that elections were executed fairly and correctly. This presumption implies 
that empirical data collection cannot be handled in the same way for election observation as 
for classical areas of empirical research. Secondly, it does not examine the issue of whether 
elected officials rule the country by democratic and constitutional principles between each 
election.6 Democracy seems to be periodical phenomena, occurring when elections are held, 
rather than a continual and omnipresent process of social order. Therefore, competitive and 
free elections appear insufficient for guaranteeing other relevant aspects of democracy, such 
as the rule of law, civil rights, and the accountability of its representatives for example.7 
Perhaps the formulation of former UN Secretary General Kofi Annan best describes the role 
of elections within democracies “While democracy must be more than free elections, it is also 
true (…) that it cannot be less”.8  
Interestingly, when examining the relationship between elections and democracy, a 
fascinating interlink becomes evident. On the one hand, democracy cannot be reduced to the 
holding of periodical elections, however, free and fair elections cannot be held without the 
requirements that democracy implies. Therefore, as will be analyzed in this paper closely 
when outlining the norm free and fair elections, the characteristics of elections mirror many 
other aspects of democracy such as the rule of law, the political system, the integration of 
political parties within the population, freedom of the media, the participation of minorities, 
campaign issues, etc. The studying of elections and in particular election observation is hence 
strongly interlinked with a broader sense of the promotion of these values. This paper 
considers therefore that election observation is the promotion of democratic values, in 
particular the democratic norm of free and fair elections.  
In this regard, OSCE’s endeavor in election observation is similarly interlinked with the 
broader issue of democratic assistance and democracy promotion. The dramatic global 
expansion of democracy and democracy promotion in the CSCE/OSCE area following the 
                                                 
4 Freedom House. http://www.freedomhouse.org/template.cfm?page=351&ana_page=333&year=2007; 25.7.08 
5 Wolgang Merkel. Embedded and Defective Democracies, p.34; In: Democratization, Vol.11 
6 Ibid. 
7 W. Merkel and Aurel Croissant. Conclusion: Good and Defective Democracies, p.199; In: Democratization, 
Vol.11 
8 UN Secretary General Kofi Annan, “Closing Remarks to the Ministerial” (Warsaw June 27, 2000) 
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end of the cold war has led to an extraordinary focus on one democratic institution; in 
particular: elections.9 In dozen of countries around the world, elections have been expected to 
initiate or consolidate transitions to democracy or to help resolve long standing conflicts. 
Elections have played a major role in the democratic transitions of the past two decades, and 
fair elections have become an increasingly critical requirement for governments to gain 
international legitimacy. The end of the Cold War facilitated an international consensus about 
the importance of genuine elections and international action to help bring them about. 10 
Furthermore, elections capture international attention. News about elections in far-flung lands 
– especially transitional elections in which struggling democrats challenge entrenched, 
autocratic regimes or elections that mark the end of conflicts – captivate international 
audiences. Hence, the international media routinely reports the conclusions of election 
observers; and foreign policy makers in the United States and Europe react strongly based 
upon their assessments.11  
On another note, as described by Eric Bjornlund in his book “Beyond Free and Fair, 
Monitoring Elections and Building Democracy”, election monitoring is perhaps the most 
visible form of the broader phenomenon of democracy promotion. The OSCE Office for 
Democratic Institutions and Human Rights makes its understanding of election observation 
and democracy promotion available to the public, stating on its website that “election 
observation is one of the most transparent and methodical ways to promote and encourage 
democracy and human rights”.12 
Nevertheless, it is also important to clarify the use of certain notions. Firstly, monitoring 
elections and observing elections do not imply the same thing. Monitoring implies a stronger 
notion and implies a certain capacity to interfere. In the case of the OSCE, “observing” is the 
usual notion for this endeavor. Secondly, election observation is not equal to electoral 
assistance, as this also implies that advice be given during the electoral process. Once an 
organization has been invited to do so by the participating State, this happens usually through 
the secondment of an expert team (prominent election assistance is often given by the Venice 
Commission of the Council of Europe and the OSCE/ODIHR). And thirdly, the Election 
Observation endeavor itself, implies the observation of the election itself and the preliminary 
conclusion afterwards. Interference in the electoral process itself is strictly prohibited when 
observing elections. 
                                                 
9 Eric C. Bjornlund. Beyond Free and Fair, Monitoring Elections and Building Democracy. 2004, p 7. 
10 Ibid. 
11 Ibid. P.8 
12 OSCE. Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights. http://www.osce.org/odihr-elections/17781.html; 
15.04.08 
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But how does the observation of elections by the international community affect the electoral 
process and the political system itself? Why do States invite foreigners to observe their 
elections? First of all, one has to bear in mind that according to the Westphalian principles of 
international relations that States are sovereign, legally equal, and do not interfere in the inner 
affairs of another State, accordingly the observation of elections by foreigners and their 
assertions about the conduct of the election appear contradictory. In fact, international 
election observation (concluding with explicit judgments about the freeness and fairness, and 
hence legitimacy, of a national election) has become one of the most common means by 
which international actors — such as the OSCE, the EU, the Council of Europe or the 
Commonwealth of Independent States, and NGOs—intrude without apology, into the internal 
politics of sovereign countries. These kinds of political intrusions are reshaping the very idea 
of Westphalian sovereignty, negating the longstanding presumption that states are free to do 
what they like within their own borders.13  
In this regard, it might be interesting to query why foreign election observers are invited to 
observe domestic elections. On the one hand, this is closely related to the common 
commitment setting for standards in international relations. In the case of the OSCE, the most 
important document (committing participating States to invite foreign observers monitoring 
domestic elections) is the 1990 Copenhagen document, signed by all participating States of 
the CSCE. In this respect, the invitation of foreign observers is a political commitment of the 
organizations’ participating States. On the other hand, a government may also have practical 
interests in inviting observers. Their presence can enhance the credibility and legitimacy of 
the elections and therefore, the legitimacy of the government in place, or of the following 
government. Especially in post-conflict countries with little economic growth, a positive 
judgment by international observers becomes an asset, and can encourage the international 
community to invest in that country, or at least, provide a solid basis for bargaining an 
accession to the international financial donor community. Furthermore, the observation of 
elections by international observers can help to rebuild confidence between previously 
adversary political parties. The presence of ‘outsiders’ during the elections and their judgment 
concerning the fairness of a vote might create confidence in the opposition that the 
government did not provoke election fraud.  
But besides these factors, the invitation of election observers also reflects the will of a country 
to engage in a dialogue of values with the international community, with regard to one 
particular value of democracy – free and fair elections. The case study examining the 
                                                 
13 Larry Diamond. Can the Whole World Become Democratic? Democracy, Development, and International 
Policies, p.17; In: Center for the Study of Democracy, University of California, Irvine, 2003 
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observation of the extraordinary parliamentary elections in Kazakhstan will re-iterate this 
argument.  
It is important to note that election observation has become an essential constituent of the 
promotion of democracy. As Thomas Carothers points out, “Elections observation is the best-
established, most visible and often best funded type of democracy related assistance.” 14  
Indeed, observing elections became an important tool to observe the implementation of one 
specific regime of democracy. Or in other words, election observation is the observation of 
the implementation of one particular norm and value of a States commitment. Hence, this 
endeavor was ambitiously wide throughout the 1990s, in trying to observe how the 
shortcomings of other aspects of democracy such as human rights, rule of law, media freedom 
etc. can influence the electoral process and the election itself. 
 
 
The norm: Free and Fair Elections 
 
International consensus has more or less emerged on what constitutes free and fair elections. 
This section outlines the relevant aspects of the scope of an election, which should be 
considered when reflecting on what truly encompasses an election conducted according to the 
norm. 
In addition to balloting and to counting, there must be opportunities for political parties to 
compete, reasonable and equal access to the media, impartial election administration, fair 
rules, a political environment free of intimidation and the prompt and just resolution of 
election related disputes and grievances. Elections that meet these standards are often referred 
to as “free and fair”.15  
On another note, international norms set specific objectives with respect to the holding of 
periodic free and fair elections, laying down a variety of related obligations. The best example 
therefore, is the rule with respect to the secret ballot – alternatives are not permitted. Instead, 
the State is bound to take such steps as are necessary to ensure not only that secrecy is 
observed and maintained, but also that the integrity of the decision is protected in the count 
that follows on the implementation of the result.16 But obligations in international law are not 
usually self executing – they require implementation on the domestic level. What is important 
is the final outcome. Hence, a tradition of free and fair elections must be maintained and 
                                                 
14 Thomas Carothers. The Observer observed, p.18; In Journal of Democracy, Volume 8, 1997 
15 Eric C. Bjornlund. Beyond Free and Fair, Monitoring Elections and Building Democracy. 2004, p 94 
16 Guy S. Goodwill-Gill. Free and Fair Elections; Interparliamentary Union 2006. p. 160 
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consolidated over the long term, based in the political culture and tradition of the respective 
State. To this extent, election observation and the goals of representative democracies have a 
programmatic dimension, anticipating progress in building democratic institutions, and 
strengthening the confidence of the people in the democratic process.17 
 
Despite such consensus in theory, the standards by which international observers assess 
elections remain vague. In the case of the OSCE, the main document of commitment is the 
1990 Copenhagen document. Although typically articulated as the minimum standards for 
free and fair elections, such criteria are usually broad aspirations. Assessing whether a given 
election has met such standards has proven to be extremely difficult, and external 
considerations often influence such assessments.18 Hence, the terminology describing a ‘free 
and fair’ election has tended to be rather obscure and difficult to assess.  
 
 
Electoral Law and political system 
Electoral systems have usually proven to be the most stable democratic institutions. In the 
post-war period countries have occasionally switched electoral formulas between d’Hondt and 
LR-Hare, adjusted the effective threshold for election, and expanded their assembly size.  
However, radical reforms – i.e. the way votes are translated into seats – have been relatively 
rare.19 The vacillation between proportional and majoritarian systems in France is the most 
significant exception. It is interesting to note, as pointed out by Lipset and Rokkan (1967) in 
their classic work on electoral cleavages, that electoral systems seem set and concrete. The 
parties in the government generally favored and maintained the status quo from which they 
benefited. The critical voices of those parties or out-groups systematically excluded from 
elected office rarely proved able to amend the rules of the game.20  Hence, this stability 
suggests that electoral systems are inherently conservative.  But elections and electoral 
systems matter. During the 1990s the debate about the electoral system moved from margin to 
mainstream on the political agenda. This shift produced awareness that electoral rules are not 
neutral: the way votes translate into seats means that some groups, parties, and representatives 
are ruled into the policymaking process and some are ruled out. 21  The core debate 
                                                 
17 Ibid. P.161 
18 Eric C. Bjornlund. Beyond Free and Fair, Monitoring Elections and Building Democracy. 2004, p 95 
19 Jean Laponce, Bernard Saint-Jaques. Choosing Electoral Systems: Proportional, Majoritarian and Mixed 
System. In: Political Science Review, 1997 
20 Ibid. 
21 Ibid. 
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encompasses the question as to whether countries should adopt majoritarian systems which 
prioritize government effectiveness and accountability, or proportional systems, which 
promote greater fairness to minority parties and more diversity and social representation.22 
Even though it falls under the classic and exclusive domain of the State in choosing between a 
majoritarian or proportional system of representation, and, that ‘there is not a single political 
system or electoral method that is equally suited to all nations and their people…’23, it has a 
considerable determination on the electoral process, in particular the political campaigning 
and the political culture itself. Additionally, the choice of the electoral system and its 
implementation has an important effect on related political rights. Majoritarian systems tend 
to favor two parties;24 this system tends to arrange the electoral districts according to the 
eligible voter number, in which one person is elected respectively – either with relative or 
with absolute majority of the votes. The absolute majority vote implies a run-off vote in the 
electoral districts when none of the respective candidates receives the absolute majority. For 
the run-off vote, either a relative majority suffices – or only the two candidates who received 
the most votes at the first voting can compete. In this way, the vote’s given for the non elected 
candidates are lost.25  
The proportional system on the other hand assumes the existence of political parties. The 
percentage of the votes received by a party in the whole voting department shall be exactly 
consistent with seats contingent in the Parliament. Thus, smaller parties have better initial 
positions for acquiring seats in the Parliament under this system. The spirit of the proportional 
system deduces also the proportional compensation of votes: Hence, votes that didn’t result in 
seats on the regional/local level are used on the national level for the amelioration of the 
proportionality as whole.26 
In general, it is consistent with the British and Anglo-American tradition to order Parliaments 
according to the majoritarian system. But it is important to note that the choice of electoral 
system has a determinant influence on the inner-state distribution of power. A good example 
therefore is the case of Northern Ireland: In Northern Ireland – with the background of 
conflict between a (narrow) pro-British protestant majority and an Irish-republican, catholic 
minority – the majoritarian electoral system resulted in the fact that the catholic minority had 
been only very weakly represented in the regional Parliament and never been represented in 
the regional government. Under this framework of the conflict, the 1998 agreement for a 
                                                 
22 Ibid. 
23 UNGA res. 46/137, ‚Enhancing the effectiveness of the principle of periodic and genuine elections,’ Dec. 1991 
24 Anton Pelinka. Vergleich Politischer Systeme. In: Böhlau 2005. p.55 
25 Ibid. 
26 Ibid. P. 67 
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proportional electoral system of the regional Parliament was negotiated, in order to assure the 
catholic minority co-determination.27 
Finally, many newer systems, such as those recently adopted in Italy and Russia, use mixed 
systems, although with a variety of alternative designs. The Additional Member System used 
in Germany combines single member and party list constituencies. Electors have two votes. 
Half the Members of the Bundestag (328) are elected in single-member constituencies based 
on a simple plurality of votes. The remaining MPs are elected from closed party lists in each 
region (Land). Parties, which receive less than a specified minimum threshold of list votes (5 
per cent) no longer entitled to any further seats. The total number of seats, which a party 
receives in Germany is based on the Niemeyer method which ensures that seats are 
proportional to second votes cast for party lists. Smaller parties which received, say, 10 per 
cent of the list vote, but which did not win any single member seats outright, are topped up 
until they have 10 per cent of all the seats in Parliament. It is possible for a party to be 
allocated 'surplus' seats when it wins more district seats in the single-member district vote 
than it is entitled to under the result of the list vote.28 
Table 1 
Parliamentary Vote OSCE participating States 
Majority Vote United Kingdom, United States, Uzbekistan 
Turkmenistan, Finland, France, Azerbaijan, 
Canada 
 
Modified Majority Vote*  Italy  
Mixed Voting System** Belarus, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Poland 
Russian Federation, Lithuania, Spain, Tajikistan 
Ukraine, Luxembourg 
 
Proportional Vote Albania, Andorra, Armenia, Austria, Belgium 
Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Croatia, 
Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia 
Georgia, Germany, Iceland, Kazakhstan 
Kyrgyzstan, Latvia, Liechtenstein, Malta 
Moldova, Montenegro, Netherlands, Norway, 
Portugal, Romania, San Marino, Serbia, Slovakia 
Slovenia, Sweden, Switzerland, The Former 
Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Turkey 
 
* Three Fourths of the Deputies (both Chambers) are voted through the relative majority vote, 
                                                 
27 Ibid. 
28 Jean Laponce, Bernard Saint-Jaques. Choosing Electoral Systems: Proportional, Majoritarian and Mixed 
System. In: Political Science Review, 1997 
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   One Fourth through the proportional vote  
** Proportionality is strongly alleviated – in particular through small electoral districts and absent (or not 
complete) proportional adjustment  
 
Both systems, majoritarian or proportional, are legitimate frameworks of the electoral system. 
But their consideration when observing the electoral process and the political campaign is of 
great importance for the evaluation of the conduct of the electoral process. Finally, the general 
and distant objective set by international law – genuine periodic elections guaranteeing the 
free expression of the electors, which shall be the basis of the authority of the government, 
allows considerable room for variation and does not determine or dictate which system a 
country should indeed use.  The same concerns the threshold, an important concept when 
analyzing the electoral system. It is a valuable concept, but also an elusive one. The concept 
derives from the fact that all electoral systems impose some kind of threshold that a party 
must exceed in order to gain representation. Sometimes this is explicit: the 5 per cent 
national-level threshold that a party must reach in Slovakia before it can earn any seats, or the 
3 per cent constituency-level threshold imposed in Spain or the 7 per cent formal vote 
threshold in Poland with small electoral districts. 29  Some countries do not use explicit 
thresholds, but nonetheless their electoral system imposes an implicit threshold, based mainly 
on the district magnitude (number of seats per constituency). While there is no precise 
relationship between the two, the formulation proposed by Arend Lijphart is generally 
accepted as being as near as likely to get:  
 
eff thresh = 75% / (m + 1)  
 
m equals district magnitude. Hence, the rationale, put simply, is that this is approximately 
midway between the threshold of representation and the threshold of exclusion. Thus, in a 4-
seat constituency, the effective threshold is estimated to be 75% / 5, or 15% of the votes. A 
district magnitude of 4 seats is approximately as forbidding to a small party as an explicit 
threshold of 15 per cent of the votes.30 It is obvious upon reflection that if the national-level 
effective threshold shall be estimated, the number of constituencies must be taken into 
account; whatever the effective threshold may be within each constituency, the more such 
constituencies there are, the lower the national-level effective threshold will be. Any formula 
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for the national-level effective threshold needs to take account of the number of seats (or 
constituencies) as well as average district magnitude.31  
Hence, the level and method of threshold has wide implications on the composition of the 
seats in a Parliament. The norm free and fair election does not define the level threshold, also 
because the level must be related to the whole electoral system as such and in particular with 
the political context and ethnical passé of the respective country. Thus, evaluating the free 
and fairness of an election simply using the benchmark of this threshold is rather problematic. 
In any case, the question of threshold and its relation when applied to a proportional, 
majoritarian or mixed system, clearly demonstrates how complex and wide-ranging this issue 
is when deducing it along the norm free and fair election.  
Table 2 
Threshold OSCE participating State with proportional voting system 
0% Finland, Iceland, t.f.Y.R.o.Macedonia, Portugal, Switzerland, Netherlands  
2% Canada, Denmark 
3% Bosnia and Herzegovina, Greece, Montenegro, Spain 
4% Austria, Bulgaria, Italy, Lithuania, Slovenia, Sweden, Norway 
5% Armenia, Belgium, Croatia, Czech Republic, Estonia, Germany, Hungary, Latvia, Monaco, Serbia, Slovakia, Tajikistan, Romania, Poland 
6% Azerbaijan, Moldova, 
7% Georgia, Russia, Kazakhstan 
8% Liechtenstein 
10% Albania, Turkey 
 
 
Election management 
At a practical administrative and oversight level, the institution of an independent Electoral 
Commission is widely adopted as an important step in building traditions of independence and 
impartiality, and the confidence of the electorate and the parties alike.32 Eastern European 
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countries, in particular Hungary, Slovenia, Romania and Poland, all established central 
commissions for the crucial elections of 1989-1990.33 
In practice, the election machinery can either be impartial, or in balance; if impartial members 
who enjoy the confidence of all parties cannot be found then balance must be created by the 
appointment of party representatives. In this respect, the ideal or most effective model will 
depend on the relative maturity of the national system. Where election administration 
previously was in government hands within a one party or authoritarian system with no 
opposition, voter confidence will only likely be inspired if opposition party representatives are 
co-opted into election administration. They may not be ‘independent’, and indeed will usually 
remain partisan, though ideally in balance with competing interests; in such situations the 
issue is not so much independence as transparency and non-governmental involvement at 
national and polling district levels. Later, when other government institutions acquire a 
reputation for impartiality and integrity, for example, when judges are seen to stand for the 
rule of law and not the party line, then independence alone may be a credible criterion for 
electoral commission membership.34 The OSCE 1990 Copenhagen document does not refer to 
the issue of partial or impartial election management. 
 
Voter Registration 
Giving practical effect to the right of those eligible to vote raises more serious problems. 
Formally recognizing the right to vote is only part of the issue, for substantial opportunities 
exist to frustrate the exercise of that right, for example, by obstructing access to the necessary 
documentation, or otherwise interfering with or discouraging registration.35 
The ‘electoral list’ is thus a crucial feature in the organization of free and fair elections. Such 
a system must be designed to enable all qualified citizens to be included, to prevent electoral 
abuse and fraud by individuals, special interest groups, political parties and governments; and 
be ‘widely accepted as an authoritative and legitimate means of cataloguing the electoral 
population and of settling disputes’.36  
Accuracy is important, especially so in proportional representation systems that employ multi-
member constituencies, but how to ensure a credible registration system is no simple matter. 
Few countries will be able, like Denmark, to update their voting registers continuously and 
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automatically, as information is supplied by local authorities. 37  On occasion, ‘self-
registration’ may be enough,38 but positive governmental action will often be essential in 
situations of transition. In the United Kingdom, annual registers are compiled through forms 
sent to every household requiring all those living there and eligible to vote to be listed; house 
visits are also undertaken (and in Canada visits by ‘enumerators’ are the rule). Provisional 
lists are drawn up and published, subject to objections; these are decided by the electoral 
registration officer, from who appeal lies to the county court. The final list is then deposited in 
public libraries and some other public buildings.39 
Voter registration and the publication of verifiable lists of electors have an important part to 
play in building and maintaining the confidence of the electorate, and thereby also 
contributing to ensuring free and fair elections. 40  Given the inherent opportunities for 
disenfranchising substantial portions of the population through manipulation of the 
registration process, transparency of process is called for. Political parties have a fundamental 
role in getting their supporters to register, double-checking provisional lists, and challenging 
errors. Practice varies between the State responsibility model of registration, through 
household surveys and visits, and the self-registration model, where the initiative lies with the 
voter.41 No rule determines the choice, but circumstances may dictate a pro-active role for the 
State, for example, in transition situations where both the idea of voting and the possibility of 
a free choice may be novel experiences. Only if the population at large is aware of the 
procedures and effectively able to access them, will a resulting election likely be fair.42 
 
 
Electoral Campaigns 
A successful election does not depend solely on what happens on ballot day; the totality of the 
process must be examined, including preliminary issues such as the nature of the electoral 
system, voter entitlement, voter registration, party organization and civic education. The 
indices of a free and fair election are especially important with respect to the conduct of the 
election campaign, at which point a number of fundamental human rights come into play, 
together with the responsibility of the State, as described in article 2 of the 1966 Covenant on 
Civil and Political Rights, ‘to respect and to ensure to all individuals within its territory and 
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subject to its jurisdiction the rights recognized in the present Covenant, without distinction of 
any kind, such as race, color, sex, language, religion, political or other opinion, national or 
social origin, property, birth or other status.’43 
Specifically, national and international observers will need to know whether freedom of 
movement, assembly, association and expression have been respected throughout the election 
period; whether all parties have conducted their political activities within the law; whether 
any political party or special interest group has been subjected to arbitrary and unnecessary 
restrictions in regard to access to the media or generally in regard to their freedom to 
communicate their views; whether parties, candidates and supporters have enjoyed equal 
security; whether voters have been able to cast their ballots freely, without fear or intimidation; 
whether the secrecy of the ballot has been maintained; and whether the overall conduct of the 
ballot has been such as to avoid fraud and illegality.44 
The CSCE/OSCE 1990 Copenhagen Document states in this respect that “the participating 
States reaffirm that [1] everyone will have the right to freedom of expression including the 
right to communication. This right will include freedom to hold opinions and to receive and 
impart information and ideas without interference by public authority and regardless of 
frontiers. ...; [2] everyone will have the right of peaceful assembly and demonstration. Any 
restrictions which may be placed on the exercise of these rights will be prescribed by law and 
consistent with international standards; [3] the right of association will be guaranteed. ....”45. 
The Document states further, “to ensure that the will of the people serves as the basis of the 
authority of government, the participating States will ensure that law and public policy work 
to permit political campaigning to be conducted in a fair and free atmosphere in which 
neither administrative action, violence nor intimidation bars the parties and the candidates 
from freely presenting their views and qualifications, or prevents the voters from learning and 
discussing them or from casting their vote free of fear of retribution; [and] provide that no 
legal or administrative obstacle stands in the way of unimpeded access to the media on a non-
discriminatory basis for all political groupings and individuals wishing to participate in the 
electoral process.”46 
An Election Observation Handbook, published by the OSCE Office for Democratic 
Institutions and Human Rights, underlines that it is particularly important that campaigning 
should be free from violence or intimidation. There should be no disruptions of campaign 
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meetings and Citizens should not fear retribution, such as loss of employment, for their 
campaign activities. 47  Additionally, all persons should be free from coercion by the 
authorities; special attention in this regard may be focused on such groups as students, 
soldiers, or local leaders. There should be no harassment of political activists, such as 
administrative detentions or sudden tax audits.”48 In case candidate or party rights are violated 
during a campaign, or in case unreasonable restrictions are imposed on campaigning, the 
Handbook points out that there must be timely and effective judicial remedies available. If 
hate speech or speech that advocates violence is introduced into the campaign, such rhetoric 
should be censured and the perpetrators held accountable.  
                                                
The Handbook outlines a detailed picture of how electoral campaigns should be conducted. 
Unfortunately there are no political commitments of OSCE participating States for the 
Handbook as noted by a Senior OSCE Official. In contrary to the 1990 Copenhagen 
Document, the Handbook had never been approved by participating States.  
On another note, examining the condition of electoral campaigning for free and fair elections 
also implies a consideration of the party system itself and how its attitudes influence the 
electoral campaign as such. Thomas Carothers notes in his book “Confronting the Weakest 
Link – Aiding Political Parties in New Democracies” that a huge debate occurred in recent 
years about a possible “postparty” democracy, hence that a greatly strengthened civil society 
could take over from parties, redefining democratic politics as a complex set of disaggregated 
pluralistic interactions between highly empowered citizens and the state.49 This viewpoint 
became especially clear after studying political party systems in new and struggling 
democracies. It became evident that the most negative consequence of problematic party 
development common to so many new or struggling democracies is the inadequate 
representation of citizens’ interests. Carothers points out that “the standard lament” (among 
others) about parties is that they are corrupt, self-interested organizations dominated by 
power-hungry elites who only pursue their own interests or those of their rich financial 
bankers, not those of ordinary citizens.50 The relationship between the party and its followers 
becomes especially evident when the voter turnout is highlighted after an election. Although 
political parties are hardly the only problematic institution, given the crucial function that 
political parties are expected to play, the consequences of troubled political party 
development are especially important. This becomes evident during the political campaigning 
 
47 OSCE/ODIHR. Election Observation Handbook; Warsaw 2005. P. 46 
48 Ibid. 
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for an election, as the election is the most visible moment where the relationship between the 
party and its adherents is highlighted. In short, as Thomas Carothers points out, although 
democracy is of course an evolving corpus of political ideas and practices that will take on 
new forms over time, it is difficult now to envisage a genuine democracy-with real political 
alternatives open to citizens and broad representation of citizens’ interests-without political 
parties or some organizations very much like them.51  
Hence, considering the interrelation of political parties and citizens and how the relationship 
among parties is conducted, is a particular asset when studying the role of the electoral 
campaign within the norm free and fair elections. Particular attention should also be paid to 
the party history of the country, socioeconomic and cultural factors.  
Finally, the campaign financing should be transparent and there should be clear legislation or 
rules governing campaign financing. These should apply equally to all candidates and parties. 
It is a good practice to require both pre- and post-election disclosure of campaign spending, 
where funds were raised and how they were spent. Where the government may provide funds 
for campaigning, this should be done on a fair and equitable basis.52 
 
 
Candidates and Political Parties 
Another important index of free and fair elections is that of candidates, political parties and 
political organization. It falls more easily within traditional notions of human rights. Article 
25 of the Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, for example, provides that every citizen has 
the right, without discrimination, to take part in the conduct of public affairs, to be elected, 
and to have equal access to public service in his or her country. Those rights are not absolute, 
however, and may be subject to a variety of reasonable limitations.53 As already pointed out 
above, a State’s choice of electoral system, for example, may directly affect the freedom of 
individuals to present themselves as candidates for election. Also in respect to threshold; 
threshold’ requirements can also limit the representation possibilities for parties that fail to 
obtain a certain percentage of the vote and thus fail to have access to the Parliament Chamber. 
Registration criteria may effectively prevent the formation of political parties, while State 
monopolies over certain resources, such as funding, meeting places, transport, printing presses 
and the media may hinder even minimal political organization. Some of the limitations on 
individual candidatures are mentioned above, and other restrictions are dealt with below in the 
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context of electoral campaigns.54 The OSCE standard, for example, emphasizes the necessity 
for choice 55 , by requiring a clear separation between State and political parties, and in 
particular that political parties not be merged with the State.56 However, the OSCE standard 
does note clarify the degree of election threshold in respect to the norm free and fair elections. 
It is hence within the domain of the participating States’ sovereignty for defining their 
threshold. 
Article 25 of the 1966 United Nations Covenant on Civil and Political Rights underlines the 
citizen’s right to take part in the conduct of public affairs, to vote and to be elected: “Every 
citizen shall have the right and the opportunity, without any of the distinctions mentioned in 
article 2 and without unreasonable restrictions:  
1. To take part in the conduct of public affairs, directly or through freely chosen 
representatives;  
2. To vote and to be elected at genuine periodic elections which shall be by universal and 
equal suffrage and shall be held by secret ballot, guaranteeing the free expression of 
the will of the electors;  
3. To have access, on general terms of equality, to public service in his country.” 
In turn, State practice demonstrates that this right is often subject to reasonable limitations, 
and the criteria for individual candidature commonly follow those necessary for voting: 
minimum age, residence and absence of disqualification. 57  The rationale for certain 
conditions such as age or residence is obvious: a sufficient level of maturity and connection to 
the community. Other limitations in turn may seek to protect the integrity of the system, for 
example, by excluding those whose independence may be threatened by legislative 
responsibilities, such as judges and civil servants.58In respect to the issue of candidature, the 
1990 Copenhagen Document states that candidates seeking office must be permitted to run 
either as party candidates or individually.59 In countries using proportionate representation 
based on party list voting, parties must be allowed to include persons who are not party 
members on the party lists. In addition, candidates cannot be discriminated against regardless 
of party affiliation or lack thereof. 60  Guy S. Goodwin-Gill, author of “Free and Fair 
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Elections” published by the Inter-parliamentary Union notes that democracy in practice, 
which requires choice between alternatives, needs at least two competing political parties, 
although competition that is too divisive defeats its purpose. In situations of transition, 
political parties often face difficulties in establishing themselves, or in engaging in 
meaningful campaigns in face of monopolies of power and resources. Neither public nor 
external aid can be ruled out as impermissible, provided that generally they contribute to 
healthy debate within a strengthening democratic process. The author notes further that where 
political parties become substitutes for grass roots support and effective local organization, 
then they may also cease to contribute to channeling the will of the people into genuine 
this may well entail a combination of public funding with election expenditure 
ontrols. 
elections.  
Finally, a free and fair election is less likely if the government denies financial resources to its 
opponents, while using all the resources at its disposal to put the opposition at a disadvantage. 
Equally, in theory at least, unlimited expenditure by any party can result in a distorted 
electoral process. The art is, according to Goodwin-Gill, to find a certain balance which best 
accommodates the objective of allowing each party a reasonable opportunity to put across its 
message; 
c
 
 
The Media 
Free and independent media is an essential element of democracy and is indispensable in a 
genuine and democratic election process. It is interesting to note that on the eve of an election 
campaign, the media is sometimes pressured or restricted by state authorities. This is 
particularly the case in authoritarian countries. Kurshed Atovullo outlined at the Seventh 
Central Asia Media Conference “Pluralism in the Media and the Internet”  in respect to the 
situation of the media ahead of the 2006 Presidential Elections in Tajikistan that the situation 
of the mass media of the Republic of Tajikistan has seriously deteriorated on the eve of the 
presidential elections. Several newspapers have stopped coming out, and two television 
channels have been shut down. For over a year, no licenses have been issued to the electronic 
mass media, and registration of new newspapers has actually been stopped in the past six 
month or so. In turn, the OSCE Election Observation Mission for the 2006 Presidential 
Elections in Tajikistan noted there was a general lack of analytical and critical reports or 
articles, which could indicate self-censorship and pressure on journalists. Furthermore, there 
61
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was little media coverage of the election campaign and a high media profile of the incumbent, 
raising doubts as to whether voters had received sufficient information to make an informed 
choice.  Kimmo Kiljunen, a member of the Finnish Delegation to the OSCE Parliamentary 
Assembly, outlined in his statement delivered as OSCE Special Coordinator, that “the lack of 
any serious campaign and credible alternatives undermined this election to a degree th
62
at it did 
ll political groupings and individuals wishing to 
them an unfair advantage, and campaign 
 size of the party; paid advertisements on radio and television, 
advertising finding different responses, both in established and 
                                                
not provide an adequate test of Tajikistan’s commitments of democratic elections.”63 
The 1990 Copenhagen Declaration states in this regard that the “participating State provide 
that no legal or administrative obstacle stands in the way of unimpeded access to the media 
on a non-discriminatory basis for a
participate in the electoral process;”.  
The media, taken as a whole, have a responsibility to provide sufficient and balanced 
information to enable voters to make a well-informed choice. If paid political advertising is 
permitted in the public or private media, then the costs and conditions should be reasonable 
and should be equally applied to all candidates.64 State-owned media, or public media, have a 
special responsibility to provide balanced and neutral information on the election and the 
contestants. All contesting points of view should be fairly and equitably communicated. It is a 
good practice for the public media, at least, to provide free airtime or print space to the 
candidates or parties. While the incumbents may get media coverage concerning their official 
duties, this should not be misused as a means to give 
events should not be confused with issues of state.65  
In established democracies, the principle of equal access to the media is widely accepted. This 
access may vary, but the underlying premise is the same according to Goodwin-Gill. Danish 
radio and television guidelines, for example, assure equal access to all registered parties, and 
equal time, regardless of the
however, are not allowed.66 
Access and fair and balanced coverage are thus the two main issues, with the 
‘appropriateness’ of paid 
emergent democracies.67  
Generally, there is also a growing acceptance of the proposition that governments have a 
positive obligation to promote a diversity of viewpoints on matters of public interest in the 
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media. This is especially true for issues under political debate. Further, where state-owned or 
state-controlled mass media exist, the government is obliged to ensure that there is no 
discrimination in programming, including on the grounds of political opinion. These 
obligations are applicable during election campaigns and help to ensure the conditions 
necessary for genuine, democratic elections.68 State practice however demonstrates that the 
media's right to function freely during the electoral process is often circumscribed by 
restrictions on their ability to criticize activities or inaction by the government and the 
political parties, to investigate corruption and to operate independently of political pressures. 
In a significant number of transitional or struggling new democracies, broadcast and print 
media face government intervention through direct censorship and threats of censorship. They 
also face government-sponsored or government-tolerated physical threats and attacks. In these 
circumstances, censorship may significantly inhibit free and fair election campaign 
forms of censorship, such as 
etention of journalists, in order to drive home their meaning.71 
broadcasting.69 
Finally, censorship includes a range of government-supported actions, from direct censorship 
to extreme cases such as murder. The term "direct censorship" refers to improper and 
unlawful prior restraints on publication. It also is used to refer to communications from 
government officials that explicitly or implicitly threaten direct censorship or some other 
consequence for publishing items unfavorable to the government.70 Government action or 
inaction that places journalists in fear for their personal safety or the safety of their 
professional equipment constitutes a form of censorship which, though "indirect", is often 
even more powerful than the measures which are more traditionally viewed as censorship. 
Often measures of intimidation are coupled with more direct 
d
 
 
 
Balloting 
Although the fairness of any election is unlikely to be determined solely by reference to what 
happens on Election Day, the actual process of balloting deserves particular attention. Among 
other issues, balloting raises the question of the location of polling stations, and their 
accessibility for the population; the presence of competent officials, versed in the procedure; 
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the presence of party representatives; secrecy of the act of voting and the security of the ballot 
box; the integrity of the counting process and its translation into a genuine political result.   72
The 1990 Copenhagen Document declares that among those elements of justice which are 
essential to the full expression of the inherent dignity and of the equal and inalienable rights 
of all human beings are (among others) free elections that will be held at reasonable intervals 
by secret ballot or by equivalent free voting procedure, under conditions which ensure in 
practice the free expression of the opinion of the electors in the choice of their 
representatives;73 The Document ensures further that votes are cast by secret ballot or by 
equivalent free voting procedure, and that they are counted and reported honestly with the 
official results made public;74 
Balloting also involves the organization and management of voting, including the opening and 
closing of polling stations at stated times; the arrangement of booths and the orderly 
movement of voters; the identification and verification of voters (hence the importance of a 
credible registration system, discussed above); an established procedure for objection and 
challenge; the issue of ballot papers to recognized voters; the marking of ballot papers out of 
sight of officials or other electors; the deposit of marked ballots; and, in the absence of other 
sufficient guarantees, the identification of voters, for example, with indelible ink, in order to 
prevent double voting.75  
The counting process in turn requires measures to ensure that ballot boxes are empty before 
voting begins, that they are secure when polling stations are closed, or during any period of 
transit, and that votes are tallied in a process that inspires confidence in the electorate.  
Further fundamental rules related to the exercise of electoral rights centre on non-
discrimination and access to the poll. Non-discrimination requires that no one shall be denied 
or prejudiced in the exercise of rights for reasons such as race, color, sex, language, religion, 
political or other opinion, national or social origin, birth or other status.76 In turn, access 
means not only physical access, in the sense from freedom from violence or intimidation, or 
from obstruction by policy or other forces; but also access in the sense that polling booth 
should be so sited that voters do not have to travel far.77 
The observation of the balloting by domestic election observers, for example local monitors 
that are either party representatives or recognized impartial officials, contributes directly to 
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the strengthening of confidence among the political parties. Having party representatives in 
place for the observation of the balloting and the conduct of polling station officials with the 
local population may also enhance the confidence of the population in the administration of 
the polling station itself. The Handbook for Domestic Election Observers, published by the 
OSCE Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights in 2003, states that “the 
observation by domestic observer groups can help to deter violations and promote confidence 
in the honesty and integrity of the electoral process. This, in turn, serves to encourage popular 
participation.”78 
 
 
Counting 
Finally, there is the count. Complementary to the principle of secret ballot is the integrity of 
the count, which looks both to ensure that the expressed wish of the elector is taken into 
account, and that the result declared corresponds with the totality of the votes cast. 79  
Sometimes the ballots will be counted on the spot; sometimes the ballot boxes are transported 
to central regional counting stations. In general, there is a detailed standard procedure for 
closing a polling station and counting the ballots. The counting process usually begins with 
the sealing of the ballot-box slot once voting has ended; it should remain sealed while polling 
officials complete forms accounting for all ballot papers and other polling materials and verify 
that the number of ballots distributed to voters matches the number of voters recorded as 
having voted. This material should be sealed separately. Often, unused ballot papers are 
invalidated before the opening of the ballot box. The ballot box is then opened and the ballots 
counted according to the designated procedure. 80  Again, the presence of domestic and 
international observers during the count and transportation can enhance transparency of the 
process and monitor any fraud. 
 
 
Complaints and Dispute Resolution 
Complaints and appeals are important aspects of any election and may arise at any moment of 
the relation process. The way in which authorities deal with complaints of citizens, political 
parties and NGOs during an election constitutes an important part of the free and fairness of 
an election. Hence, a free and fair electoral system does not only depend on voter registration, 
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free campaigning and secret ballot; it must also be capable of dealing promptly and 
effectively with the different types of complaint that will inevitably arise.  
This might include attempts to suppress voter turn-out, alleged misinterpretation of the 
electoral laws or procedures, alleged violations of the criminal law, disputes regarding the 
accuracy of the count, or claims that the cumulative effect of such irregularities is so 
extensive as to invalidate the elections.81 
The integrity of the system requires not only that such issues be dealt with by an independent 
and impartial authority, such as the electoral commission or the courts, but also that decisions 
be reached in a timely manner, in order that the outcome of elections not be delayed. As with 
other aspects of the electoral process, the availability of such procedures must be open and 
known to the electorate and the parties.82 
In practice, dealing with complaints and the appeals process by the respective authorities goes 
far beyond the Election Day. The OSCE/ODIHR Handbook for election observers states that 
the Election Observation Mission endeavors to arrange that observers remain and monitor 
these processes. Unfortunately the 1990 Copenhagen Declaration neither includes the issue of 
election complaints nor defines how this should be handled by respective state authorities. 
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Evaluating elections according to the norm  
 
Although this paper has so far listed the various conditions that characterize a free election, 
(such as secret balloting, non-discrimination etc.) the question remains as to whether 
international observers can actually assess the conduct of an election in accordance with the 
“free and fair” standard. Therefore another analytical approach is required. Evaluating 
elections according to this norm and making the assessment of the observations public implies 
two essential components: firstly, as introduced earlier, elements of development cooperation 
and secondly, aspects of international political cooperation and therefore opportunities for 
exercising political pressure.  
Indeed, measuring elections against a free and fair standard suggests a dichotomy: that 
elections either pass or fail a test of legitimacy.83 The focus on the norm free and fair has 
encouraged international election assessments to make categorical, “bottom line” judgments 
that fail to take other nuances into account. Such assessments are furthermore very hard to 
prove empirically.84 In fact, the wording ‘free and fair’ has become something of a rhetorical 
touchstone and it has not been established how an empirical assessment can be realized in 
observation practice. In addition, despite the notorious usage of the phrase free and fair and 
the great significance which has been attached to it, there has been surprisingly little progress 
in the development of a practical set of criteria by which to judge whether an election has 
indeed been free and fair. Efforts to make the standard more precise have been largely 
unsatisfactory.85 
However, references to the language of free elections are not a recent occurrence. The 1948 
Universal declaration of Human Rights states in its Article 2186 that 
(1) Everyone has the right to take part in the government of his country, directly or through 
freely chosen representatives. 
(2) Everyone has the right of equal access to public service in his country. 
(3) The will of the people shall be the basis of the authority of government; this will shall be 
expressed in periodic and genuine elections which shall be by universal and of equal suffrage 
and shall be held by secret vote or by equivalent free voting procedures. 
 
                                                 
83 Eric C. Bjornlund. Beyond Free and Fair, Monitoring Elections and Building Democracy. 2004, p 97 
84 Wolfgang Merkel. Embedded and Defective Democracies, p.34; In: Democratization, Vol.11 
85 Eric C. Bjornlund. Beyond Free and Fair, Monitoring Elections and Building Democracy. 2004, p 97 
86 Universal Declaration on Human Rights. General Assembly resolution 217 A (III) of 10 December 1948 
 34
Various documents, reports and publications still refer to the term “free and fair”. Indeed, it 
has become something of a legend. The OSCE Parliamentary Assembly also refers to this 
terminology. In its report for the General Committee on Democracy, Human Rights and 
Humanitarian Questions entitled “Transparency in the OSCE” presented at the Assemblies 
Annual Session in June 2008 in Astana, Kazakhstan, it states that „Such transparency will 
contribute to election processes that must become better, more “Free and Fair” as the OSCE 
has stated in its election observation reports. If an election process really is free and fair 
there is no need to hide anything from the public eye. “ 
However, this begs the question - why do institutions involved in election observation still 
evoke this terminology in spite of its hazy definition?  
When election observation took off in the 1990s, international organizations such as the 
CSCE/OSCE attempted to better define the free and fair standard, and to articulate the 
standards various components. The 1990 Copenhagen Document of the CSCE commits 
participating States to hold free elections at reasonable intervals, guarantee universal and 
equal suffrage, and to ensure that votes are casts by secret ballot. Also, to ensure that law and 
public policy permits political campaigning to be conducted in a fair and free atmosphere, in 
which neither administrative action, violence, nor intimidation bars the parties and the 
candidates from freely presenting their views, or prevents the voters casting their vote free of 
fear of retribution;87 Bearing these lines in mind, the 1990 Copenhagen Document deduces a 
definition of the notions of both free election and of fair election.  
But it is interesting to note that contemporary observation practice generally avoids the “free 
and fair” formulation because it is more definitive than assessments typically can or should 
be.88 Observers rather reflect upon whether the number and extent of irregularities exceed an 
acceptable level, thereby significantly affecting the outcome of the election.89 It is important 
to distinguish between the individual verbal responses to journalistic questions by the Heads 
of the Institutions and the official preliminary statements of the Mission as a whole. These 
frequently encompass the findings of more than one institution – for example in the OSCE 
area these are often the European Parliament, the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of 
Europe and the two OSCE institutions; the ODIHR and the OSCE PA.  
A good example is the recent election in Serbia, where the statement of the International 
Election Observation Mission did not mention the notions of ‚free and fair’ in written text, 
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even though the election had been held mostly in line with the countries OSCE commitments. 
The International Election Observation Mission assessment stated that “The 11 May early 
parliamentary elections in Serbia were overall in line with OSCE and Council of Europe 
commitments for democratic elections, although they were overshadowed, in part, by some 
negative aspects of the campaign. The elections were administered professionally and in an 
atmosphere of confidence in the process. They provided a genuine opportunity for the citizens 
of Serbia to choose from a range of political parties and coalitions, which vigorously 
competed in an open and overall calm campaign environment.”90  However, in response to a 
journalists question during the press conference as to whether the elections could be 
considered “free and fair,” the OSCE Short term observer Special Coordinator Mr. Battelli 
responded, “Yes, in my view they were free and fair”.  
It is interesting to note that although observers principally avoid the free and fair assessment, 
analyzing to what extent the outcome of an election is affected by its irregularities, that the 
media and the international community still searches for this free and fair assessment. 
In the case of the extraordinary Parliamentary elections in Kazakhstan, August 2007, an 
election that will be closely analyzed in Chapter Four, the IEOM main statement concluded 
that “while the 2007 parliamentary elections in Kazakhstan reflected welcome progress, a 
number of international standards were not met, in particular with regard to elements of the 
new legal framework and the vote count;”91 In turn, BBC journalist Natalia Antelava reported 
from Astana that Kazakhstan has never held an election deemed free and fair by the 
international community.92 
 
Over time, the notion of free and fair has become a myth and yet still the benchmark for any 
election intending international legitimacy. For struggling democracies with little economic 
growth and other internal problems, a positive election observation assessment and being 
labeled with a wide ranging semantic notion such as ‘free and fair’, could considerably 
influence the fostering of the countries’ inner politics and provoke a more optimistic attitude 
from the international community. 
However, election observers have also adopted other semantic compromises in assessing 
elections. Often they will call a moderately flawed transition election a “step forward” 
towards democracy.93 In the case of the OSCE observation missions, the assessments try to 
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reflect whether an election had been held in line with the participating States commitments. 
Hence, the missions generally try to balance whether the election (including the whole 
electoral process) was more or less in line with the countries 1990 Copenhagen commitments.  
Considering the critical Presidential Elections in Georgia January 2008, the International 
Election Observation Mission (IEOM) stated in its Preliminary Findings and Conclusions 
“while the 5 January 2008 extraordinary presidential election in Georgia was in essence 
consistent with most OSCE and Council of Europe commitments and standards for 
democratic elections, significant challenges were revealed which need to be addressed 
urgently. This election was the first genuinely competitive presidential election, which 
enabled the Georgian people to express their political choice.”94  
The question of how the observation of an election can be assessed also reflects upon the role 
of elections within democracy. Accordingly, the belief that an election is part of the countries’ 
democratization process and not an isolated event implies that election observers must 
consider how the election contributes to that process.95 Thus, considering whether the election 
will stimulate further democratization, encourage political contestation, and involve the 
citizens of that country in the political process, according to the argument of Elklit and 
Svensson election observers, in making their evaluation, should make political judgments 
such as whether the election will further stimulate the democratization process or not. 
Therefore, as formulated earlier, a judgment of how the common values agreed upon have 
been implemented during an election, can also be used as an important tool for exercising 
political pressure within the international community.  
In any case, the various arguments as to whether the assessments of election observers should 
be a political judgment on the countries democratization process, or rather a purely analytical 
and de-politicized assessment of the countries commitments to free and fair elections,  reflects 
that such an undertaking is a sensitive and a unique situation where international institutions 
judge internal political events. Events which by definition will always rank prominently on 
the national political agenda.  
Finally, the semantic implication when assessing an election along the “free and fair” 
dichotomy is also interlinked to the fact that free and fair election have proven to be 
extremely difficult to assess empirically. In particular, it is not possible to base the Statement 
of Preliminary Findings and Conclusions on an empirical fundament when it has been 
delivered the day after the election. This involves the question of timing - when should the 
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assessment actually be reported to the public? Typically, observer groups will make an initial 
public statement soon after the completion of the balloting. 96  The more experienced 
observation institutions call this a “preliminary” or “interim” statement, as they plan to issue a 
final statement or report some time later. It is interesting to note that the question of the 
assessment statement’s timing poses two problems. On the one hand, the delivery of the 
assessment immediately after the election, even before the results are known, will have the 
advantage that the assessment will be in the media spotlight. On the other hand, such early 
assessments may be based on limited and incomplete information and could subsequently be 
proven inaccurate if problems occurred during the counting process.97 In particular, if these 
assessments are only based on telephone discourse, rather than extensive personal debriefings 
with all observers, (observers are usually deployed in different parts of the country and the 
spokespersons or leaders of observer groups are in the capital) then a time frame must be 
considered for all observers to commune for a debriefing that will constitute the basis of a 
more comprehensive assessment. 
However, statements that are based on a thorough debriefing may lose impact through late 
delivery, as news cycles and journalists tend to draw quick conclusions based on early 
impressions.98 The media spotlight always shines the brightest just after Election Day. 
A further problem contributes to the timing the assessment’s statements issue: The correlation 
of the findings from both long-term and short-term observers. As described earlier, the free 
and fairness of an election comprises considerably more then the Election Day and the 
balloting itself. Thus whilst an election may be effectively organized and administered, the 
pre-election campaign may not have been carried out with such legitimacy. Bjornlund argues 
for instance, that problems arise when a separate group of observes - often larger, high profile 
groups – arrive in the country shortly before the Election Day. Because these observers, 
according to Bjornlund, have not been present in the country during the campaign and pre-
election period, have considerably less experience for problems which may have occurred 
during that time. However, these factors will also depend on the country which is being 
observed. Comparing for example elections that were held in Serbia and Turkmenistan; The 
political situation in Serbia and its geographical position meant that the international 
community followed the election more closely than other elections of this scale. Hence, 
diplomatic representations, Parliamentary Assemblies, International NGO’s, the media, etc… 
had already gathered a great deal of information concerning the conduct of the electoral 
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process, including issues such as political campaigning. However, the elections were held in 
Turkmenistan, a country whose political situation had drawn considerably less international 
attention (in particular with respect to issues concerning Kosovo). In this regard, the presence 
of Long-term observers in Turkmenistan contributed significantly to such an in-depth 
assessment by the observation mission.  
Spencer Oliver, Secretary General of the OSCE Parliamentary Assembly, in response to the 
question raised by a BBC journalist (with respect to the non observation of the election by the 
OSCE/ODIHR), as to whether the OSCE Parliamentary Assembly is able to “fill the gap” of 
observing the Russian Duma election in December 2007, said that all Parliamentarians99  
deployed to observe the election were provided with Russian news coverage, briefed by their 
Embassies and of course were able to access information provided by the large media 
contingent observing every aspect of the election.  
It is thus arguable that in practice the deployment of Long term observers depends more on 
the country under observation. In the case of the Russian election, the media coverage of the 
entire pre-election period was extensive. Every single aspect of the political campaign and 
opposition criticism had been reported in detail by the media. Thus, it might be interesting to 
query whether the observation of Long-term observers would have brought new or different 
findings than the findings of journalists. This prompts further questions regarding who Long 
term observers are, the nature of long term observation, and what this entails. 
 
 
The Observers 
 
Before introducing how the norm of free and fair elections had been established through 
participating States’ commitments within the Organization for Security and Cooperation in 
Europe- and how it is deduced in the organizations’ institutional architecture,  I would like to 
briefly outline the notions of short term & long term observation. Furthermore I will examine 
the respective institutions that deploy election observers within the OSCE area. This is of 
particular importance since the OSCE frequently co-operates with these institutions during 
election observation missions.  
The OSCE, in particular the OSCE/ODIHR, has set the standard for comprehensive election 
observation methodology. The methods applied by the ODIHR are accepted as the most 
comprehensive approach to Long term and Short term observation. This OSCE benchmark, 
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coupled with the political role of OSCE Parliamentarians, has been adopted as election 
observation methodology by other international institutions, in particular by the European 
Union and also in part by the United Nations.  
As will be outlined in detail later, the Commonwealth of Independent States has also 
increased its cooperation with the OSCE and is considering the deployment of election 
observation missions along a similar methodology. 
Taking the increasing efforts of other institutions into account, OSCE election observation 
endeavors are often undertaken in cooperation with institutions of the Council of Europe and 
the European Union. The cooperation with these institutions, representing common values 
related to free and fair elections, has therefore lead to a cooperation within a framework 
entitled International Election Observation Mission. Usually encompassing the two OSCE 
institutions, the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe, the European Parliament 
and the NATO Parliamentary Assembly.  
 
 
Long Term Observers (LTO’s)100 
The deployment of Long Term Observers several weeks before the Election Day reflects the 
will to properly observe the pre-electoral process. LTOs presence during the conduction of 
political campaigns and observing media and political group activity, implies that a great deal 
of information can be gathered. Their impressions, coupled with those of Short term observers, 
monitoring the conduct of the Election Day itself (including balloting, vote counting and 
transportation) should facilitate a balanced conclusion as to the free and fairness of the whole 
election.  
Indeed, Long term Observation is deduced from the idea that information about the electoral 
process can only be gathered through a ground-level presence. Indeed, this presumption does 
not consider that information about the pre-electoral process can also be gathered through 
other channels, for example through the media, independent domestic election observer 
groups or domestic NGO’s.  
However, LTO Observation is carried out based on the different aspects of the norm free and 
fair elections outlined earlier in this Chapter. The OSCE/ODIHR Handbook for Long term 
Observers highlights the role of LTOs in observing the Election Administration, Complaints 
and Appeals, Voter Lists, Registration of Candidates, Election Campaign, Media, Gender and 
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National Minorities. It is important to note that during their presence on the ground, they 
establish contact with the local population. Only through such contact can relevant 
information about the electoral process be obtained. Hence, contact with domestic election 
observation groups become important, as these independent domestic observer organizations 
can provide a wealth of information.101  
Finally, the OSCE/ODIHR Handbook for Election Observation states that “the substantive 
role of the LTO is to observe and assess the effectiveness and impartiality of the election 
administration, the implementation of the election law and regulations, the nature of the 
campaign, and the political environment. For this purpose, LTOs establish and maintain 
contacts with regional and local election administrations and government authorities, 
political parties and candidates, leaders of minority groups, and civil society organizations 
relevant to the elections. This includes human-rights groups, domestic election observer 
groups, women’s organizations, other NGOs, and media representatives. In co-ordination 
with the EOM media analyst, LTOs may be asked to follow coverage of an election in the 
regional media.”102 
 
 
Short Term Observers (STOs) 
The voting and the counting are central acts of any electoral process. An election constitutes a 
unique moment of accountability for the government. There are important and often 
challenging administrative tasks and the manipulation of the processes of balloting and 
counting that can destroy the integrity of an election.  
In theory, the number of STOs should depend upon geographic, demographic and political 
factors. Such factors include the size of the country, the degree of confidence the international 
community has in domestic sources of information (nonpartisan national monitors, media and 
parties/candidates), the extent of cooperation between international observers and domestic 
monitors, the extent of coordination among different international observation efforts, and the 
type of election problems feared.103 In reality, the number of international observers is rather 
a reflection of the visibility and extent of overseas interest in a given election, not to mention 
the availability of funding (which is itself a function of visibility and interest).104 
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In the case of the OSCE, on the one hand there are the STOs seconded by participating States 
at the request of the ODIHR. The participating State (Ministry of Foreign Affairs) incurs all 
costs of the STOs. On the other hand there are STOs of the OSCE Parliamentary Assembly, 
hence Parliamentarians deployed as election observers.105 STOs usually stay in-country for 
approximately one week. STOs are deployed in teams of two and observe voting and counting 
on Election Day. They are deployed according to a plan that provides a broad and balanced 
presence throughout the country on Election Day. 106 STOs begin work very early on Election 
Day by observing the opening of polling stations. In the course of the day, STOs usually visit 
some 10 polling stations. They then select one polling station at which to observe closing 
procedures and the vote count. In some cases, STOs may be required to remain at a single 
polling station, or they may be assigned to observe tabulation at a mid-level election 
commission and/or to perform other duties, such as observing special voting procedures 
(military or prison voting or following a mobile ballot box).107 Attendance at the pre-election 
briefing is mandatory for all STOs; individuals who cannot arrive in-country in time for the 
briefing will not be accepted as members of the respective EOM. Even experienced observers 
need to be briefed on issues and procedures specific to a particular election.108 
Finally, it is also the responsibility of Short term observers to be present during the count and 
to observe it carefully. The count is an important stage in the election process, and it should 
be closely followed and thoroughly observed. It normally takes place at the polling-station 
level and STOs should select one of their assigned polling stations at which to observe the 
closing procedures and then remain there for the vote count. In some instances, STOs may be 
asked to attend the count at a particular polling station. STOs are provided with special forms 
to complete that contain a number of specific questions about polling-station closing 
procedures and counting procedures.109 
 
 
 
The Code of Conduct for Election Observers 
One particular aspect in respect to the work of observers is the Code of Conduct. Although 
international election observation are widely accepted around the world, much therefore 
depends on ensuring the integrity of international election observation, and all who are part of 
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international election observation missions. This includes long-term and short-term observers, 
members of assessment delegations, specialized observation teams and leaders of the mission, 
must subscribe to and follow a Code of Conduct commemorated on October 27th 2005 in New 
York at the United Nations. 
First of all, election observers must respect the sovereignty of the host country, as well as the 
human rights and fundamental freedoms of its people.110 Observers must respect the laws of 
the host country and the authority of the bodies charged with administering the electoral 
process. Further, election observers must follow any lawful instruction from the country’s 
governmental, security and electoral authorities and maintain a respectful attitude toward 
electoral officials and other national authorities. Observers must note whether laws, 
regulations or the actions of state and/or electoral officials, unduly burden or obstruct the 
exercise of election related rights guaranteed by law, constitution or applicable international 
instruments. 
But observers must also respect and protect the integrity of the international election 
observation mission. This includes following the Code of Conduct, any written instructions 
(such as a terms of reference, directives and guidelines) and any verbal instructions from the 
observation mission’s leadership. They must; attend all of the observation mission’s required 
briefings, trainings and debriefings; become familiar with the election law, regulations and 
other relevant laws as directed by the observation mission; and carefully adhere to the 
methodologies employed by the observation mission. Observers must also report to the 
leadership of the observation mission any conflicts of interest they may have and any 
improper behavior they see conducted by other observers that are part of the mission.111 
One of the core principles of the code of conduct is the impartiality of observers. They must 
maintain strict political impartiality at all times, including leisure time in the host country. 
They must not express or exhibit any bias or preference in relation to national authorities, 
political parties, candidates, referenda issues or in relation to any contentious issues in the 
election process. Observers also must not conduct any activity that could be reasonably 
perceived as favoring or providing partisan gain for any political competitor in the host 
country, such as wearing or displaying any partisan symbols, colors, banners or accepting 
anything of value from political competitors.112 
Furthermore, election observers must not obstruct any element of the election process, 
including pre-election processes, voting, counting and tabulation of results and processes 
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transpiring after Election Day. Observers may bring irregularities, fraud or significant 
problems to the attention of election officials on the spot, unless this is prohibited by law, and 
must do so in a non-obstructive manner. Additionally, observers may ask questions of election 
officials, political party representatives and other observers inside polling stations and may 
answer questions about their own activities, as long as observers do not obstruct the election 
process. However, in answering questions observers should not seek to direct the election 
process. Observers may ask and answer questions of voters but may not ask them to tell for 
whom or what party or referendum position they voted.113 
Of particular importance, especially for the evaluation of the whole election, is that election 
observers must ensure that all of their observations are accurate. Observations must be 
comprehensive, noting positive as well as negative factors, distinguishing between significant 
and insignificant factors and identifying patterns that could have an important impact on the 
integrity of the election process. Observers’ judgments must be based on the highest standards 
for accuracy of information and impartiality of analysis, distinguishing subjective factors 
from objective evidence. Indeed, observers must base all conclusions on factual and verifiable 
evidence and not draw conclusions prematurely. Therefore election observers also must keep 
a well documented record of where they observed the observations made and other relevant 
information as required by the election observation mission and must turn in such 
documentation to the mission.114 
Another important aspect of the Code of Conduct for Election Observers is that observers 
must refrain from making any personal comments about their observations or conclusions to 
the news media or members of the public before the election observation mission makes a 
statement, unless specifically instructed otherwise by the observation mission’s leadership. 
Observers may explain the nature of the observation mission, its activities and other matters 
deemed appropriate by the observation mission and should refer the media or other interested 
persons to the those individuals designated by the observation mission.  
Finally, election observers must maintain proper personal behavior and respect others, 
including exhibiting sensitivity for host-country cultures and customs, exercise sound 
judgment in personal interactions and observe the highest level of professional conduct at all 
times, including leisure time.115 
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Relevant international institutions deploying election observer within the OSCE area 
 
Before introducing how the norm free and fair election had been established within the OSCE 
and how the observation of this norm is deduced in the organization’s institutional 
architecture, I would like to outline the relevant international institutions deploying election 
observers within the OSCE area. This is of particular importance, as the OSCE in most 
frequent cases cooperates with other institutions, in particular the Parliamentary Assembly of 
the Council of Europe and the European Parliament. Finally, this section outlines the work of 
the Inter-parliamentary Assembly of the Commonwealth of Independent States (IPA CIS), 
which has increased its activities in this field over the years. Usually, the Parliamentary 
Assembly of the Council of Europe, the European Parliament and the two OSCE institutions, 
the Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights and the Parliamentary Assembly, 
deliver a joint preliminary assessment in the framework of the International Election 
Observation Mission (IEOM). Although the IPA CIS has not until now integrated the IEOM 
framework, cooperation between these institutions is currently increasing.  
 
 
The Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe (PACE) 
 
Being the oldest Parliamentary Assembly in Europe, the PACE has a long history of election 
observation and has been on the forefront of many developments in this field. The defining 
moment which laid down the basis for the structural observation of elections by PACE was 
the decision of the Parliamentary Assembly in June 1989 to introduce Special Guest Status for 
national legislative Assemblies in European non-member States in order to forge closer co-
operation with those countries on their path to democracy. 116 Special Guest Status could be 
granted to “…national legislative assemblies of European non-members states which apply 
and implement the Helsinki Final Act of 1 August 1975 and the instruments adopted at the 
CSCE (later OSCE) conferences, together with the two United Nations International 
Covenants of 16 December 1966 on Civil and Political Rights and on Economic, Social and 
Cultural rights…” These criteria established the principle that national legislative Assemblies 
are chosen by regular, free and fair elections, a central precondition for any parliament 
seeking Special Guest Status in the Parliamentary Assembly.117 
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The first PACE election observation mission was in Latin America, Chile, in 1989. The 
experience gained from this observation, as well as the positive reception given to it, not only 
by the Chilean political leadership and population, but also by the media, contributed to the 
agreement by the Assembly to introduce election monitoring as a mechanism for co-operation 
and assessment of compliance with the criteria for democratic elections in states seeking 
Special Guest Status in the Parliamentary Assembly or membership of the Council of 
Europe.118  
Subsequently, the PACE observed Parliamentary elections in Hungary (25 March and 8 April 
1990), the Parliamentary Elections of the German Democratic Republic of 18 March 1990 
and elections in Romania, Bulgaria, and the Czech and Slovak Federal Republic in the course 
of the 1990s. From that moment on, legislative elections in states seeking or enjoying Special 
Guest Status in the Assembly and States applying for Council of Europe membership were 
systematically observed by the Assembly. In the first few years the decision to observe was 
formally taken on an ad hoc basis by the Bureau of the Assembly. The principle of systematic 
observation was formalised in June 1996 when the Bureau of the Assembly adopted a formal 
set of principles and criteria for the observation of elections by the PACE. Moreover, in this 
decision the Bureau of the Assembly also agreed to consider, on a case by case basis, the 
possibility of observing presidential elections in the states mentioned above, as well as 
parliamentary elections in existing member states.119 
It is important to note that a unique feature of the commitments and standards against which 
PACE assesses elections is that these are not only political, but legally binding for both 
applicant and member states of the Council of Europe. For member States this principle is 
enshrined in Article 3 of Protocol 1 of the European Convention on Human Rights, which 
explicitly provides for the right to periodical elections by free and secret suffrage120. 
The PACE Election Observation Missions are foremost political in nature. Firstly, this is the 
result of the specific objective of the election observation missions, namely to ascertain 
whether a country is making progress towards accession or honoring its commitments and 
obligations as a member state of the Council of Europe. Secondly, this is the result of the 
specific composition of the election observation missions deployed by the Assembly: 
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Parliamentary observers who have a first hand experience of democratic systems and who are 
therefore well placed to give a knowledgeable political assessment of the elections.121 
A second aspect of the nature of PACE Election Observation Missions is that in general they 
are part of an ongoing long-term process carried out in the framework of the accession and 
monitoring procedures of the Assembly. A four-phased approach is used: a preparatory phase, 
normally carried out by the Monitoring Committee, which focuses on the legal and contextual 
aspects of the elections; a pre-electoral phase, often carried out by a specific pre-electoral 
mission, which assesses the political climate and preparations in the run-up to the elections; 
the observation of the elections themselves; and lastly a post-electoral phase which monitors 
the response to recommendations made by the Assembly on the basis of the observation of the 
elections.122 
Finally, the PACE officially endorsed on 27 October 2005 the “Declaration of Principles for 
International Election Observation” and the “Code of good Conduct for International Election 
Observers” which were initiated by the United Nations Electoral Assistance Division 
(UNEAD), the National Democratic Institute (NDI) and The Carter Center (TCC). This 
endorsement has led to an intensification of contacts between the PACE and these 
organizations, as well as other members of the United Nations family and the Organization of 
American States (OAS). In recent years the Assembly has widened and deepened its co-
operation with parliamentary bodies in the African and Asian regions, which have expressed 
their strong interest in the experience of PACE in the field of parliamentary democracy and 
co-operation.123 
 
 
The European Union (EU) 
 
The promotion of democracy is at the centre of the EU’s Common Foreign and Security 
Policy (CFSP), and relations between the EU and its partners are established in recognition 
that the consolidation of democratic institutions and human rights is of joint value and 
common interest. In line with this policy, the EU provides extensive support to initiatives and 
programs that seek to promote, develop and consolidate human rights, democratic institutions 
and the rule of law in partner countries. Since the early 1990s, a human rights clause has been 
included in all EU agreements with partner countries. The Cotonou Agreement (2000) signed 
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by the EU and partner countries in Africa, the Caribbean and Pacific (ACP) regions places 
strong emphasis on democracy, good governance and respect for human rights.124 However, it 
is important to note that the EU subscribes to the viewpoint that a genuine and democratic 
election process - hence free and fair elections - can contribute to ensuring sustainable peace 
and stability. Elections provide groups with an opportunity to express their political voice in 
competition with their opponents without resorting to violence, and enable the peaceful 
transfer of political power. In this regard, election observation by the EU is understood as EU 
crisis management and peace-building initiatives in partner countries.125 
Since the 1990s, the EU has increased its activities in election observation endeavors. Over 
the course of the years the EU has developed a similar methodology to the OSCE’s. On 
another note, each EU Member State is also a participating State of the Organization for 
Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE). Election observation within OSCE participating 
States is undertaken by the ODIHR and by the OSCE Parliamentary Assembly, as will be 
described in more detail later. As the EU and the OSCE/ODIHR use a comparable 
methodology and as the OSCE/ODIHR has developed into the most active election 
observation institution engaged in this area, the EU does not deploy missions to observe 
elections in the OSCE region, as stated in the Handbook for European Union Election 
Observation. 126  Nevertheless, the European Parliament, whose members act as chief 
observers while Member States provide the long-term and short-term observers for an EU 
election observation mission, also sometimes decide to deploy an independent observation 
mission when there is no EU mission. This happens in most cases in the OSCE area and in 
cooperation with other international organizations.127 The European Parliament, as the elected 
representative body of EU citizens, plays a prominent role in election observation, and 
deploys its own delegations to observe elections. It is of relevance that the European 
Parliament is the only EU institution deploying election observers in the OSCE area. 
The European Parliament’s focal point for elections is the Election Coordination Group 
(ECG), which is co-chaired by the Chairpersons of the Parliament’s Foreign Affairs 
Committee and Development Committee and which was established by decision of the 
Conference of Presidents. The Election Coordination Group examines all general questions 
related to planning, organisation, evaluation and follow-up of Parliament's election 
observation missions. Furthermore, the Group is charged with establishing priorities for 
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election observation delegations of the European Parliament and presenting six month 
calendars to the Conference of Presidents, as well as specific requests for authorization to 
send delegations;128 The Election Coordination Group has a six month program of election 
observation missions that consider the indicative number of five countries for every six month 
calendar and therefore ten countries every year, with the possibility of an additional two 
countries per year in exceptional cases.129 
In order to avoid sending small delegations that might not be representative of the European 
Parliament's composition, a number of three Members per delegation is considered the 
minimum required for an election observation mission. Based upon a screening done by the 
responsible services fifteen days before the Election Day, the chairpersons of the Election 
Coordination Group will inform the Conference of Presidents if the participation threshold is 
not met and therefore the delegation could be cancelled.130 
Table 3 summarizes EP election observation mission within the OSCE between 2004 and 
today. 
Table 3 
Country Nature of Election Date 
Armenia Presidential 19.02.2008 
Georgia Presidential 05.01.2008 
Kosovo Legislative 17.11.2007 
Ukraine Parliamentary 30.09.2007 
Armenia Parliamentary 12.05.2007 
Montenegro Referendum 21.05.2006 
Ukraine Parliamentary 26.03.2006 
Kazakhstan Presidential 04.12.2005 
Azerbaijan Parliamentary 06.11.2005 
Kyrgyzstan Presidential 10.07.2005 
Albania Parliamentary 03.07.2005 
Moldova Parliamentary 06.03.2005 
Kyrgyzstan Parliamentary 27.02.2005 
Ukraine Presidential, rerun 2nd round 26.12.2004 
Ukraine Presidential, 2nd round 21.11.2004 
Ukraine Presidential, 1st round 31.10.2004 
Kosovo Parliamentary 23.10.2004 
 
 
In general, EP EOM delegations arrive in the country where elections are taking place two to 
three days before Election Day. They should arrive sufficiently in advance and not to leave 
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during the Election Day. In accordance to the principles of the Code of Conduct for Election 
Observers, they follow the agreed program, including briefings and organized meetings with 
election officials, political parties, NGOs, etc and refrain from publicity commenting on the 
organization of the elections, the candidates or political issues before the press conference at 
which the preliminary statement is issued.131 
It is interesting to note that although the EP delegation represents an independent institution, 
the EP delegation should always work in the framework of Long-term Missions (EU-EOMs 
or OSCE/ODIHR). The guidelines state clearly that no official EP Election Observation 
Mission should be organized in countries where no long term observation is present. For a 
mission in an OSCE member country, EP delegations should integrate as fully as possible into 
the framework of an IEOM and should proceed to a joint statement at the end of the process. 
Finally, the guidelines also stress that in the exceptional case of an EP delegation being sent to 
observe an election where there is no organization running Long Term Observation (i.e. an 
EU-EOM or OSCE/ODHIR mission), the delegation should avoid delivering a comprehensive 
assessment of the election. The credibility of such assessments requires a more 
comprehensive and long-term observation effort than the resources of an EP delegation, 
present for only two or three days in the country, permit.132 
 
 
The Inter-parliamentary Assembly of the Commonwealth of Independent States (IPA CIS) 
 
The Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) was founded in 1991 after the dissolution of 
the Soviet Union. The CIS performs its activities on the basis of the Charter, adopted by the 
Council of Heads of States on 22 January 1993, which stipulates the goals and principles of 
the Commonwealth, and rights and obligations of the countries. 133 The Charter states that the 
Commonwealth was formed on the basis of sovereign equality of all its members and that the 
Member States were independent and equal subjects under international law. The Charter also 
states that the CIS serves the development and strengthening of friend-ship, inter-ethnic 
accord, trust, mutual understanding, and cooperation between States. Armenia, Azerbaijan, 
Belarus, Georgia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Moldova, Russia, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, 
Ukraine, and Uzbekistan are member States.134  
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In turn, the Inter-parliamentary Assembly of Member Nations of the Commonwealth of 
Independent States was founded on 27 March 1992 in the city of Alma-Ata/Almaty, 
Kazakhstan. The Agreement of the Inter-parliamentary Assembly, signed by the heads of 
parliaments of the Republic of Armenia, Republic of Belarus, Republic of Kazakhstan, 
Republic of Tajikistan, Republic of Uzbekistan, Kyrgyz Republic and Russian Federation, 
was established as an advisory body for preparation of draft legislative documents of mutual 
interest.135 
In 1993-1995 the Inter-parliamentary Assembly also included the parliaments of the 
Azerbaijan Republic, Georgia, and the Republic of Moldova. In 1999 Ukraine joined the 
Alma-Ata Agreement. In May 1995 heads of the CIS states signed the ‘Convention on the 
Inter-parliamentary Assembly of Member Nations of the Commonwealth of Independent 
States’ that came into force on 16 January 1996. According to this Convention the Inter-
parliamentary Assembly gained the official status as an inter-state body and occupied the 
leading role in the system of agencies of the Commonwealth of Independent States.136 
For the purpose of democratization of social life in the CIS States, the Inter-parliamentary 
Assembly sends election observers to the parliamentary elections and the elections of heads of 
states. The IPA CIS had its first election observation on 6 March 1994, when the group of 
observers from the IPA CIS followed the election process to the Parliament of Kazakhstan. 
Since then, the CIS Inter-parliamentary Assembly members under the invitation of entitled 
power bodies, participate regularly in monitoring the electoral processes in member nations of 
the Commonwealth of Independent States. However, the CIS Inter-parliamentary Assembly 
also deploys election observation outside of the Commonwealth countries. Thus on 24 
September 2000 the CIS Inter-parliamentary Assembly conducted the monitoring of elections 
of the President and the Parliament of Yugoslavia, and on 21 January 2007 — of 
parliamentary elections in the Republic of Serbia. The Commonwealth observers also 
followed the process of local elections in Great Britain. 
It is interesting to note that the experience of election observation in Commonwealth countries 
and beyond their borders resulted in the adoption of the Convention on Standards of 
Democratic Elections, Electoral Rights and Freedoms in Member Nations of the 
Commonwealth of Independent States. This Convention, submitted to the Council of Heads of 
States by the CIS Inter-parliamentary Assembly on 7 October 2002 in Chisinau, was signed 
by the presidents of seven countries of the Commonwealth.  
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Interestingly, this convention is unique globally. It clearly constitutes a framework for free 
and fair elections and is not only politically, but also legally binding. The Convention defines 
standards for democratic elections (also in reference to relevant OSCE documents), outlines 
the means of equal suffrage, direct suffrage, secret balloting and periodically and compulsory 
elections. Furthermore, the convention defines free, fair and authentic elections, the 
conducting of the election by electoral bodies (election commissions) and the financing of 
elections and of election campaign of candidates and political parties. Finally, the convention 
also clearly refers to the role of domestic election observation. In respect to the issue of 
international election observation, the convention states that “International observers shall 
receive the permission to enter the territory of the state in accordance with the procedure 
stipulated by the law, and they are accredited by a relevant electoral body upon presentation 
of a relevant invitation. Invitations may be sent by the bodies authorized by the law upon an 
official publication of the decision on setting of election. Proposals to send invitations may be 
submitted by charter bodies of the Member States of the Commonwealth of Independent 
States.”137 Hence, the convention constitutes a solid reference for election in CIS participating 
States and demonstrates clear standards for the holding of elections within the CIS area. 
The efforts of the IPA CIS within elections and parliamentarianism also resulted in the 
creation of the International Institute on Monitoring Democracy Development, 
Parliamentarianism and Suffrage Protection for the Citizens. It constitutes a supplementary 
consultative body of the IPA CIS created in accordance with the Convention on the Inter-
parliamentary Assembly of Member Nations of the Commonwealth of Independent States and 
with the objective to assist the exchange of information, generalization of the advanced 
experience in democracy development, parliamentarianism and suffrage protection for 
citizens. This Institute’s Aspects of activities include: monitoring of research and elaborations 
in issues of democracy development, parliamentarianism and suffrage protection for citizens; 
coordination of researches on problems of development of the CIS election legislation; 
monitoring of legislation of the CIS member states in the sphere of democracy development, 
parliamentarianism and suffrage protection for citizens; analysis of international experience of 
parliamentarianism development, work of international parliamentary and non-governmental 
organizations in the sphere of democracy development; preparation of recommendations on 
implementation of settled norms of international law in model and national legislation of the 
CIS member states; monitoring of mass media information on election processes in the CIS 
member states; collection, maintenance and generalization of information related to the 
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objectives and aspects of activity of the Institute.138 
In respect to the issue of election observation, the institute shall provide methodical support 
for the work of the IPA CIS international observers and the CIS observer’s missions in 
monitoring preparation and organization of elections.139 
Finally, although the IPA CIS election observation delegations do not participate in the 
framework of the IEOM, between PACE, EP, and the OSCE PA/ODIHR and sometimes the 
Parliamentary Assembly of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, contact between the 
OSCE and the IPA CIS is steadily growing. For example, the first meeting of the OSCE and 
IPA CIS delegations took place on April 2006 in Kiev. Previously, in February 2006 at the 
Winter session of the OSCE Parliamentary Assembly the acting OSCE Chairman, Minister of 
Foreign Affairs of the Kingdom of Belgium, Karel de Gucht, announced the intent of the 
OSCE to create a team of several competent parliamentarians to monitor the election 
processes in different countries, to analyze methods of work of the ODIHR and other 
organizations involved in monitoring as well as to prepare their own evaluation reports on 
activity of these organizations and proposals for their efficiency enhancement.140  
At the beginning of the meeting the Head of the IPA CIS delegation, Svetlana Orlova, said 
that her colleagues were open to dialogue and stressed that the CIS Inter-parliamentary 
Assembly had long and fruitful cooperation with the OSCE. According to her these two 
organizations “always attached special importance to the protection of human rights and 
particularly of suffrage”. This commonness of interests was fixed in the Joint Statement of the 
IPA CIS Council and the OSCE Parliamentary Assembly Bureau signed in 1998.141  
 
* 
Finally, there are a wide range of aspects to consider when examining the role of observers 
and the sponsoring institutions. Evidently, election observation became a prominent means for 
promoting a particular value of democracy – free and fair elections. As the same value is 
composed of a wide range of other democratic regimes, election observation became the most 
effective way to promote democratic values and the exercise of political cooperation. 
Thus, particular standards were set by the OSCE when deploying Long term and short term 
election observation. These standards, established throughout the 1990s, encompass a 
comprehensive election observation methodology, carried out by a high number of Short and 
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long term observers and parliamentary observers. It is important to note that there are 
parliamentarians present as Short term observers, and one parliamentarian is appointed as 
OSCE Special Coordinator- as will be described later in more detail. The OSCE/ODIHR is 
the forerunner in the elaboration of comprehensive Long term and Short term election 
observation missions. This particular OSCE endeavor during the course of the years has 
become a model for other international institutions.   
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Conclusion 
 
 
This chapter has considered a wide range of aspects related to election observation, outlining 
the conclusive link between election observation and the promotion of democratic values. 
Particular importance was attached to the introduction of the idea of elections as an essential 
component of democracy. Interestingly, this reflection revealed an exciting relationship 
between elections and other democratic values such as the rule of law, media freedom and a 
broader sense of political governance. Bearing this in mind and perceiving election 
observation as the promotion of these values, this endeavor becomes an important feature of a 
pragmatic and interactive approach to the field of democracy promotion. 
Assuming that an election is not simply an isolated event, but also an integral part of a 
countries democratization process, this Chapter further stressed that election observers should 
perceive the determinative influence of elections. Hence, election observation, and in 
particular the issue of assessing election observation, implies a subsequent component for the 
exercise of international political cooperation and pressure. International pressure which in 
turn, can encourage the motivation of a particular country to continue democratizing the 
political system - which is a key reason as to why election observation has become such an 
important instrument for exercising the promotion of democracy. However, election 
observation requires that standards be set for both, a free and fair election and its observation. 
The OSCE finally set the standards for election observation during the course of the 1990s, 
such as Long term, Short term and parliamentarian election observation. Over the course of 
several years the elaboration of a comprehensive election observation methodology was 
developed by the ODIHR. Together with the political role of OSCE Parliamentarians, this 
methodology became the benchmark for election observation and served as a model for other 
international institutions. The European Union for example, has adopted a similar 
methodology. Hence, EU election observation missions are led by Members of the European 
Parliament, who act as chief observers, while Member States provide the long-term and short-
term observers who take part in an EU Election Observation Missions.142  
Therefore, the following Chapter will closely examine how norm free and fair elections had 
been established among the OSCE participating States, in conjunction with OSCE standards 
for election observation and their implications. 
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Chapter Three: 
The Norm and Standards in the OSCE 
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Introduction 
 
Chapter two examined in more general terms the role behind OSCE election observation, its 
relationship with the promotion of democratic values, important aspects of the norm free and 
fair elections and what is implied when election observers assess their observations. 
Additionally, it studied institutions deploying election observers in the OSCE area and the 
standards set by the OSCE. Chapter two concluded that the OSCE was the forerunner in 
establishing standards for election observation and that this process consists of two key 
components: Firstly, development cooperation and secondly, international political 
cooperation and pressure. 
This section will focus on the inner-organization of election observation missions, considering 
in detail exactly how these standards have been established within the organization. This begs 
the question - are OSCE standards for election observation part of the organizations’ aquis? In 
this respect, I will investigate how the norm of free and fair elections had been established 
during the course of the years and also how the organization has shifted its institutional focus 
to the third dimension of security since the collapse of the Soviet Union. Therefore I will 
outline a chronology of OSCEs relevant commitments and budget decisions and also examine 
the standards of OSCE election observation.  
Assuming that OSCE standards encompass the scope of comprehensive Long term, Short 
term and parliamentary involvement in election observation, including the political leadership 
of the mission, this chapter will analyze the respective methodologies of the OSCE 
Parliamentary Assembly and the OSCE Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights- 
exploring their respective institutional differences and why their roles are complementary 
within OSCE election observation endeavors. 
Finally, this chapter will examine OSCE standards for election observation and the critical 
argument that OSCE election observation are inherently biased and only deployed fully in 
eastern countries, as has been suggested by some CIS States, who introduced their desire for 
OSCE reforms, in particular regarding the organizations’ endeavors in election observation, 
including a reduction of both - the autonomy of the OSCE/ODIHR and the number of election 
observers deployed for each mission.  
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Origins and Relevant Commitments 
 
How did the norm free and fair election emerge within the CSCE/OSCE? What are the 
relevant decisions that created election observation endeavors and OSCE institutions, where 
does the responsibility lie for the deployment of election observation missions? To answer 
these questions, this section will consider relevant CSCE/OSCE documents that were integral 
in the development of what is generally known as election observation. Therefore, this section 
will briefly introduce how the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe came about, 
its implications to the geopolitical system of the two Cold War blocks and the desire to 
promote democracy in the CSCE area after the collapse of the Soviet Union. 
 
The Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe has its origins in the oft-repeated 
Soviet call for a pan-European security conference in the 1950s and 1960s. A collective 
security forum that excluded Canada and the United States would of course have decoupled 
Europe from the United States and would have undermined the North Atlantic Treaty 
Organization (NATO). Therefore, the West Europeans initially resisted the formation of such 
a conference. However, as the Warsaw Pact gathered steam in the second half of the 1960s 
and German “Ostpolitik” pressed ahead, NATO began to express more interest in creating a 
stable security environment. U.S. and Western European interests centered on the reduction of 
conventional military forces in Europe, also known as Mutual and Balanced Force Reductions 
in Europe, or MBFR.143 Hence, the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) 
was conceived, born, and, as it were, raised in an environment of conflicting short-term and 
long-term views and interests. The CSCE's development and the role which it came to play in 
European security can be understood only in the greater context of this European security 
environment. If it was the East that conceived the idea of the Conference, then the West was 
initially the reluctant parent. The West agreed to the idea only because of linkage politics, and 
even then, was less than enthused.144  
It is important to note, that there had been three main motivating considerations often 
attributed to the Soviet Union to understand its push for the conference. Firstly, the Soviet 
Union hoped that such a conference, along with the post-war division of Europe, would 
legitimize their global standing. Secondly, if the United States could be excluded, the 
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Conference could be used to weaken the trans-Atlantic link and the American role in Europe. 
Finally, the Soviet Union thought the Conference might give fresh stimulus to East-West 
economic cooperation and thus spur the economic development of the Soviet Union and its 
Allies.145 The second point is of particular interest, as it reflects an important doctrine in 
Soviet Union foreign policy, namely isolating the United States’ influence in Europe. 
Initially, the West had little interest in working to develop the Conference. In the 1950s and 
early 1960s, the political climate between East and West was tense, and there appeared to be 
little to be gained from such a conference. The warming of relations between the East and the 
West which accompanied the period of détente changed the western attitude somewhat 
however, and it appeared tempting to exploit the strong Soviet desire for the Conference.146 
The West wanted to give the Conference what is now labeled a "human dimension" to be a 
forum in which to deal with normative issues such as the free movement and exchange of 
people, free elections, and free information. These normative elements were codified in 
"Basket III" of the Helsinki Accords, and throughout the twenty years following their signing, 
the West rarely missed an opportunity to demonstrate that the Soviet Union was failing to live 
up to its commitments on human right matters.147 
Finally, the group of neutral and non-aligned States (Austria, Cyprus, Finland, Liechtenstein, 
Malta, San Marino, Sweden, Switzerland and Yugoslavia) perceived the Conference as an 
opportunity to gain influence and to play a role in matters which were typically played out 
between the East and the West. However, the nine neutral and non-aligned States had 
different security concerns and reasons according to their respective geo-political situations 
that pushed them to lobby for the Conference.148   
Furthermore, throughout the 1950s and l960, talks of a European conference to discuss 
security issues became a recurring theme in Soviet and eastern European pronouncements.149 
In 1964, a proposal by Poland that a conference be held, and that it include the United States, 
was endorsed by the Warsaw Pact. Later, in July of 1966, the Warsaw Pact issued the 
Budapest Declaration expanding on the idea of a conference and of collective security. In 
1969, the same group of states issued the Budapest Appeal, an Appeal to all European 
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Countries, renewing their efforts to assemble a “general European conference to consider 
questions of European security and peaceful cooperation”.150 
Finally, the government of Finland invited all European States, and the United States and 
Canada in 1969, to preparatory talks in Dipoli, Helsinki. This was the beginning of the so 
called “Helsinki process” - preparatory talks from November 22, 1972 to June 8, 1973. These 
negotiations prepared the agenda and the Rules of Procedure for the Conference on Security 
and Co-operation in Europe, which opened at Helsinki on 3 July 1973 and continued at 
Geneva from 18 September 1973 to 21 July 1975. The Conference was concluded at Helsinki 
on 1 August 1975 by the High Representatives of 37 States.151  
The Helsinki Final Act addresses military, economic and humanitarian concerns within the 
four "baskets". Although it is Baskets I, II and III which deal with the substantive issues of 
security, economic and environmental cooperation, and humanitarian cooperation respectively, 
it is Basket IV, the Follow-up to the Conference, which prevented the CSCE from becoming 
nothing more than "a historical footnote”.152 This basket considered that in order to achieve 
the aims sought by the Conference, participating States make “further unilateral, bilateral and 
multilateral efforts and continue, in the appropriate forms set forth below, the multilateral 
process initiated by the Conference.”153  
Although the third basket of the Helsinki Final Act addresses humanitarian questions, the 
norm free and fair elections and respectively the invitation of election observers, had not yet 
been addressed. Nevertheless the invitation of foreigners as observers, “voluntarily and on a 
bilateral basis, in a spirit of reciprocity and goodwill” was a confidence building measure, 
which started with the Helsinki final act. Although these observers did not actually observe 
elections, their presence to attend military maneuvers154 can be considered as a starting point 
for the idea that the invitation of foreign observers could create confidence among 
participating States. Election observation, which followed much later in the CSCE process, 
was also perceived in the beginning as a confidence building measure between CSCE 
participating States. 
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Table 3155 
Date Meeting Location Document 
4.10.1977 – 9.3.1978 First Follow up 
meeting on the CSCE 
Belgrade Concluding Document 
of the Belgrade 
Meeting 
4.11.1986 – 9.1.1989 Third Follow-up 
Meeting on the CSCE 
Vienna Treaty on 
Conventional 
Weapons, signed in 
Paris 
05-29.06.1990 Conference on the 
Human Dimension of 
the CSCE - 2nd 
meeting 
Copenhagen Copenhagen 
Document of the 
Copenhagen meeting 
19-21.11.1990 
 
Paris Summit Paris Charter of Paris for a 
New Europe 
 
The other major innovation of the CSCE Helsinki Final Act, and hence also of relevance for 
the question of elections and election observation, was that it broadened the concept of 
security far beyond the way in which states and most experts thought about international 
security at the time.156 Attributing economic, environmental and humanitarian issues to the 
idea of security was at that time revolutionary in international politics. In this way the CSCE 
was considered to have a ‘dual character…as an instrument of détente and as an agent for 
systemic change’.157  
But the collapse of the Soviet Union and the German reunification dramatically changed the 
geopolitical landscape. The Copenhagen Document, a result of the Conference on the Human 
Dimension of the CSCE, and the Charter for a New Europe, adopted by the 1990 CSCE 
summit in Paris, marked the transition from the politics of the Cold war towards a new era. 
Democracy, human rights and peace are the central notions in both documents, clearly 
demonstrating enthusiasm for spreading democracy in the CSCE area. Prior to the 
Copenhagen Document, and the Paris Charter, the lesser known Bonn Conference on 
Economic Co-operation in Europe, was held in April 1990. The Conference resulted in the 
adoption of the “Document of the Bonn Conference”, a document that explicitly referred to 
the close relationship between economic progress and political pluralism, a relationship that 
had never before been accepted in the CSCE framework.158  
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The Paris Charter enshrined the conscious agreement of the participating States with regards 
to two key principles:  multi-party democracy and market economy.159 Indeed, the Charter 
states “we undertake to build, consolidate and strengthen democracy as the only system of 
government of our nations.”160 Indeed, such language could never have been found in an 
agreement during the two block system. Under these new circumstances on the European 
continent, with several new independent states striving for elections, the document of the 
Copenhagen Meeting of the Conference on the Human Dimension of the CSCE was adopted 
in June 1990. As in the Charter, the language employed in the Copenhagen Agreement is very 
supportive of human rights and democracy. In its preamble it says “They (participating States) 
recognize that pluralistic democracy and the rule of law are essential for ensuring respect for 
all human rights and fundamental freedoms, the development of human contacts and the 
resolution of other issues of a related humanitarian character. They therefore welcome the 
commitment expressed by all participating States to the ideals of democracy and political 
pluralism as well as their common determination to build democratic societies based on free 
elections and the rule of law.” 161  
After the collapse of the Soviet Union, the former western allies had a strong bargaining 
position; it would otherwise have been difficult to include such a wide range of humanitarian 
issues in the Declarations. The Copenhagen document thus deals with various aspects of the 
third basket, such as human rights, the free and fairness of elections, rule of law and national 
minorities.  
On another note, the Copenhagen Document constitutes the most remarkable human rights 
commitment thus far adopted in the framework of the CSCE. It is a result of the second 
meeting of the Conference on the Human Dimension of the CSCE, which took place in 
Copenhagen from 5 to 29 June 1990. It clearly reflected the new political situation in Europe 
brought by the total disintegration of the Eastern block: for the first time in CSCE history the 
Member States of the Warsaw Pact did not have regular meetings as a group for the 
preparation of joint standpoints.162 This phenomenon also reflects the fact that the traditional 
purpose of the CSCE process to overcome the artificial division of Europe had apparently 
been achieved (the preamble of the First Basket of the Helsinki Final Act already stated that 
the CSCE “should lead to the development of better and closer relations among them in all 
fields and thus to overcoming the confrontation stemming from the character of their past 
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relations”).163 Another interesting feature of the Copenhagen Document is that for the first 
time a human rights commitment had been laid down as a “confidence-building measure” 
(CBM). 164  Previously, confidence-building measures concerned only military aspects of 
security. Now the security CBMs had been supplemented with human rights CBMs. 
The Copenhagen Document consists of a Preamble, five chapters of varying length and an 
annexed chairman statement. The Chapters concern the rule of law, the individual rights and 
related issues, the working of democratic institutions and the importance cooperation in this 
area, national minorities, and individual rights and related issues. In respect to the norm free 
and fair elections, chapter one is the most significant. Hence, a detailed provision concerning 
free elections was inserted. A striking feature of this first chapter is its detailed character. For 
example, paragraph 5 lists 21 sub-paragraphs about “those elements of justice which are 
essential to the full expression of the inherent dignity and of the equal and inalienable right of 
all human beings”.  
According to the first sub-paragraph (5.1) of Chapter One, CSCE States entered into the 
obligation, inter alia, for “free elections that will be held at reasonable intervals by secret 
ballot or by equivalent free voting procedure, under conditions which ensure in practice the 
free expression of the opinion of the electors in the choice of their representatives;”165  
Another important commitment set in Chapter one is detailed in article 6 which states that the 
participating States declare that the will of the people, “freely and fairly expressed through 
periodic and genuine elections, is the basis of the authority and legitimacy of all government.” 
Furthermore and of equal relevance, participating States will accordingly “respect the right of 
their citizens to take part in the governing of their country, either directly or through 
representatives freely chosen by them through fair electoral processes.” Finally, participating 
States committed themselves to also “recognize their responsibility to defend and protect, in 
accordance with their laws, their international human rights obligations and their international 
commitments, the democratic order freely established through the will of the people against 
the activities of persons, groups or organizations that engage in or refuse to renounce 
terrorism or violence aimed at the overthrow of that order or of that of another participating 
State.”166  
Finally, the norm free and fair election was established among CSCE participating States with 
the Copenhagen Declaration. This was defined in Article 7 of Chapter One, which states that 
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“to ensure that the will of the people serves as the basis of the authority of government, the 
participating States will 
? hold free elections at reasonable intervals, as established by law; 
? permit all seats in at least one chamber of the national legislature to be freely contested in a 
popular vote; 
? guarantee universal and equal suffrage to adult citizens; 
? ensure that votes are cast by secret ballot or by equivalent free voting procedure, and that 
they are counted and reported honestly with the official results made public; 
? respect the right of citizens to seek political or public office, individually or as 
representatives of political parties or organizations, without discrimination; 
? respect the right of individuals and groups to establish, in full freedom, their own political 
parties or other political organizations and provide such political parties and organizations 
with the necessary legal guarantees to enable them to compete with each other on a basis of 
equal treatment before the law and by the authorities; 
? ensure that law and public policy work to permit political campaigning to be conducted in 
a fair and free atmosphere in which neither administrative action, violence nor intimidation 
bars the parties and the candidates from freely presenting their views and qualifications, or 
prevents the voters from learning and discussing them or from casting their vote free of 
fear of retribution; 
? provide that no legal or administrative obstacle stands in the way of unimpeded access to 
the media on a non-discriminatory basis for all political groupings and individuals wishing 
to participate in the electoral process”. 
In this regard, the Copenhagen Declaration in article 7 constitutes not only political 
commitments for OSCE participating States to the holding of free and fair elections, but also 
defines the various aspects of free and fair elections. There can be no justification for a 
particular election if that election does not respect all of these commitments.  
The same document also connects the role of foreign and domestic observers with the rights 
to free elections. This resulted in the inclusion of paragraph 8 in which participating States 
agreed that “the presence of observers, both foreign and domestic, can enhance the electoral 
process for States in which elections are taking place.” It further states that “they therefore 
invite observers from any other CSCE participating States and any appropriate private 
institutions and organizations who may wish to do so to observe the course of their national 
election proceedings, to the extent permitted by law.” Finally, it also states that “they will also 
endeavor to facilitate similar access for election proceedings held below the national level. 
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Such observers will undertake not to interfere in the electoral proceedings.”167 The birthplace 
of CSCE/OSCE election observation endeavors are hence found in Article 8 of Chapter One 
of the 1990 Copenhagen Declaration. Presumably, the fact that observers had already been 
invited to observe military maneuvers as committed by participating States in the Helsinki 
Final Act was a great asset when negotiating article 8.  
Nevertheless, according to Bloed and van Dijk the provision contains two loopholes that 
could be used to obstruct the smooth implementation of the commitment. Firstly, the right to 
send observers is only granted to “appropriate” private institutions and organizations, which 
enables malevolent States to argue that organizations of which they do not approve , are thus 
“not appropriate”.168 Secondly, the right to observe the election proceedings may be exercised 
only “to the extent permitted by law”, which affords CSCE States considerable discretion in 
restricting this right.169 
Even though the Copenhagen Document, like all CSCE documents, is politically, but not 
legally binding, it has become the organization’s most important document of reference for 
the human dimension. In particular, the Copenhagen document became the CSCE/OSCE’s 
most important reference for the execution of its election observation undertaking. But when 
comparing article 8 for the invitation of foreign and domestic observers with article 7 for the 
holding of free and fair elections, some important aspects become evident. As noted above, 
the latter clearly describes what constitutes free and fair elections. Article 8 in turn, only 
constitutes a reference for the invitation of observers. However, the same article does not 
define the modalities and procedures for election observation on issues such as; how many 
observers shall be invited, how soon they should arrive in the country before the election and 
what rights they are finally granted for their observation.  
Chapter three of the Copenhagen Declaration refers to another issue relevant to the OSCE and 
to this thesis. Article 27 requires particular attention. It states that the “participating States 
will also facilitate the establishment and strengthening of independent national institutions in 
the area of human rights and the rule of law, which may also serve as focal points for co-
ordination and collaboration between such institutions in the participating States. They 
propose that co-operation be encouraged between parliamentarians from participating States, 
including through existing inter-parliamentary associations and, inter alia, through joint 
commissions, television debates involving parliamentarians, meetings and round-table 
discussions.” The role of parliaments in respect to issues such as democracy, political 
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pluralism and elections, had already been identified during the negotiations for the 
Copenhagen Declaration.  
Finally, the Copenhagen Declaration brought substantive progress in the field of human rights 
and humanitarian issues. In respect to the norm free and fair elections and elections 
observation, the Copenhagen Document is of central importance and the main reference for 
participating States commitments. Following this Declaration, a Summit took place in Paris, 
adopting a Charter for a new Europe. The Charter is the first document establishing an 
institutional structure of the CSCE and thus creating bodies entitled to assist participating 
States in the realization of their commitments. It is interesting to note that the focus on the 
development of CSCE structures in the Charter is strongly interlinked with democratic aspects. 
On the one hand, the Paris Charter recalled that “democratic government is based on the will 
of the people, expressed regularly through free and fair elections” and that everyone has the 
right to “participate in free and fair elections”, (article 6 and 7 of Chapter one of the 
Copenhagen Document is therefore annexed to the Charter), on the other hand the Charter 
stresses “our common efforts to consolidate respect for human rights, democracy and the rule 
of law, to strengthen peace and to promote unity in Europe require a new quality of political 
dialogue and co-operation and thus development of the structures of the CSCE.”  
In respect to the institutionalization of the CSCE, the Paris Charter created the Office for Free 
Elections and the CSCE Parliamentary Assembly. The Office for Free Elections should 
“facilitate contacts and the exchange of information on elections within participating States. 
Furthermore, the Office is tasked to foster the implementation of paragraphs 6, 7 and 8 of the 
Document of the Copenhagen Meeting, compile information, including information provided 
by the competent authorities of participating States, on the dates, procedures and official 
results of scheduled national elections within participating States, as well as reports of 
election observations, and provide these on request to governments, parliaments and 
interested private organizations.170 Finally, the Office is also tasked to serve and facilitate 
contact among governments, parliaments or private organizations wishing to observe elections 
and competent authorities of the States in which elections are to take place.171 
With respect to the CSCE Parliamentary Assembly, the Charter calls “for greater 
parliamentary involvement in the CSCE, in particular through the creation of a CSCE 
parliamentary assembly, involving members of parliaments from all participating States.” 
Furthermore, the Paris Charter “urges that contacts be pursued at parliamentary level to 
discuss the field of activities, working methods and rules of procedure of such a CSCE 
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parliamentary structure, drawing on existing experience and work already undertaken in this 
field.”  
Thus, the creation of the CSCE Parliamentary Assembly and the Office for Free Election 
clearly demonstrates a conviction to “to build, consolidate and strengthen democracy as the 
only system of government of (our) nations”. These two institutions are both vital to the 
pursuit of this goal: Firstly, an institution to assist participating States to follow their 
commitments in the conduction of free and fair elections. And secondly, an institution which 
constitutes an indispensable pillar of democracy – parliamentarianism – and which also 
pursues this objective “on the parliamentary level”. This is also reflected in the Seminar of 
experts on democratic institutions, held on 4 November in Oslo 1991, as called for by the 
Summit. According to the agenda annexed to the Charter, Study Group A dealt with 
constitutional reforms, the rule of law and independent courts, and division of power between 
legislative, executive and judicial authorities. Study Group B in turn dealt with the 
organization of elections, the organization of political parties and the organization of 
independent non-governmental organizations.172 
Finally, it is also important to stress the institutional difference between the CSCE 
Parliamentary Assembly and the Office for Free Elections. The latter, like the OSCE 
secretariat and the Conflict Prevention Centre, is accountable to the Council (Ministers of 
Foreign Affairs) and thus also to the Committee of Senior Officials, which is empowered to 
determine the tasks and methods of operation. The Parliamentary Assembly is an independent 
CSCE body acting in accordance with the protocol on the political level of the CSCE. This 
was alluded to at the second Meeting of the Council of Ministers which took place in Prague, 
January 1991, and established a cooperation between the CSCE PA and the CSCE Executive 
branch. Accordingly, the Declaration adopted by the Council states that “in the interest of 
encouraging an active dialogue with the CSCE Parliamentary Assembly, the Chairman-in-
Office of the Council will be in contact with the Chairman of the Committee of Heads of 
Delegation of the Assembly in order to explore possible interest in the presence of the 
Chairman of the Council at the Budapest Meeting of the Assembly in July 1992.” 
Additionally, the declaration points out that “the Chairman of the Council will be prepared to 
make himself available to report on the work of the CSCE; to answer parliamentarians' 
questions in this regard; and to take note of parliamentarians' views for subsequent 
transmission to the Council.” This was the starting point for a regular co-operation between 
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the executive, intergovernmental bodies of the CSCE and the parliamentary dimension of the 
CSCE.  
On another note, the Prague Meeting of the Council of Ministers renamed the Office for Free 
Elections as the Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights and also widened its 
mandate. Interestingly, this enlarged mandate does not refer to election observation explicitly 
or to its role in this endeavor mandated at the Paris Charter. However, the Declaration decided 
that the Office shall, under the guidance of the Committee of Senior Officials, “serve as an 
institutional framework for sharing and exchanging information on available technical 
assistance, expertise, and national and international programs aimed at assisting the new 
democracies in their institution-building;”173 Furthermore, the decisions taken at the fourth 
meeting of the CSCE Council of Ministers in Rome, 1993, clearly enhanced the ODIHRs 
election observation program. Accordingly, the Ministers decided on the “enhancement of its 
(ODIHRs) role in comprehensive election monitoring,” without further defining 
“comprehensive election monitoring” The Committee of Senior Officials was therefore tasked 
to consider the financial and administrative implications of strengthening the ODIHR.174  
An innovation in ODIHRs endeavor for observing participating States commitments to 
elections, was a decision made in 1994. The CSCE Budapest Summit, also famous for having 
relabeled the CSCE as the OSCE (Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe), 
decided that “the ODIHR will play an enhanced role in election monitoring, before, during 
and after elections. In this context, the ODIHR should assess the conditions for the free and 
independent functioning of the media.” In fact, these three lines became the cornerstone of 
reference for the later development of the ODIHR methodology for election observation, 
which will be analyzed more closer at a later stage. However, the Summits participating 
States also requested “that co-ordination between the various organizations monitoring 
elections be improved, and task the ODIHR to consult all relevant organizations in order to 
develop a framework for co-ordination in this field.”  
It is interesting to note, that the Budapest summit, although enhancing ODIHRs role in 
election observation, did not refer to the organizations Parliamentary Assembly activity in 
election observation. Despite the fact that the Parliamentary Assembly had recently observed 
the 1993 Russian Duma elections, the parliamentary elections in Moldova, Kazakhstan and 
Ukraine, and the parliamentary and presidential elections in the Former Yugoslav Republic of 
Macedonia.. 175  The CSCE Parliamentary Assembly was already active as a deplorer of 
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parliamentarians as election observer. In turn, according to the election observation mission’s 
reports published chronologically on the ODIHR website, the office had held practically no 
missions before 1996. Interestingly, although the Budapest mandate offered a wide range of 
possibilities for comprehensive election observation, the turning point, according to a Senior 
OSCE Official, was when the Office persuaded the Ministries of Foreign Affairs of OSCE 
participating States, to second observers according to the Office’s demand – such as long term 
and a high number of short-term observers. This development granted the ODIHR the 
resources the CSCE PA had previously been accorded: voluntary observers and national 
institutions covering their travel costs.  
The Lisbon Document, approved by the Heads of States and Governments at the Lisbon 
Summit in 1996 had no relevant decisions, neither for commitments in respect to free and fair 
elections, nor for OSCE election observation endeavor as such. However it stated that the 
OSCE’s comprehensive approach to security required improvement in the implementation of 
all commitments in the human dimension, in particular with respect to human rights and 
fundamental freedoms. Among the acute problems within the human dimension, the Summit 
explores the continuing violations of human rights, such as involuntary migration, and the 
lack of full democratization, threats to independent media, electoral fraud, manifestations of 
aggressive nationalism, racism, chauvinism, xenophobia and anti-Semitism; all of which 
continue to endanger stability in the OSCE region. Finally, participating States stressed their 
commitment to continuing to address these problems.176 
As previously mentioned, various international institutions participated in election 
observation missions within the OSCE area in 1996, most prominently, the Parliamentary 
Assembly of the Council of Europe and the European Parliament. Having several institutions 
observing the same election in one particular country, required professional cooperation in 
order to avoid overlap, unnecessary expense and confusion. Accordingly it was desired that 
the two OSCE institutions cooperate more closely in order to improve OSCE’s performance 
in election monitoring. This resulted in the 1997 Cooperation Agreement between the 
OSCE/ODIHR and the OSCE PA. The Cooperation Agreement had been explicitly endorsed 
by the 1997 OSCE Ministerial Council in Copenhagen.  
The participating States “welcomed the (Parliamentary Assembly’s) agreement with the 
ODIHR on procedures to enhance co-operation in election monitoring.” Furthermore, the 
Ministerial Declaration stated that “in the area of Human Dimension/Democracy Building the 
exchange of information between the ODIHR and the various OSCE Missions etc., 
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participating States and other OSCE institutions has increased, as has joint implementation of 
projects. Contacts with international organizations have been expanded at all levels in order to 
combine resources and develop mutually reinforcing programs. Thus, a formal co-operation 
framework has been established with the Council of Europe and is being discussed with the 
Commission of the EU. To improve OSCE’s performance in election monitoring the ODIHR 
signed an agreement with the Parliamentary Assembly on closer co-operation, including on 
co-ordination of statements following elections.”  
Hence, the institutional cooperation procedures of CSCE/OSCE election observation between 
1991 and 1996 were at times considered to be undefined and unclear. However in 1997 clear 
guidelines regarding the conduction of OSCE institutional cooperation in election observation 
were formalized. In its preamble the OSCE Ministerial Council in Copenhagen states that 
“since the establishment of the OSCE Parliamentary Assembly and the OSCE Office for 
Democratic Institutions and Human Rights following the Charter of Paris, both OSCE 
Institutions have engaged in various aspects of election assistance and observation. 
Experience has shown that it is both practical and desirable for these two OSCE Institutions 
to work more closely together on election projects. (…) In order to avoid overlap, 
redundancy, unnecessary expense and confusion it is agreed that the following procedures 
will be undertaken to enhance the capabilities and effectiveness of both of these OSCE 
Institutions in the future;” 
The Cooperation Agreement addresses nine issues for OSCE election observation cooperation. 
More specifically; the Needs Assessment Mission, where the ODIHR, in consultation with the 
OSCE PA, will initiate a preparatory Needs Assessment Mission prior to a long-term election 
observation. The Exchange of Information, where regular field reports from the ODIHR On-
site Coordinator and long-term observers are sent to the OSCE PA. Observer Briefings, where 
the ODIHR will assist the OSCE in providing a separate briefing for parliamentarians 
whenever necessary. Logistical Support, where the OSCE/ODIHR will assist the 
parliamentary observer delegation with logistical support. The Deployment of observers, 
where the OSCE/ODIHR On-site Coordinator will provide the OSCE PA with a detailed 
deployment plan well in advance of the arrival of short-term observers.  
Finally, the Co-operation agreement also tackled political issues, such as the function of the 
OSCE Special Coordinator, stating that the OSCE Chairman-in-Office may designate a 
political figure as a Special Coordinator to lead the short-term OSCE observer mission. This 
political figure should normally be the President of the OSCE PA or an OSCE PA senior 
official recommended by the OSCE PA in consultation with the Chairman in Office. This 
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Special Coordinator will work closely with the OSCE/ODIHR On-site Coordinator and will 
deliver the preliminary post-election statement in conjunction with other appropriate officials. 
In the event that other international parliamentary bodies are strongly represented in the short-
term observer mission, the Special Coordinator may designate a Co-Chair or Co-Chairs of the 
observation mission, as appropriate.177 
As already described in Chapter one, the question of when the Preliminary Post-Election 
Statement should be delivered, is of fundamental importance. According to the Cooperation 
Agreement, the preliminary post-election statement will normally be made on the afternoon 
following the election. This represents a compromise between the time constraints on 
parliamentarians requiring an early departure, and technical needs of the ODIHR, which often 
require 24-48 hours after Election Day for a full de-briefing and the comprehensive 
assessment of statistical data and vote count process.178  
For the final report, the Cooperation Agreement states that the ODIHR and the OSCE PA will 
submit to each other preliminary drafts of their final reports for comment. While the ODIHR 
and OSCE PA reports may emphasize certain aspects of the election process in more or less 
detail, they should try to avoid direct contradictions without compromising the integrity of 
their independent observations and conclusions. It would be helpful if the reports could 
contain agreed upon recommendations from both the ODIHR and the OSCE PA.179 
The 1997 Cooperation Agreement thus constitutes a formal agreement between the two 
institutions engaged in OSCE election observation. It is also notable that this agreement 
grants the political leadership to the OSCE PA in election observation missions. This will be 
analyzed later on, in particular when considering the PA and the ODIHR in their respective 
functions. 
The Seventh Meeting of the OSCE Ministerial Council in Oslo 1998 also addressed the issue 
of free and fair election, particularly in relation to the conflicts in the Balkans, but did not 
decide on any new commitments or relevant decisions with respect to election observation. 
However, the Chairman’s activity report states regarding human dimension related issues, that 
apart from assistance in the comprehensive implementation of commitments, the OSCE 
should put a strong emphasis on the supervision and monitoring of elections. Co-operation 
between the ODIHR and the Parliamentary Assembly of the OSCE on electoral observation 
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was strengthened and improved in several cases through joint efforts with the Council of 
Europe.180 
Additionally, the report underlines that the new methodology for electoral assistance and 
observation developed by the ODIHR, which includes the monitoring of the entire election 
process, has proven to be efficient and reliable in terms of assessing compliance with OSCE 
commitments. Numerous projects were prepared and run by the ODIHR in co-operation with 
several OSCE missions and other international and national institutions. They strengthened 
the role of the OSCE in the promotion of democracy, the rule of law and respect for human 
rights, and helped in the build-up and consolidation of democratic institutions in several 
participating States.181 
It is also important to point out that although the Chairman’s activity report presents a certain 
perspective, which can influence other participating States, it is still not a decision that other 
OSCE participating States agreed on. However, important decisions and reaffirmations of 
election related commitments were later made at the organizations last Summit in Istanbul. 
The Meeting of the Heads of States and Governments in 1999 resulted in the Istanbul 
Document, which contains a Charter for European Security, the Istanbul Summit Declaration 
and the Istanbul Document.  
It is interesting to note that contrary to previous documents, the Charter for European Security 
clearly endorsed the Parliamentary Assembly as the most important OSCE institution in the 
field of democracy development and election monitoring. In fact, the Charter states that “the 
Parliamentary Assembly has developed into one of the most important OSCE institutions 
continuously providing new ideas and proposals. We (OSCE Heads of States and 
Governments) welcome this increasing role, particularly in the field of democratic 
development and election monitoring. We call on the Parliamentary Assembly to develop its 
activities further as a key component in our efforts to promote democracy, prosperity and 
increased confidence within and between participating States.”  
But the Charter also reaffirms previous commitments related to free and fair election and for 
the invitation of election observers. In detail, it states that OSCE participating States “reaffirm 
their obligation to conduct free and fair elections in accordance with OSCE commitments, in 
particular the Copenhagen Document [of] 1990.” Furthermore they “recognize the assistance 
the ODIHR can provide to participating States in developing and implementing electoral 
legislation.” Finally, the Charter states that “in line with these commitments, participating 
States will invite observers to (our) elections from other participating States, the ODIHR, the 
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OSCE Parliamentary Assembly and appropriate institutions and organizations that wish to 
observe our election proceedings.” 
In turn, the Istanbul Declaration stated its appreciation of the work of the ODIHR and the 
Parliamentary Assembly before during and after the election. The declaration states therefore 
that “with a large number of elections ahead of us, we (OSCE participating States) are 
committed to these being free and fair, and in accordance with OSCE principles and 
commitments. This is the only way in which there can be a stable basis for democratic 
development. We appreciate the role of the ODIHR in assisting countries to develop electoral 
legislation in keeping with OSCE principles and commitments, and we agree to follow up 
promptly ODIHR’s election assessments and recommendations. We value the work of the 
ODIHR and the OSCE Parliamentary Assembly - before, during and after elections - which 
further contributes to the democratic process.”  
The Declaration also commits to secure the full right of persons belonging to minorities to 
vote and to facilitate the right of refugees to participate in elections held in their countries of 
origin. Furthermore, the Declaration underlines the necessity to ensure fair competition 
among candidates as well as parties, including through their access to the media and respect 
for the right of assembly.182 
The Summit reaffirmed participating States commitments for the holding of free and fair 
elections according to the 1990 Copenhagen Document. It also confirms the role of the 
Parliamentary Assembly and of the ODIHR in election observation endeavors. However, as 
with the Copenhagen Document, the Istanbul Document contains no provision for the 
methods of an election observation regarding how many observers should be invited and 
when long-term monitoring should start. This begs the question, whether the confirmation of 
the role of the two OSCE institutions – the Parliamentary Assembly and the ODIHR – also 
constitutes a confirmation of the methodology employed by the ODIHR. A methodology that, 
as will be described later when outlining the ODIHR, is contested by several CIS countries.  
Another relevant document regarding the norm free and fair elections and OSCE election 
observation, is decision number 7, entitled “Election Commitments”, of the tenth meeting of 
the OSCE Ministerial Council 2002 in Porto. The Ministers of OSCE participating States 
reiterated commitments previously stated in the 1990 Copenhagen Document and in the 
Istanbul Summit Declaration. Reaffirming the determination to implement these commitments 
and acknowledging that democratic elections can be conducted under a variety of electoral 
systems, the Ministerial Council takes into account Permanent Council (PC) Decision 
                                                 
182 OSCE. Istanbul Document. Istanbul 1999, p. 51 
 73
Number 509. This decision was an attempt to approve a document produced by the ODIHR 
entitled “International Standards and Commitments: A practical Guide to Democratic 
Elections Best Practice”. This document summarized election related commitments of OSCE 
participating States that were well beyond the scope of the OSCE. The idea was to extend 
election related commitments to other international organizations such as the UN, in order to 
widen the scope of reference when evaluating the subsequent findings of election observation 
missions.  
However, the PC did not approve this document but simply tasked the ODIHR to further 
develop its current draft and to report on progress made to the Permanent Council by 30 June 
2003. Therefore, considering the fact that MC decision number 7 only refers to PC decision 
509, which was not approved, the MC decision in turn appears somewhat lacking with regard 
to new election related commitments. On the contrary, this simply tasks the Permanent 
Council to consider the need to elaborate additional commitments for elections. As has 
already been stated, that democratic elections can be conducted under a variety of electoral 
systems, one might get the impression that it is becoming ever more difficult to introduce new 
election related commitments in OSCE documents.  
On another note the eleventh meeting of the OSCE Ministerial Council in Maastricht 2003 
also adopted a decision on election related commitments, of less significance but worthy of 
mention. As with decision number 7 taken at the OSCE Ministerial in Porto, decision 5/03 
entitled “Elections” acknowledged that democratic elections can be conducted under a variety 
of different electoral systems and laws. Further, the decision welcomed both the continuing 
efficient cooperation between the ODIHR and the OSCE Parliamentary Assembly, and the 
document “Existing Commitments for Democratic Elections in OSCE Participating States: A 
Progress Report”, which was prepared by the OIDHR and submitted to the participating 
States. Finally, the decision recognizes that there is a particular need for establishing 
confidence within the electorate, for transparency of election procedures, and for 
accountability on the part of authorities conducting elections. It also calls upon participating 
States to further enhance their co-operation with the ODIHR in this field. Again, as with 
decision number 7 taken at the OSCE Ministerial in Porto, the Ministerial Council also tasked 
the Permanent Council to drawn on the ODIHR’s expertise in this field, to consider the need 
for additional commitments on elections, and to report to the next Ministerial Council. 
It is also worth mentioning the decision 17/05 taken at the Ljubljana Ministerial Meeting 
entitled “Strengthening the Effectiveness of the OSCE.” This decision reaffirms the 
participating States full adherence to the norms, principles and commitments of all three 
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dimensions of the OSCE agreed since the 1975 Helsinki Final Act and the 1990 Charter of 
Paris for a New Europe. The decision further takes into account contributions of the 
Parliamentary Assembly and tasks the ODIHR to submit a report on the implementation of 
existing commitments and ways of strengthening its election-related activities to the next 
Ministerial Council. 
The above mentioned documents and decisions draw a clear picture: OSCE election 
observation has been elaborated through independent action over the course of several years. 
The methodology was established through exercise and application and has since become 
customary practice among OSCE participating States. Interestingly, when analyzing 
Ministerial Council decisions in a chronological order, it becomes clear that election 
observation related commitments have not greatly increased during the course of the years, 
excepting those which have been confirmed as OSCE aquis. 
 
*Table 4 on next page summarizes relevant CSCE/OSCE decisions on election related issues. 
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 Table 4 
Date Document Commitment, Decision, Mandate of ODIHR 
Jun. 1990 Copenhagen Document 
Free and Fair Elections and Invitation of Invitation 
of Election Observer 
Nov. 1990 Paris Charter 
Democracy, Elections; establishment of the CSCE 
Parliamentary Assembly and Office for Free 
Elections 
Jan. 1992 Prague Ministerial 
Office for Free Elections renamed in Office for 
Democratic Institutions and Human Rights 
Nov. 1993 Rome Ministerial 
ODIHR receives mandate for “comprehensive” 
election monitoring; CSO shall work it out 
Dec. 1994 Budapest Summit 
CSCE renamed in OSCE; ODIHR mandate for 
election monitoring “before, during and after the 
election” 
Sept. 1997 
1997 Cooperation 
Agreement 
Signing of the Cooperation Agreement between the 
OSCE Parliamentary Assembly and the 
OSCE/OIDHR 
Dec. 1997 Copenhagen Ministerial Endorsement of the 1997 Cooperation Agreement 
Nov. 1999 Istanbul Summit 
Participation of minorities and refugees in election; 
reaffirmation of previous commitments for free and 
fair elections; endorsement of the OSCE PA as the 
most important institution in democracy promotion 
and election monitoring. 
Dec. 2002 Porto Ministerial Decision Number 7: “Election Commitments” 
Dec. 2003 Maastricht Ministerial Decision Number 5/03: “Elections” 
Dec. 2005 Ljubljana Ministerial Decision 17/05: “Strengthening the Effectiveness 
of the OSCE”   
Dec. 2006 Brussels Ministerial Decision 19/06: re-endorsement of the 1997 
Cooperation Agreement as the basis of OSCE 
Election observation activities 
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The Three dimensions of security and election observation 
 
Outlining the establishment of free and fair elections within the OSCE in chronological order 
and thus how this has resulted in OSCE election observation practice, implies further analysis 
of the organization’s three dimensional approach to security. This section seeks therefore to 
clarify how the norm of free and fair elections and their observation are carried out by the 
OSCE on a thematically and institutional level.  
As already mentioned above, two OSCE institutions engage in this endeavor – the OSCE 
Parliamentary Assembly and the ODIHR. However, the OSCE Parliamentary Assembly is 
autonomous in its nature, therefore acting independently and encompassing parliamentary 
delegations of 55 OSCE participating States. The ODIHR in turn, is an executive OSCE 
institution, interlinked with the organization’s decision making bodies. Taking this into 
account, this section will briefly outline how elections and election observation are 
institutionally interlinked with the three dimensional approach of security. 
It is important to note that the OSCE is understood as a collective security organization with a 
three dimensional security approach. The former three CSCE baskets became known after the 
transformation of the CSCE as an organization at the Budapest Summit, as the OSCE’s three 
dimensions of security. Basket one contained confidence building measures and certain 
aspects of security and disarmament, later becoming the Politico-Military dimension. Basket 
two considered Cooperation in the Field of Economics, of Science and Technology and the 
Environment, subsequently it became the Economical and Environmental dimension. Basket 
three of the Helsinki Final Act addressed cooperation in the field of Humanitarian and Other 
Fields, later becoming known as the OSCE’s Human Dimension. 
In fact, the notion of “comprehensive security” was popularized towards the end of the Cold 
War, and is the result of a rethinking in strategical and security-political research. The 
subsequent geopolitical architecture of the world following the collapse of the Soviet Union, 
urged a redefinition of the traditional concept of security.183 In other words, scholars and 
practitioners believed in the necessity to widen the notion of security above its traditional 
understanding of state and military security. Hence, the OSCE deduces its activities along the 
three dimensions of security, but how does the norm free and fair election and its observation 
correspond to this concept? What place and role has election observation within this three 
dimensional approach to security?  
                                                 
183 Heinz Gärtner. Konzepte Internationaler Sicherheit. Spezialvorlesung zur Internationalen Politik. SoSe: 2005 
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Table five outlines OSCE activities according to the organization’s three dimensions. The 
table was drafted in accordance with information available on the OSCE website.  
 
Table 5 
Dimension Activity 
I 
Arms control, Border management, Combating terrorism, Conflict prevention, 
Military reform, Policing 
 
II 
Anti-trafficking, Economic activities, Environmental activities 
 
III 
Anti-trafficking, Democratization, Education, Elections, Gender equality, Human 
rights, Media freedom, Minority rights, Rule of law, Tolerance and non-
discrimination 
 
 
According to the information provided by table 5, election (including election observation) 
does not play a particular role in the OSCE. Thus, thematically the place of elections is in the 
third dimension, as elections are considered to be a part of humanitarian issues. In this regard, 
elections activities are deemed of equal importance as education and gender equality for 
example, within the third dimension. 
According to the argument of some participating States and OSCE Officials, the three 
dimensions do not receive a balanced representation in today’s OSCE. Dr. Thomas 
Buchsbaum, Deputy Head of the Austrian Mission to the OSCE during the Austrian 
Chairmanship in 2000, perceived in his article on the “OSCE’s Comprehensive Security: 
Integrating the Three Dimensions”, that the OSCE is faced with the persistent criticism of 
certain features of the current shape of the organization, in particular from Russia and Belarus 
as well as by some other participating States from Central Asia. Buchsbaum outlines the main 
points of their criticism stating that “today’s OSCE unduly privileges the Human Dimension 
against the other dimensions and is thus not respecting the comprehensive character of the 
OSCE security concept;” 
This criticism partly relates to the issue of the organizations’ Unified Budget for its 
institutions. It is important to note that the distribution of OSCE funds is considerably higher 
within the third dimension than funds distributed within the first and second dimensions. 
Table six contains a brief overview of budget distribution in relation to the three dimensions 
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within the organization’s Secretariat and Institutions. The distribution of funds for OSCE 
Field Missions is not included in this table, as funds are reallocated diversely from Mission to 
Mission, according to their respective mandates. For example the funds allocated to the OSCE 
Mission in Kosovo (biggest OSCE Mission to date) within the third dimension, exceed the 
funds allocated for the Mission’s first and second dimensions. 
 
Table 6184 
Dimension Unit/Institution                 EUR 
Strategic Police Matters Unit     954,600 
Action against Terrorism Unit    740,000 
Conflict Prevention      3,348,400 
I 
       Total:   5,043000 
Economic/Environmental Aspects of Security  1,855,800 II 
       Total:   1,855,800 
 
Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights 14,939,900 
High Commissioner on National Minorities   2,852,800 
Representative on Freedom of the Media   1,260,200 
III 
       Total:   19,052900 
 
These figures outline a clear picture: the human dimension has become the organization’s 
most important area of activities. The former Office for Free Elections, which in 1992 became 
the Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights, is today the most costly OSCE 
institution and the organization’s most famous executive body acting in the third dimension. 
However, this also begs the question as to why the OSCE PA is not included in table 6. As 
already noted above, the OSCE PA, autonomous is its institutional nature, represents the 
parliamentary dimension of the OSCE. Thus, the OSCE PA cannot be attributed to any single 
dimension (as outlined in table 6) since the political activity of its committees encompass all 
three OSCE dimensions. Its budget is composed of the contributions from the Parliaments of 
OSCE participating States and not from the OSCE decision making bodies, such as the 
Ministerial Council or the Permanent Council. 
                                                 
184 The figures were excerpted from Annex I of the Permanent Council Decision PC.DEC/780/Corr.1, published 
on the OSCE website. http://www.osce.org/documents/pc/2007/02/23164_en.pdf; 22.3.2008  
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When more closely examining the ODIHRs budget for election observation, it becomes 
evident that this practice has become the most costly activity within the OSCE’s third 
dimension. Interestingly, the United States condition to include humanitarian related issues in 
the Helsinki process, after the collapse of the Soviet Union, shifted the organization’s 
institutional focus towards these issues. Presumably, with the end of the Cold War and a 
perceived victory for democracy, an advantageous position was provided for former western 
allies to bargain the institutional and structural focus of the CSCE/OSCE towards the third 
dimension, in particular for activities related to the fostering of democracy within 
CSCE/OSCE participating States. 
When examining Table 4, which lists funds of the Office for Democratic Institutions and 
Human Rights in the 2007 Unified Budget, it becomes evident that funds for election related 
activities largely over-ran funds related to other activities. This paper argues therefore, that 
election observation became not only the organizations most publicly known activity, but also 
the most important endeavor for the organization itself, in particular in demonstrating its 
values, norms and commitments in democracy promotion.  
As already described in Chapter two, election observation is strongly interlinked with a 
broader sense of democracy promotion and is acknowledged to be the most effective 
instrument for its assistance and promotion. Taking this into account, it is logical that the 
organization has primarily focused on this endeavor.  
Although, as highlighted in table 5, elections are only one activity within the third dimension, 
this endeavor has become the organizations most important and most visible endeavor in the 
promotion of its core values and norms. 
 
Table 7185 
 
                                                 
185 OSCE. Decision Nr.780. Approval of the 2007 Unified Budget. 
http://www.osce.org/documents/pc/2007/02/23164_en.pdf ; 11.4.08  
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 On another note, it is important to underline that a mandate was given with these ideas in 
mind. As already outlined in detail earlier, this third dimensional institutional focus was 
initiated with the signing of the 1990 Copenhagen Document and the Paris Charter clearly 
committing participating States to build, consolidate and strengthen democracy as the only 
system of government of our nations.186 Hence, democratic government must also be based 
on the will of the people, expressed regularly through free and fair elections.187 
                                                
Finally, it was the inherent link between elections and democracy that strongly influenced a 
shifting of the OSCE’s focus towards election observation. Having observed one particular 
aspect of democracy– elections, the organization also began to recognize that other aspects 
such as political campaign issues, media, rule of law, minority rights, etc., must also be 
considered for a democratic election process.  
Issues regarding democratic elections can sometimes be confused as was addressed in Chapter 
two. When considering election observation and in particular its corresponding assessment, 
this endeavor becomes far more than simply observing the balloting and the Election Day 
itself. Election observation can rather be seen as the assessment of a countries degree of 
democracy and implies a certain judgment concerning that country’s political system.  
Election observation and its subsequent evaluation have therefore received a prominent 
international role since its conception. It has become an important feature in the field of 
democracy promotion, facilitated by development cooperation and international political 
pressure. Therefore, election observation has become a fundamental activity within the 
organization to effectively promote its norms and values, and in particular to observe OSCE 
participating States commitments.  
In this respect, when re-examining table 5, it is clear that the third dimension includes a wide 
range of humanitarian activities which are un-doubtable linked to the idea of democratic 
elections. Election observation endeavor, thus also implies the observation of these other 
aspects, as they are part of a free and fair election. 
 
The following section will focus therefore institutions that deploy OSCE election observers. 
Particular attention is paid to the methodology of the OSCE Parliamentary Assembly and the 
OSCE Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights. The central argument of this 
thesis, that OSCE election observation requires the complementary engagement of both 
institutions, will be further elaborated. 
 
186 CSCE. Charter of Paris for a New Europe. Paris 1990. p. 3 
187 Ibid. 
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OSCE Institutions deploying Election Observer 
 
 
Before introducing the methodologies of the OSCE Parliamentary Assembly and the 
OSCE/ODIHR, I would like to re-stress that election observation, according to the 1990 
Copenhagen Document, is based on participating States commitments to invite “appropriate 
institutions” to do so.  
Therefore, OSCE election observation starts with the formal invitation to deploy a mission by 
the participating State. Once the date of the election itself is set, the participating State 
announces the election in the Permanent Council through a diplomatic representative. 
Subsequently, the same participating State forwards a Note Verbal to the Office for 
Democratic Institutions and Human Rights. This constitutes a formal invitation for the 
ODIHR to consider deploying an Election Observation Mission (EOM). In addition to this, 
the Parliamentary Assembly Secretariat (either at the Headquarters in Copenhagen or the 
Vienna Liaison Office) receives a letter from the Chairman of the respective Parliament, 
inviting the PA President to consider the deployment of an election observation mission. It is 
important to note that both letters, the Note Verbal from to the ODIHR and the letter from the 
Chairman of the Parliament to the Parliamentary Assembly President represent a formal 
invitation for the deployment of an Election Observation Mission. But even though a formal 
procedure of consultation between both institutions – the Office for Democratic Institutions 
and Human Rights and the Parliamentary Assembly - is defined in the 1997 Cooperation 
Agreement, practice has proven that the two institutions usually make their own independent 
decision, as to whether to deploy a mission or not.188  
While the OSCE PA has engaged almost exclusively in the observation of parliamentary 
elections by short-term observers, the ODIHR has engaged in election assistance, long-term 
assistance, long-term observation and short-term observation of presidential, parliamentary 
and municipal elections, as well as referendums.189 A practical example of the independence 
of both OSCE institutions is the recently deployed election observation delegation to the 2007 
Duma election in Russia. While the OSCE/ODIHR declined the invitation on the grounds of 
Visa restrictions for their observers, the OSCE Parliamentary Assembly together with the 
                                                 
188 Interview with a Senior Official of the OSCE PA. 
189 Cooperation Agreement between the OSCE Parliamentary Assembly and the OSCE Office for Democratic 
Institutions and Human Rights. Copenhagen, 2nd September 1997. OSCE PA. 
http://www.oscepa.net/Activities/Election%20Observation/266-Election%20Observation; 16.4.08 
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Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe, deployed a delegation of 70 parliamentary 
observers.190  
The following section constitutes a separate examination of both OSCE institutions, focusing 
on their different institutional characteristics and roles during election observation missions. 
 
 
The OSCE Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR) 
As has already been outlined during the analysis of the relationship between election 
observation and the organization’s comprehensive security approach, the former Office for 
Free Elections became over time the organizations most active executive institution in the 
third dimension. Executive, in so far as its mandate lays in the responsibility of the OSCE 
decision making bodies. This is currently the Permanent Council, who meets on a weekly 
basis in Vienna and the Ministerial Council, meeting annually in the country holding the 
Chairmanship. Before 1992, when the Office for Free Election was renamed as the Office for 
Democratic Institutions and Human rights by the Prague Ministerial Council, the Office for 
Free Election was accountable to the Committee of Senior Officials (CSO). Both the 
Committee of Senior Officials and the Permanent Council (the former Permanent Committee 
renamed as Council in 1994 at the Budapest Summit) are the OSCE’s decision making bodies 
representing CSCE/OSCE participating States. This implies that the budget of the Office is 
composed of the participating States contributions in the framework of the Unified Budget 
decision, adopted by the PC every year for the incoming year.191 In turn, the Director of 
ODIHR, appointed through consensus in the PC, usually a career diplomat, reports regularly 
to the Permanent Council on the institution’s activities. 192  Hence, there is a direct link 
between the ODIHR and the Permanent Council - the main decision making body of the 
organization. 
The primary building blocks of the Office are the Elections, Democratization, and Human 
Rights departments, along with the Contact Point for Roma and Sinti Issues and the Program 
on Tolerance and Non-Discrimination. As already outlined in table 7, the most costly 
department of the ODIHR is the election department. During the Ambassador Christian 
Strohal’s tenure, who was Director of the ODIHR from 2003 to June 2008, the Office 
                                                 
190 OSCE PA. http://www.oscepa.net/Activities/Election%20Observation/Past%20Missions: 16.4.08 
191 OSCE. Decision Nr 780. 649th Plenary Meeting. PC Journal No. 649, Agenda item 1; 
www.osce.org/documents/pc/2007/02/23164_en.pdf; 16.4.08 
192 OSCE. PC Journal 700, 7. February 2008. http://www.osce.org/documents/pc/2008/02/29647_en.pdf; 16.4.08 
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established 79 election missions, deploying more than 19,000 election observers.193 Bearing 
this in mind, it becomes evident that the Office has a substantial organizational workload, 
requiring a considerable budget and staff. 
With respect to the Office mandate for election observation, it is important to reiterate table 4, 
which points out relevant OSCE decision since the 1990 Copenhagen Document. As has 
previously been stated, the 1990 Copenhagen Document contains very little in respect to the 
invitation of observers (as the Office did not exist at this time). Therefore, ignoring 
organizational decisions taken by the Permanent Council, the Office mandate is related to the 
Prague, Rome and Copenhagen Ministerial, to the Budapest and Istanbul Summit and to 
certain decisions taken at the Porto, Maastricht and Ljubljana and Brussels Ministerial. Most 
prominently the Budapest Summit, which tasked the ODIHR to monitor “before, during and 
after the election.” Considering this in relation to the commitments taken by participating 
States for free and fair elections in the 1990 Copenhagen Document, it is arguable that 
ODIHR’s mandate is constituted, together with the Budapest Summit task, along the 
definition of elections set forth in the 1990 Copenhagen Document.  
However, although such a mandate as outlined above has never been formally accepted, in 
practical application the ODIHR deploys its mission in accordance with these commitments.  
Therefore, the main methodology in election observation encompasses the argument that an 
election is more than simply a one-day event. Thus, the methodology aims to provide an in-
depth insight into all elements necessary for a democratic electoral process, including the 
legal and regulatory framework, the election administration; the election campaign, including 
the media environment; the complaints and appeals process; voting, counting, and tabulation; 
and the announcement of results.194  
This methodology was first developed nearly a decade ago; it has also served as a model for 
other international organizations. The ODIHR methodology has been adopted by the UN and 
EU, as well as various NGOs active in the domestic or international observation of elections.  
In recent years, the ODIHR has adapted its methodology to permit a focused assessment of 
specific aspects of the electoral process, primarily in more-advanced democracies, through the 
deployment of election assessment missions. 195  The Needs Assessment Mission (NAM) 
typically considers the following issues:196 Pre-election environment, including the general 
                                                 
193 OSCE. 716th Meeting of the Permanent Council. Address by Ambassador Christian Strohal, Director of the 
OSCE Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR). P.5 
http://www.osce.org/odihr/documents.html?lsi=true&limit=10&grp=249   
194 OSCE/ODIHR. http://www.osce.org/odihr-elections/13748.html; 17.4.08 
195 Ibid. 
196 OSCE/ODIHR; Election Observation. A decade of monitoring elections. The people and the practice. P.16 
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extent to which human rights and fundamental freedoms are being observed by the 
government in relation to the upcoming election; The legislative framework and any 
amendments since the last election; The status of the media; The degree to which interlocutors 
believe the establishment of an observation mission can serve a useful purpose. According to 
the 1997 Cooperation Agreement, the Needs Assessment Mission is carried out in 
consultation with the OSCE PA, which in turn may send a representative when it wishes to do 
so. In any case, the ODIHR will inform the OSCE PA of the results of the Needs Assessment 
Mission. Finally, the needs assessment will take into account any previous reports by the 
ODIHR and the OSCE PA regarding the country concerned, including progress made on any 
recommendations. Such missions will also assess the extent, needs and context of the 
observation and should serve to establish an early dialogue with the national election 
authorities.197  
However, practice has proven that the ODIHR does not consult the OSCE PA before going on 
a NAM, the ODIHR only informs the OSCE PA of its intention to go.198 
The Core Team comprises the On-side Coordinator (Head of the ODIHR Mission), the 
Deputy Head of Mission, Election-, Legal-, Political-, and Media Analysts, and the Co-
coordinator of Long-term observers.199 It is important to note that the range of analysts is 
selected according to the requirements of democratic elections and hence the argument - 
defectiveness in one particular regime has considerable influence on the holding of free 
elections. This constitutes the main methodology of the ODIHR. A good example is the work 
of a Media Analyst. He or she leads a team of four to eight individuals responsible for 
preparing both quantitative – the total amount of time and parties – and qualitative – whether 
the coverage is positive, negative or neutral - analysis.200 Hence, this methodology is centered 
on the idea that defectiveness in one particular regime, for example in the regime of media, 
influences the election campaign and therefore the playing field of the election as such. These 
experts are appointed for each election observation mission by the Director of the Office and 
vary in number, depending on the country in which the election is observed. The recent 
ODIHR mission to the parliamentary elections in the Former Yugoslav Republic of 
Macedonia, encompassed Political, Legal, Election, and Media Analysts. Additionally, a 
Long-term Coordinator and Security Experts were deployed. Bearing in mind the relationship 
between elections and democracy as previously explained, the ODIHR’s election observation 
                                                 
197 OSCE. Cooperation Agreement between the OSCE Parliamentary Assembly and the OSCE Office for 
Democratic Institutions and Human Rights. 1997, Copenhagen. 
198 Interview with a Senior Official of the OSCE PA 
199 Ibid; P. 18 
200 Ibid; P.18 
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methodology reflects the necessity to observe the entire election process, including its wide 
range of components.  
In addition to the Core Team, appointed by the Director of ODIHR, there are also the Long-
term and Short-term observers seconded from OSCE participating States. It is important to 
note that these people are not usually election experts in a professional or academic sense. 
However, they have already completed several ODIHR election observation missions under 
and have submitted their application to the election experts’ database.201  
Long-term observers spend six to eight weeks observing and assessing the election 
administration, implementation of the law and other regulations, the conduct of the campaign, 
and the political environment - in essence, carrying out the same sort of observation and 
reporting activities in the regions that the core team is doing in the capital.202 In turn, the 
Short-term observers, around four hundred people for every EOM, arrive several days before 
voting and are given a comprehensive briefing about their role, responsibilities, and 
expectations. They observe the polling, counting and tabulation procedures and report their 
findings. In particular, observers visit, on average, about ten polling stations on Election Day, 
where they fill out forms (each form containing general questions, as well as questions related 
to specific issues regarding that particular election) to gather detailed information about each 
polling station. Each form contributes to the overall statistical profile of how polling-station 
procedures are being conducted throughout the country, which the core team analyses and 
uses to draw conclusions about the Election Day process. This permits the observation 
mission to determine whether irregularities, when they occur, are of an isolated nature or are 
systematic.203 An example of an OSCE/ODIHR form is annexed to this paper. 
Finally, the idea of a wide range of observers who assess their findings according to forms, 
reflects the idea to base the assessment of an Election Day observation on an empirical 
fundament. Although this is not of central importance to this paper, it is worthwhile to 
emphasize that it is very difficult, if not impossible, to empirically prove whether an election 
was conducted in a free and fair manner. This would also imply the necessity to standardize 
the findings of Long term observers, which would be an equally if not more difficult 
undertaking.  
Nevertheless, it is also important to stress that the ODIHR methodology for the statistical 
analysis of STO forms makes it possible to bring out the systematic and recurrent, or 
                                                 
201 OSCE/ODIHR: http://elexperts.odihr.pl/; 17.4.08 
202 OSCE/ODIHR. Election Observation. A decade of monitoring elections. The people and the practice. P.20 
203 Ibid. P. 21 
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otherwise, nature of certain malfunctions or frauds in the polling stations or during the 
counting and the results. 
In sum, ODIHR’s election observation has two principal objectives: first to determine whether 
a particular election meets OSCE commitments and other international standards for 
democratic elections, and also to be conducted in compliance with national legislation, which 
should reflect OSCE commitments; and second to offer recommendations, where necessary, 
to support governments in implementing improvements for future elections.204 The purpose of 
election observation is not simply to commend those countries that conduct their elections 
well or to criticize those that fall short of meeting their commitments. Instead, ODIHR offers 
proactive and constructive input, whereby it not only calls attention to specific areas for 
possible improvement, but also makes recommendations and provides assistance to rectify 
any shortcomings.205 
 
Again it is important to reiterate that the methodology of the ODIHR had been established 
through practice. These practices have been proven useful during the course of missions, and 
have become a standardized methodology in OSCE election observation.206 It is important to 
note that the Budapest Summit entasked such ODIHR’s methods, which in turn have been 
proven to be an effective feature of observation missions in struggling democracies. Indeed, 
the starting point for ODIHR’s methodology was the Budapest Summit and the engagement 
of OSCE participating States to second Long term and Short term observers.207 Before, the 
Office had no observers and a very small staff. Therefore, before 1994, the OSCE 
Parliamentary Assembly had more observers when deploying parliamentarians than the Office 
for Free Elections/ODIHR.208 
 
 
The OSCE Parliamentary Assembly 
In addition to the Short-term Observers seconded by OSCE participating States, there are 
parliamentary observers sent by the OSCE Parliamentary Assembly. But before starting to 
outline the methodology and the history of the CSCE/OSCE Parliamentary Assembly when 
deploying parliamentarians as election observers, I would like to briefly highlight particular 
institutional and political characteristics of this Assembly. The OSCE Parliamentary 
                                                 
204 OSCE/ODIHR. Annual Report 2007. Warsaw 2008.p.12 
205 Ibid. 
206 Interview with a Senior Official of the OSCE Secretariat 
207 Interview with a Senior Official of the OSCE Parliamentary Assembly 
208 Ibid. 
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Assembly was created by the governmental structures of the organization. At the NATO 
Summit in July 1990, U.S. President George Bush urged the creation of a Parliamentary 
Assembly as part of the 'institutionalization' of the CSCE.209 Included in his proposal was an 
idea to base the CSCE Parliamentary Assembly on the already existing Parliamentary 
Assembly of the Council of Europe. Many European countries argued that in order not to 
create more bureaucratic structures and to save money, the Council of Europe Parliamentary 
Assembly could transform into a CSCE Parliamentary Assembly when issues of relevance to 
the CSCE process were discussed.210 However, during the preparatory meetings for the CSCE 
Summit in Paris in 1990, it was determined that the CSCE Parliamentary Assembly should be 
an independent parliamentary body. One main reason behind this was that major players in 
the CSCE at the time - such as the United States, Canada and the Soviet Union - were not 
Members of the Council of Europe and would inevitably be second-class members of a body 
made up of a majority of Council of Europe Parliamentarians. 211  In April 1991, the 
parliaments of participating States met in Madrid and adopted a resolution establishing such 
an assembly. The first OSCE Parliamentary Assembly formal meeting took place in Budapest 
in July 1992. 
Today, the Parliamentary Assembly consists of 317 parliamentarians from all OSCE 
participating States, with the aim of promoting parliamentary involvement in the activities of 
the OSCE and facilitating inter-parliamentary dialogue and co-operation. Therefore, 
Parliaments of all OSCE States are entitled to be represented in the Parliamentary Assembly. 
As is usual for inter-parliamentary Assemblies, it has its own budget and Rules of Procedure. 
The Assembly at each Annual Session of the OSCE Parliamentary Assembly elects the 
President of the Parliamentary Assembly, who in turn acts as the highest representative of the 
Assembly and presides over the meetings of the Assembly. The President is elected for one 
year and can be re-elected for one more year.212  
On another note, whereas OSCE institutions all have a certain level of independence, the PA 
is placed mostly outside the organizational structures and has its own budget. As the national 
legislators are not constrained by diplomacy or consensus, this gives the PA a lot of freedom 
to maneuver in monitoring the commitments.213.  
 
                                                 
209 Spencer Oliver. The Parliamentary Assembly and its Political Influence in the OSCE. P.2 
210 Ibid. 
211 Ibid. 
212 OSCE PA. http://www.oscepa.net/Organization/President; 18.4.08 
213 Jos Boonstra. OSCE Democracy Promotion: Grinding to a Halt? In: Fride, 44 Working Paper; P. 10 
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Overview of the OSCE; Organigram excerpted from the OSCE Annual Report 2006, published by the OSCE 
Secretariat 
 
 
When examining this organigram, one significant institutional difference between the OSCE 
PA and OSCE/ODIHR becomes apparent. The OSCE PA, together with the Permanent 
Council and the Forum for Security Cooperation, is placed on the political level of the OSCE. 
The OSCE/ODIHR on the other hand, together with the Secretariat and other institutions is 
placed on the executive level of the organization. This implies that the OSCE PA, as is usual 
for inter-parliamentary Assemblies and Parliaments, acts independently and not on the 
instruction of the decision making bodies of the organization. Subsequently, the OSCE PA is 
an autonomous OSCE body representing an essential institution of democracy - 
parliamentarianism - in an organization, which has a strong intergovernmental background 
but simultaneously purports the promotion of democracy.  
In an organization like the OSCE, whose participating States are at very different stages in the 
development of parliamentary democracy, the international level is often the only opportunity 
for some parliamentarians to receive important information that enables them to exercise their 
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control function. 214  Members of such inter-parliamentary assemblies have therefore an 
intermediary function. They pass information between the international and national levels, 
acting, where necessary, as ‘translators’ for colleagues that might be less familiar with the 
political processes taking place so that, jointly, they can be more effective in scrutinizing their 
national governments.215 I 
It is interesting to note, that although the OSCE PA is founded in the Paris Charter and 
reiterated in the Istanbul Document as one of the most important institutions of the OSCE, 
there is nearly no formal agreement between the OSCE governmental and executive bodies. 
The only formal relationship between the OSCE PA and an executive OSCE institution is 
based on the 1997 Copenhagen Cooperation Agreement. In fact, co-operation has to a large 
extent developed through practice and mutual agreement with the governmental side.216  
When considering the methodology behind deploying Parliamentarians as OSCE election 
observers, it is important to examine the tasks of the OSCE PA as set forth in the Assemblies 
Rules of Procedure. The Assembly reflects the three OSCE dimensions in its committee 
structure, as does the OSCE governmental body. Therefore election observation is based 
thematically in the third dimension. Regarding the OSCE PA’s activities in election 
observation, Rule 2 is of relevance: In particular when stating to „assess the implementation 
of the objectives of the OSCE” and in addition “to support the strengthening and 
consolidation of democratic institutions in the OSCE participating States;”217  
Thus the Assembly’s election observation is deduced along these two tasks as set forth within 
its Rules of Procedure. Furthermore, at the Annual Session of the Parliamentary Assembly of 
the OSCE in Helsinki (1993) the then Chairman-in-Office, Swedish Foreign Minister 
Baroness Margaretha af Ugglas, urged Parliamentarians to actively participate in election 
observation and monitoring. In response to this call, the OSCE Parliamentary Assembly has 
developed a particularly active program for observing elections in the OSCE area. The 
presence of parliamentary observers at elections emphasizes the importance of legislatures as 
institutions that must provide a balance to executive authority.218  
Hence, the OSCE PA has been active in election observation since its conception. Beginning 
with the groundbreaking elections in Russia in December of 1993, at which the OSCE 
Parliamentary Assembly coordinated the monitoring activities of over 1,000 observers from 
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parliaments, governments and private institutions,219 the OSCE PA deployed between 1993 
and 2003, 1475 OSCE Parliamentarians to observe 60 elections.220 A delegation of 36 CSCE 
parliamentarians from 21 participating States observed the first multi-party Duma elections 
and the referendum on the constitution in the Russian Federation on 12 December 1993. The 
Delegation concluded unanimously that based on their limited investigation, the elections and 
the referendum, were on the whole conducted in a free and fair manner. 221  The 36 
Parliamentarians were accompanied by 21 staff of both, the national parliaments and the 
Headquarters of the CSCE/OSCE PA, based in Copenhagen. Starting with the Russian 
parliamentary elections in December 1993, the Parliamentary Assembly has, by now, led 93 
election observation missions involving more than 2,700 parliamentarians.222 
On another note, I would like to re-iterate table 4 as the source of a more general overview of 
OSCE documents highlighting the role of the OSCE PA in election observation. The 1997 
Copenhagen Ministerial and the 1999 Istanbul Charter for European Security are of particular 
importance regarding OSCE PA’s engagement in election observation. The Copenhagen 
Ministerial endorsed officially the 1997 Co-operation Agreement (examined earlier in this 
Chapter) between the Parliamentary Assembly and the OSCE/ODIHR. The Istanbul Charter, 
states that “the Parliamentary Assembly has developed into one of the most important OSCE 
institutions continuously providing new ideas and proposals. We (Heads of States and 
Governments) welcome this increasing role, particularly in the field of democratic 
development and election monitoring.” Thus, the Parliamentary Assembly’s activity in 
election observation is solidly based on its own Rules and Procedures and on several 
documents of the organization’s governmental body. 
According to the 1997 cooperation agreement between the PA and the ODIHR, the Assembly 
plays a leading role in OSCE election observation endeavors. In particular, when the 
Chairman in Office appoints the OSCE Special Coordinator for Short term Observers - 
normally the President or a senior official of the PA - this individual will be tasked to deliver 
the preliminary post election statement on behalf of the OSCE.  
It is important to note that whenever a judgment about elections and democracy is accorded 
by the international community, it gains greater legitimacy and credibility within the host 
popolulation and political community, when delivered by Parliamentarian election observers. 
Hence, the deployment of experienced Parliamentarians for the observation of elections 
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becomes of greater significance, when considering that the levels of scrutiny and international 
pressure on the host country will increase with the release of an election observation 
assessment statement.  
Additionally, as already outlined earlier, election observation became a prominent 
international activity through the course of the years. It is not simply an occasion to assess the 
evaluation of an election, but rather the evaluation of a country’s democratization process as 
such. Therefore it requires legitimacy, which is gained through the deployment of observers 
who are elected officials and represent one essential institution of democracy – 
parliamentarianism.  
This composition together with the comprehensive methodology of the ODIHR regarding 
Long-term and Short-term observation constitutes the established OSCE election observation 
standards, which served as a model for other international institutions, most prominently for 
the European Union. 
However, the deployment of Parliamentarians as OSCE election observers implies the need to 
have professionals on the ground. Observers who have fought elections themselves in their 
home countries are likely to have a greater insight into issues such as political campaigning 
and the course of the electoral process itself, than Short-term observers seconded for the 
mission and briefed by the ODIHR core team two days before the election observation. These 
Short-term observers would not have contested elections or gathered the relevant political 
experience, therefore lacking an important insight into the various characteristics of political 
campaigning, elections etc.  
Hence, elected Members of Parliament provide unequalled credibility and visibility to 
election observation projects because of who they are and what they do. As elected officials, 
full practitioners in the process and dependent upon elections themselves, they are rightly 
presumed to know more about elections than anybody else. The fact that they have succeeded 
in being elected and hold public office gives them a certain standing to speak about elections, 
which obviously provides unequalled credibility in this field.223 
Finally, the inclusion of experienced OSCE Parliamentarians in OSCE election observation as 
professionals with practical expertise in issues such as political campaigning and electoral 
processes can be understood as the methodology of the Parliamentary Assembly. 
 
Thus, in my opinion the standard application of OSCE election observation encompasses the 
following aspects: The ODIHR’s comprehensive methodological approach through the 
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deployment of long term observers on the ground weeks before Election Day, observing the 
whole electoral process including media, human rights, gender aspects etc. Additionally a 
high number of ODIHR Short term observers and several Parliamentarians of the OSCE PA 
for the observation of balloting and counting, including one OSCE Special Coordinator tasked 
to deliver the final assessment.  
These methods are applied with the cooperation of other parliamentary bodies, such as the 
Council of Europe, the European Parliament and sometimes the NATO Parliamentary 
Assembly. However, it should be noted that the functional relationship between the ODIHR 
and the OSCE PA, during an election observation, is also dependent on the cooperation of 
other Parliamentary institutions.  
 
* 
 
Since the institutionalization of the CSCE in the Paris Charter, creating both, the CSCE 
Parliamentary Assembly and the Office for Free Elections, both institutions – although very 
different in their institutional characteristics - have engaged in observing OSCE participating 
States commitments for free and fair elections. These institutional characteristics are also 
reflected in their respective duties regarding election observation.   
However, this dual engagement led to the establishment of parallel structures for the 
observation of OSCE participating States’ elections. With the mutual objective (the 
observation of the norm) both institutions deploy election observers along different 
methodologies. First the CSCE PA with the deployment of CSCE parliamentarians, later the 
OSCE/ODIHR with the deployment of long term and short term election observers. Particular 
attention should be paid to events such as the 1994 Budapest Summit mandating the ODIHR 
for monitoring before, during and after the election and the 1997 Copenhagen Ministerial 
Council endorsing the Cooperation Agreement between the OSCE PA and the OSCE/ODIHR. 
However, OSCE election observation standards have encompassed the complementary 
activity of both the OSCE PA and the OSCE/ODIHR (since it was formally endorsed in 1997). 
Their complementary roles are also due to their different institutional characteristics. In my 
opinion, as will be reflected in Chapter four, OSCE election observation must consider that 
international political pressure will be generated by their subsequent assessment. This 
necessitates that the assessment of the mission is delivered at the highest possible political 
level, a fact which is reflected by the appointment of the OSCE Special Coordinator – a 
member of the OSCE Parliamentary Assembly.  
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Therefore this thesis argues that any deliberation based on OSCE standards for election 
observation must consider the complementary roles of both, the OSCE PA and the ODIHR. In 
this regard, the argument that the ODIHRs methodology is the single reason why the OSCE 
has set the international standard for election observation, clearly ignores the complementary 
role of the OSCE PA. This is reflected, in particular, when examining the composition of EU 
election observation missions - which are led by Members of the European Parliament, who 
act as chief observers, while Member States provide the long-term and short-term 
observers.224 
 
 
Problems and Constraints  
 
In reality, OSCE election observation currently faces various problems and challenges. First 
of all it is important to note that inner institutional cooperation does not always function 
according to the 1997 Cooperation Agreement. In fact, the level of cooperation between the 
two institutions differs from EOM to EOM. The ODIHR and some diplomats of the 
Permanent Council argue that Parliamentarians should not be election observers because 
parliamentarians often make politically motivated statements after elections and are mostly 
ignorant about the countries they briefly visited, while the ODIHR is well informed with the 
ins and outs of local legislation and traditions.225  
In my belief it is also a matter of prestige. The ODIHR has sometimes been reluctant to yield 
information to the OSCE Special Co-ordinator, an individual not necessarily considered as a 
part of its team but who is tasked to deliver the OSCE final assessment statement. This 
individual will be in a position to claim subsequent international recognition, perhaps 
overshadowing the contribution of the ODHIR.  
In addition to the problems related to the cooperation between the OSCE PA and the ODIHR, 
it is also important to note that the relationship between the OSCE governmental side and its 
parliamentary dimension is also occasionally problematic. As elaborated earlier when 
underlining the independent characteristics of both institutions, (with regard to whether an 
election observation mission should be deployed) the OSCE PA observed the 2007 Russian 
Duma elections while the ODIHR declined the invitation. Interestingly, OSCE Secretary 
General Marc Perrin de Brichambaut noted in a speech given at the European Humanities 
University and Institute of International Relations and Political Science in Vilnius on May 9th 
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2008, that “tensions led the OSCE to desist from sending an election observation mission to 
the Russian parliamentary elections (2007) and presidential elections (2008) because of undue 
restrictions placed on the size, duration and freedom of movement of the planned OSCE 
observation team.”226 According to this statement there was no OSCE observation of the 2007 
Russian Duma elections, although the organizations Parliamentary Assembly were present as 
observers together with the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe with over 70 
Parliamentarians.227  
Hence, over the years some tensions have grown between the PA and the OSCE Vienna 
institutions. The PA argues for instance that the relationship between the Assemblies 
President and Secretary General is comparable to that of the organizations Chairman-in-
Office and Secretary General; something that is not recognized by the Permanent Council.228 
This refusal can be partly explained by the fact that the members of the Permanent Council, 
since they cannot treat the PA as a subordinate institution, e.g. on the same level of the 
ODIHR, wish to treat only the President as a full and equal partner, thereby putting 
themselves on an equal political level, whereas the PA argues that the President is on the level 
of the Chairman-in-Office and the PA Secretary General the equivalent of the OSCE 
Secretary General.229 
But beside these inter-institutional problems, often caused by the lack of clearly defined roles 
and the status of the PA within the organization, OSCE election observation, in particular the 
ODIHR today faces other problems, constituting a threat to the whole endeavor. When 
considering table 4, which lists relevant OSCE election related commitments, it becomes 
evident that although the norm has been defined, issues regarding the invitation of observers 
have not. Although the Budapest Summit tasked the ODIHR to observe before, during and 
after the election, it did not define how many observers or how many days before the election 
these experts should be deployed. Hence, the entire ODIHR election observation methodology   
which has been established over the years, is based on practice and custom rather than on 
politically binding commitments of OSCE participating States. This problem became public 
before the Russian Duma elections in December 2007, when the ODIHR declined the 
invitation arguing that the Russian authorities had refused to give Visas to their experts and 
logistics officers. In turn, the Russian OSCE Ambassador Wladimir Woronkow underlined in 
                                                 
226 OSCE. http://www.osce.org/documents/sg/2008/05/31768_en.pdf; 25.6.08  
227 OSCE PA. http://www.oscepa.net/Activities/Election%20Observation/242-
Russian%20Duma%20Elections%20/; 25.6.08 
228 Andreas Nothelle. The OSCE Parliamentary Assembly – Driving Reform. In: OSCE Yearbook 2006 
(Hamburg 2007), 351 
229 Ibid. 
 95
an interview he gave for the Austrian newspaper Der Standard230 that there is no OSCE 
document, which constitutes a timeframe for the deployment of a mission. The Ambassador 
elaborated further that although the ODIHR advocates the deployment of long term observers 
two month before the Election Day, some OSCE States, (believing themselves to be the 
‘Avant-garde’ of Democracy) invite the Office only three weeks before elections. 
Additionally Mr. Woronkow pointed out that in Russia, there are approximately 100000 
polling Stations and that it makes no difference whether there are 500 or 5000 observers 
present during the vote. Therefore, Russia suggests having the same number of observers for 
each country. According to the OSCE Budget, this should be 50. And finally, regarding the 
function of Long term observers and how they perceive media coverage of the election 
campaign, Mr. Woronkow stated that nowadays there is no need to be present in the country. 
The same can be said of the legal framework of the election, since all relevant information is 
available on the internet, according to the Russian OSCE Ambassador.  
This interview outlines a clear picture. That some OSCE participating States are not satisfied 
with how OSCE election observation is carried out. In fact, Russia and several other CIS 
States have criticized the way in which OSCE/ODIHR election observation missions are 
implemented. They perceive an unbalanced approach, arguing that OSCE election observation 
missions are only properly deployed east of Vienna. In September 2007, seven CIS States 
presented “Basic Principles for the Organization of ODIHR Observation of National 
Elections”.231 According to these principles, the size of election observation missions should 
be restricted to 50 persons, the heads of mission should be appointed by the Permanent 
Council, and all key decisions including those regarding the publication of election reports 
should be taken by the Permanent Council. With its decision to admit only 70 ODIHR 
observers to the Russian parliamentary elections in December 2007, the Russian Federation 
has underlined its position.232  
In sum, as noted by a Senior Official of the OSCE Secretariat, from a legal perspective the 
Russian Federation is well within its rights. The Copenhagen Document states very little and 
the commitments made are very modest. Everything is built on custom.233 
It may therefore be necessary to urge the reformation of the OSCE, or at least that a clear 
definition regarding the status quo and standard practices in election observation be 
established. The Russian Federation openly states that the OSCE needs a legal character. It is 
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my belief that some western countries, especially the US, perceive a serious risk in the 
implementation of such an idea. When opening the debate over the issuing of clear 
commitments regarding the number of observers to be invited and at what particular date 
before the election, the established OSCE standards for election observation would be 
questioned. To date, the strategy of the US and some EU States is rather to have international 
standards established though practice and based on customary procedure, than to risk the 
endeavor of comprehensive long-term-, short-term- and parliamentarian leadership in the 
pursuit of a legal definition and framework.  
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Conclusion 
 
 
During the course of the years, election observation has become the OSCE’s most important 
activity in its third dimension of security, since it is most visible to the public and its most 
effective means for the promotion of democracy. The 1990 Copenhagen Declaration 
committed participating States to conduct elections according to the norm. Today, this norm 
has become one of the most important OSCE aquis in the human dimension and embraces 56 
participating States, all with different political and electoral systems, traditions, cultural and 
ethnic backgrounds.  
As an endeavor encompassing both, development cooperation and political cooperation, and 
can also be used for the exercising of international political pressure, OSCE election 
observation methodology became a benchmark for other international institutions deploying 
election observers during the course of the 1990s. OSCE standards for election observation 
encompass the complementary efforts of both, the OSCE PA and the OSCE/ODIHR. But it is 
important to point out that the elaboration of these standards, in particular of the ODIHR’s 
comprehensive election observation methodology, was developed through practical 
application. Coupled with the contribution of the OSCE PA, this proved to be an effective 
approach and came to be accepted as the standard implementation of OSCE election 
observation missions. However, the concession of the ODIHR’s autonomy was also of central 
importance for the development its methodology. Indeed, OSCE standards for election 
observation would not exist in their current form, had the decision making bodies of the 
organization interfered in the development of this methodology. Both, the autonomy of the 
OSCE PA (as part of the Assemblies institutional constituent) and the OSCE/ODIHR, are 
essential components for the continued impartiality of OSCE election observation missions. 
Today, an OSCE election observation endeavor faces various constraints and problems. 
Amongst others, these problems comprise a contestation of the established standards, by a 
particular group of participating States, calling for OSCE reformations. However, fragile 
customs and commitments provide that the mission continue along the standards set. Until 
today, only the Russian Federation has openly refused these standards when imposing a limit 
on ODIHR observers during the Duma 2007 elections. It is worth questioning whether other 
participating States will follow this example or rather willingly accept established OSCE 
election observation standards. 
 
 98
Chapter Four  
Case Study: OSCE Election Observation of the Extraordinary 
Parliamentary Elections in Kazakhstan, August 2007 
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Introduction 
 
 
The inclusion of this Case Study was intended to highlight two arguments outlined previously: 
That election observation missions cannot avoid considering the international pressure on the 
host country when releasing their assessment and that OSCE election observation is also in 
practice carried out as complementary activity of the OSCE PA and the OSCE/OIDHR.  
In this regard, the context for the election observation shall be outlined with particular regard 
to the dialogue between Kazakhstan and the OSCE concerning democratic values and its 
subsequent OSCE Chairmanship bid. However, it is important to note that this paper does not 
intend to analyze Kazakhstan’s political system as such, rather to examine the OSCE election 
observation mission and the implications of its assessment. Therefore an examination of why 
the election was called and a closer comparison between the Statement of Preliminary 
Findings and Conclusions, the OSCE/ODIHR Interim Report and the Final Report, this paper 
will demonstrate the roles and responsibilities of the respective OSCE institutions in this 
election observation mission.  
However, in particular the examination and the comparison of the election observations 
assessments will reflect that election observation and in particular its evaluation related to 
Kazakhstan’s political OSCE commitments for free elections, can generate important aspects 
of international political pressure. Pressure, which in turn constitutes the most effective 
feature of election observation in the promotion of democratic core values. The role of the 
two OSCE institutions will also be examined in the context of such international pressure, in 
particular the responsibility of the OSCE Special Coordinator when delivering the Statement 
of Preliminary Findings and Conclusions on behalf of the OSCE. 
On another note but of equal importance, the case study will also demonstrate that OSCE 
election observation is based on a comprehensive methodology, encompassing the 
consideration of aspects such as media freedom, political campaign issues, candidates’ 
registration, etc. Furthermore, that the assessment methodology focuses on whether the 
defectiveness of such regimes can influence the free and fairness of the whole election.  
Finally, it is important to note that the Case Study does not intend to examine closely the 
findings of the election observation assessment; it rather aims to demonstrate particular 
aspects of relevance to the main argument of this paper. The Statement of Preliminary 
Findings and Conclusions of the International Election Observation Mission is annexed to this 
paper in case of further interest regarding the mission’s findings.  
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The Context for the Election Observation  
 
First of all, I would like to point out that the Republic of Kazakhstan has for some time 
engaged in a dialogue with the OSCE regarding (among other issues) democratic values. This 
is reflected in particular with the establishment of an OSCE Mission in Almaty in 1998, with 
the mandate to promote the implementation of OSCE principles and commitments as well as 
the co-operation of the Republic of Kazakhstan within the OSCE framework. Special 
emphasis lies on the regional context encompassing all OSCE dimensions.234 In 2007, the 
OSCE Mission in Almaty was renamed the OSCE Centre in Astana, a decision related to the 
relocation of the OSCE presence from the former to the new Capital of the country. However 
this had little impact on the mandate, which still aimed toward the promotion and  
implementation of OSCE principles and commitments, furthermore, stating that the Centre 
should  establish and maintain contact with central and local authorities, universities and 
research institutes, as well as representatives of civil society and NGO’s.235  
On another note, the dialogue of values is also related to the invitation of OSCE election 
observers. The CSCE Parliamentary Assembly had already deployed an observation 
delegation to the parliamentary elections in 1994. The conclusion of the CSCE Observer 
Team was that the election process did not meet the standards which CSCE participated States 
had pledged to uphold. In particular the provision which allowed nearly one-quarter of the 
new Parliament to be virtually appointed by the President, combined with the widespread 
violation of Article 46 of the Electoral Code and apparent abuse of authority by local electoral 
commissions, made a positive conclusion by the CSCE PA Team impossible.236  
Hence, since 1994, the OSCE continuously deployed election observers to monitor 
presidential and parliamentary elections in Kazakhstan. Interestingly, looking at the OSCE 
Statements of Preliminary Findings and Conclusions for the observation of parliamentary 
elections since 1999 chronologically, a positive trend of improvements in the legislative and 
regulative frameworks, in transparency of the overall election process and in the ability for 
political parties to convey their messages to voters, becomes evident.237 Even though these 
statements also underlined that various OSCE commitments were not met, this trend clearly 
demonstrated the will of the country to increase its efforts for more genuine democratic 
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elections. At this point it is also important to underline that the ODIHR worked throughout 
the course of these years, offering various recommendations for the improvement of the 
electoral law, which were in turn considered by the Kazakh authorities.  
This continual cooperation with OSCE institutions and the OSCE’s presence in Kazakhstan, 
led the Kazakh Republic to invite the OSCE to observe the August 2007 Parliamentary 
elections.  
The countries bid for the OSCE Chairmanship demonstrates a further important aspect of the 
dialogue and cooperation between the OSCE and Kazakhstan. Kazakhstan’s candidature to 
hold the chairmanship was first discussed at the 2006 Ministerial Council in Brussels. This 
bid was for the Chairmanship in the year 2009. However, due to the lack of consensus on the 
issue, the OSCE participating States decided to return to Kazakhstan’s offer at the next 
Ministerial Council in Madrid at the end of 2007.238 Subsequently Kazakhstan was entrusted 
with the OSCE Chairmanship for 2010, and when considering the timing of the election 
(August 2007), it is interesting to question whether the assessment of the election observation 
had an impact on the decision taken in Madrid. This paper therefore clearly argues that yes, 
the election observation assessment in August 2007 by the OSCE institutions, had a 
considerable influence on whether to entrust Kazakhstan the OSCE Chairmanship or not. 
 
Hence, it might be important to further question why the elections were held at all. In fact, the 
elections were called in order to allow constitutional amendments into effect. In line with the 
constitution, the President of the Republic of Kazakhstan dissolved the Parliament and 
scheduled election of the Majilis (lower chamber of the Parliament) for the 18th of August. 
The Senate of the Kazakh Parliament, composed through the election of the Maslikhats, 
expired and had in regular terms elections on the 18th of August.239 Hence, two elections were 
held on the 18th of August, an ordinary election of the Maslikhats (Senate) and an 
extraordinary election of the Majilis (lower chamber of the Parliament). Therefore, the early 
elections of the Majilis were needed to break a constitutional impasse. Under amendments 
approved in May 2007, changes in the legislature’s authority could not take effect until a fresh 
body of deputies has been elected under the new system.  
In this respect, under the new election system, 98 of the 107 deputies of the Majilis were 
elected via proportional representation in a single nationwide constituency. Voters voted for 
political parties, and those which surpassed the seven per cent threshold subsequently chose 
which candidates would receive mandates. The remaining nine deputies were not elected in a 
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popular vote but had been chosen by the Assembly of People, an unelected body, on 20 
August.240 
In May 2007, the Parliament adopted significant amendments to the Constitution, a number of 
which affected the election process. Inter alia, the constitutional amendments increased the 
number of Majilis deputies from 77 to 107 and introduced a number of additional changes, 
including a new electoral system, the reduction of the presidential mandate from seven to five 
years, removal of term limits for the first President of Kazakhstan, provision to permit the 
President to engage in political party activity during his/her tenure, and changes to the future 
composition of the CEC.241 
On 19 June, the Election Law was amended, primarily to reflect the relevant changes to the 
Constitution and to define the election system. Previous Majilis elections were held under a 
predominantly majoritarian election system, with ten seats elected through a proportional 
system. Under the new legislation, 98 deputies of the Majilis were elected in a proportional, 
closed list system in one nationwide constituency. Voters voted for political parties, and the 
parties subsequently chose after the publication of final results which candidates would 
receive any mandates obtained.242  
Following mergers, seven political parties submitted candidate lists to the Central Election 
Commission. In an inclusive process, the CEC registered all seven parties, with the following 
number of candidates: Ak Zhol (98 candidates), All National Social Democratic Party 
(ANSDP) (80 candidates), Auyl (33 candidates), the Communist People’s Party of 
Kazakhstan (CPPK) (20 candidates), the National Democratic Party Nur Otan (126 
candidates), the Patriots’ Party (11 candidates) and Rukhaniyat (9 candidates). Of 400 
nominated candidates, 23 were not registered by the CEC, either for not submitting the 
required documents or on eligibility grounds. There were no complaints from the parties 
regarding the registration process.243 
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The Election Observation Mission 
 
As stated already, OSCE election observation missions usually occur in cooperation with 
other international institutions. In most cases, the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of 
Europe, the European Parliament and the NATO Parliamentary Assembly participates. All 
together, they form the International Election Observation Mission, who agrees on a common 
statement delivering the assessment of their observations.  
In the case of the observation of the August 2007 extraordinary parliamentary elections in 
Kazakhstan, three international institutions were present to observe the election. First in place 
was the OSCE/ODIHR, which arrived on the 17th of July for the deployment of its Long term 
observers. Second in place was the OSCE PA, which arrived on the 9th of August.244 Finally, 
the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe arrived a few days later. These three 
institutions composed the International Election Observation Mission.  
However, what was the composition and roles of the respective OSCE institutions? First of all, 
it is important to point out that the OSCE/ODIHR established its mission on 17th of July for 
the deployment of 36 Long term observers.245 Together with the 36 Long term observers, the 
ODIHR core team with 19 members was deployed. This team was headed by Ambassador 
Lubomir Kopaj, OSCE On-side Coordinator, and by Paul O’Grady, Deputy Head of 
Mission.246 Additionally, the ODIHR Core team was composed of two political analysts, two 
election analysts, one legal and two media analysts, one Long term observer Coordinator, one 
security expert, one gender analyst, one liaison officer, three electronic voting experts, one 
finance officer and two logistic experts.247 Indeed, composing such a team of experts clearly 
demonstrate the Office’s conviction that election observation must consider aspects of how 
the political system, the media freedom and the election law are constituted. Interestingly, 
these individuals, despite their expertise, are neither Long term, nor Short term observers; 
rather they are staff of the mission and responsible for the briefing of the observers according 
to their areas of proficiency. Subsequently, the 36 Long term observers, seconded from OSCE 
participating States, were briefed on 19th of July by the ODIHR Core team, before their 
deployment to the various regions of Kazakhstan.248  
                                                 
244 Klas Bergman and Urdur Gunnarsdottir. Managing the Mechanics of Election Monitoring. In: OSCE 
Magazine October-November 2007; http://www.osce.org/publications/sg/2007/10/27195_938_en.pdf  
245 OSCE/ODIHR. http://www.osce.org/odihr-elections/item_12_25488.html; 7.7.08 
246 OSCE/ODIHR. http://www.osce.org/documents/pdf_documents/2007/07/25488-1.pdf; 7.7.08 
247 Ibid. 
248 http://www.osce.org/odihr-elections/item_12_25488.html; 7.7.08 
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A few weeks later on 9th of August, the OSCE PA Core team arrived in the country, headed 
by Ambassador Andreas Nothelle, who is the Vienna-based Special Representative of the 
OSCE PA. He immediately established contact with the ODIHR team, starting intensive 
communication and co-ordination.249 This arrival was followed by eight staff members from 
the Parliamentary Assembly’s International Secretariat in Copenhagen, who had been 
monitoring developments in Kazakhstan through the Internet and the media since the 
beginning of the campaign. They were instantly thrown into frenzied preparations for the 
arrivals of parliamentarians from OSCE countries. Details of hotel bookings, flight schedules, 
briefings, deployment on Election Day, and de-briefing the next day were organized and 
coordinated. 250  Before the arrival of the Short term observers and the OSCE Special 
Coordinator, both teams – the PA and the ODIHR – had meetings with representatives of the 
Kazakh political parties, NGOs and officials of the central, divisional and District election 
commissions. These meetings were sometimes held together, and sometimes separately.  
Bearing in mind that the OSCE PA staff had already arrived in the country on the 9th of 
August, almost ten days before the Election Day, this clearly demonstrated that the OSCE PA 
was engaged in more than simply the observation of the Election Day itself. Considering the 
political role of the OSCE PA according to the 1997 Cooperation Agreement, important 
aspects becomes evident: That the OSCE PA requires time for gathering its own impressions 
as to how the pre-election period is conducted, and to take into account the observation of the 
ODIHR, in particular the findings of the Long term observers. This is of particular importance, 
as the OSCE PA has the responsibility for delivering the election observation assessment on 
behalf of the OSCE. Therefore, the Canadian Senator Consiglio Di Nino and Vice Chair of 
the Parliamentary Assembly’s first General Committee and Head of the Canadian Delegation 
to the OSCE PA, was appointed Special Coordinator by the OSCE Chairman-in-Office, 
Spanish Foreign Minister Miguel Angel Moratinos. Senator Di Nino arrived in Kazakhstan on 
13th of August and heading the OSCE PA delegation, was hence responsible for delivering the 
post election statement on 19 August on behalf of the OSCE and the International Election 
Observation Mission.251 
The 13th of August also marked the arrival of 390 Short term observers seconded by OSCE 
participating States plus 57 parliamentarians of the OSCE PA, representing 18 countries and 
five members of the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe. Separate briefings 
                                                 
249 Klas Bergman and Urdur Gunnarsdottir. Managing the Mechanics of Election Monitoring. In: OSCE 
Magazine October-November 2007; http://www.osce.org/publications/sg/2007/10/27195_938_en.pdf  
250 Ibid. 
251 Ibid. 
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were organized for both, the Short term observers seconded by participating States and for the 
parliamentarians, deployed through the OSCE Parliamentary Assembly and the Parliamentary 
Assembly of the Council of Europe. These briefings covered several issues of importance for 
the election. They considered the political system and the election law (including how the 
constitutional amendments were affected), media freedom, the conduct of the election 
campaign and gender issues. It is important to point out that the briefings also constituted 
basic background information about the elections. Therefore observers attended these 
briefings in order to gather basic knowledge about the country’s political system, election law 
and respective political campaign issues. 
Finally, on Election Day, the International Election Observation Mission deployed 449 
observers from 45 OSCE participating States, including: 381 OSCE/ODIHR observers, 61 
OSCE PA observers and 7 PACE observers. The IEOM observed voting in 1,743 polling 
stations, vote counting at 174 polling stations and the tabulation of polling results at 123 
Territorial Election Commissions (TECs).252 
 
 
The Assessment 
 
First of all, it is important to point out that the International Election Observation Mission 
published only one common report. This was the Statement of Preliminary Findings and 
Conclusion. All three institutions therefore agreed to assess their observations together. This 
resulted in the Statement of Preliminary Findings and Conclusion. The OSCE/ODIHR in turn, 
published independently the Interim Report and the Final Report.  
As already examined in Chapter two’s section entitled “Evaluating According to the Norm”, 
the evaluation of an election observation has to be carried out in accordance with the norm for 
free and fair elections defined in the respective OSCE commitments of participating States. 
The most important point of reference is therefore the 1990 Copenhagen Document, examined 
extensively in the previous chapters. A further aspect of central importance for the evaluation 
is the question of when the Statement of Preliminary Findings and Conclusions should be 
delivered. Most frequently this is done at a press conference with the issuing of the post-
election statement. Normally this happens on the afternoon following the election. 253  As 
                                                 
252 OSCE/ODIHR. Final Report of OSCE/ODIHR Election Observation Mission to the Parliamentary Elections 
of 18th August in Kazakhstan. Warsaw 2007, p. 4 
253 OSCE. Cooperation Agreement between the OSCE Parliamentary Assembly and the OSCE Office for 
Democratic Institutions and Human Rights. Copenhagen, 1997 
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media interest is most intense immediately after Election Day, the Statement of Preliminary 
Findings and Conclusion has a much greater impact than the Interim Report or the Final 
Report issued by the ODIHR. This is particularly the case for highly sensitive elections such 
as the extraordinary 2007 Kazakh parliamentary election, when considering that Kazakhstan 
had been strongly linked with the OSCE Chairmanship.  
In this regard, the Statement of Preliminary Findings and Conclusions, representing the 
assessment of the three institutions – the OSCE/ODIHR, the OSCE PA and PACE - given on 
19th of August, was of pivotal importance as the evaluation would certainly receive worldwide 
media coverage. Therefore, the huge significance of the language employed becomes evident. 
Hence, it is undeniable that the choice of words and phrases for the election observation 
assessment implies a great deal of international pressure on the State in which the election 
was held. 
However what had the different OSCE institutions actually observed? What did the ODIHR 
observe in Kazakhstan in the weeks before the election according to its comprehensive 
election observation methodology?  
Table 8 outlines the most important issues of concern,254 as noted in the ODIHR Interim 
Report, in the Statement of Preliminary Findings and Conclusions of the International 
Election Observation Mission (OSCE institutions and PACE) and in the ODIHR’s Final 
Report, issued several weeks after the election by the ODIHR. 
When examining Table 8 more closely, various aspects become evident. In particular that 
election observation, as already outlined in Chapter two and Chapter three, is much more than 
the observation of the voting and the vote count. In fact, election observation encompasses 
components such as how the media covers the political campaign and election law issues such 
as candidate registration etc. With respect to candidate registration for example, the election 
observation missions were concerned about the fact that there were no provisions for 
individual or independent candidature. This is not in line with the 1990 Copenhagen 
commitments, which states that the participating State (Kazakhstan) “respects the right of 
citizens to seek political or public office, individually or as representatives of political parties 
or organizations, without discrimination”.255 On another note, the media did – according to 
the three reports – give preferential treatment to the governing party Nur Otan. 
 
 
                                                 
254 From the authors perspective 
255 Document of the Copenhagen Meeting of the Conference on the Human Dimension of the CSCE. 
Copenhagen 1990 
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Table 8 
 
Issues of concern 
 
 
Reports published 
 
 
Interim Report 16th of 
July – 4th of August 
(OSCE/ODIHR) 
Statement of 
Preliminary Findings 
and Conclusions 
(OSCE and PACE)  
19 August 2007 
Final Report 
(OSCE/ODIHR)  
30 October 2007 
Calling for the Election 
Concern because 
surprise for some 
parties. Little time to 
adjust their campaign 
Ibid. Ibid. 
Candidate Registration 
Concern because 
Candidature only 
possible through 
political parties, no 
provision for 
individual or 
independent 
candidates. 
Ibid., concern because 
not in line with 
Copenhagen 
Commitments, 
paragraph 7.5 
Ibid., concern because 
not in line with 
Copenhagen 
Commitments, 
paragraph 7.5 
Media 
Concern because news 
broadcasts were 
dominated a by 
positive coverage of 
Nur Otan 
Concern because 
preferential treatment 
of the governing Nur 
Otan party in the State 
media  
Concern because state 
media gave preferential 
treatment to Nur Otan 
in news coverage. 
Threshold 
Concern because high 
7 per cent threshold for 
the representation in 
the Majilis 
Concern because of the 
high 7 percent for the 
representation in the 
Majilis  
Concern because 
additional constraint to 
pluralism  
Counting 
--- Concern because 40% 
of observer reports 
assessed the vote count 
negatively  
Concern because 39% 
of observer reports 
assessed the vote count 
negatively 
Assembly of the 
People of Kazakhstan 
Concern because not in 
line with OSCE 
commitments  
Ibid. not in line with 
paragraph 7.2 of 
Copenhagen 
Commitment 
Ibid. not in line with 
paragraph 7.2 of 
Copenhagen 
Commitment 
 
However, when analyzing Table 8 it also becomes evident that excepting the issue of counting, 
all other issues of concern as for example the early calling of the election, no provision for 
individual candidate registration, the preferential treatment of the governing party in the State 
media – had already been raised in the Interim Report published by the ODIHR.  
In this respect, it is important to note that the Interim Report constitutes an important source 
of evaluation, as it already includes certain long term observation findings. Dissected further, 
this argument reflects the viewpoint that OSCE election observation is also in practice a 
complementary activity of the OSCE PA and the OSCE/ODIHR: because the Interim Report, 
encompassing the observation of Long term observers and ODIHR experts, constitutes an 
indispensable source of findings for the Statement of Preliminary Findings and Conclusions. 
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Hence, the OSCE Special Coordinator, as a member of the OSCE PA and appointed by the 
OSCE Chairman-in-Office, must take these findings into account before delivering the OSCE 
assessment. 
Finally, having considered all the issues of concern raised in the three reports as summarized 
in Table 8, and evaluating these issues according to the norm Free and Fair Elections as 
outlined in Chapter Two, it is presumably arguable that the election was not free and fair.  
However, Table 8 only raises the issues of concern and ignores the positive aspects of this 
election. In turn, balancing these concerns against such positive aspects as, for example, the 
fact that parties enjoyed greater access to media than in previous elections, that the Central 
Election Commission conducted its work in a transparent manner, that the mechanisms for 
hearing election complaints were more inclusive than in previous elections and that the 
Central Election Commission and local authorities made efforts to improve the quality of 
voters registers,256 it becomes evident that the deliberation over how the evaluation should be 
concluded, ultimately reflects the choice between two possibilities: concluding that the 
election was predominated by either positive or negative aspects. Hence, it is this choice 
which ultimately influences how the conduct of the election is perceived by the international 
community at large. This is the moment when election observation becomes a tool for 
exercising international political pressure. It is therefore arguable, that the OSCE Special 
Coordinator, being himself elected and appointed by the OSCE Chairman-in-Office, is 
responsible for this decision and everything it entails. 
Bearing this responsibility in mind and also the continuing cooperation between Kazakhstan 
and the OSCE coupled with its bid for Chairmanship, it is clear that a great deal of political 
pressure was generated by this decision. For some time the political agenda of the OSCE PA 
has supported Kazakhstan’s dialogue of democratic values with the OSCE. The Assembly’s 
President also expressed his support for the country’s bid for OSCE Chairmanship several 
times, something, which is also reflected in the decision to hold the 2008 Annual session in 
Astana. Hence, it was of importance for the OSCE PA observation mission that (once the 
observation of the OIDHR had been taken into account) despite the fact that the election 
assessment contained both, positive and negative components, an encouraging rather than a 
discouraging assessment statement was finally issued. At least, a statement that provided 
motivation for continuing cooperation with the OSCE, and in particular with the ODIHR, in 
order to address the issues which were not in line with OSCE commitments. Therefore, the 
following passage seems to constitute a compromise between the shortcomings, already 
                                                 
256 International Election Observation Mission. Statement of Preliminary Findings and Conclusion. Astana, 2007 
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reflected in the Interim Report and the encouragement to continue the cooperation with the 
OSCE institutions. 
“While these elections reflected welcome progress in the pre-election process and 
during the conduct of the vote, a number of OSCE commitments and Council of 
Europe standards were not met, in particular with regard to elements of the new legal 
framework and to the vote count. 
There was an increased ability for political parties to convey their messages to voters, 
including through the media, and the central election administration worked 
transparently. However, a number of the new legal provisions conflict with OSCE 
commitments. On election day, the voting was assessed in positive terms; however, 
the process deteriorated during the counting of the votes.”257 
When regarding this assessment, which was cited by a multitude of newspapers, reports and 
documents, the impact of such a statement becomes evident. In this regard, election 
observation and in particular its subsequent statement, implies an important normative 
strength because it will either motivate or discourage the respective national institutions 
responsible for the election. Furthermore it will also have a considerable impact on the 
population of the country and its political parties, as such an assessment cited through the 
national and international media is a significant judgment on the conduct of that country’s 
political activities. 
Finally, the International Election Observation mission to the extraordinary parliamentary 
elections in Kazakhstan, compromising the OSCE/ODIHR, the OSCE PA and PACE, fulfilled 
its task with the observation of the Election Day and delivered its assessment. In turn, the 
ODIHR continued its observation after the election until the 30th of August.258 Two months 
later the ODIHR published a Final Report. This report contains the entirety of its observations, 
since the deployment of Long term observers on 17th July. Interestingly the language 
employed in the Final Report is far more negative than in the Statement of Preliminary 
Findings, agreed by all three institutions. In fact, when examining the language employed in 
the Final Report, it becomes clear that the evaluation of the election by the ODIHR is more 
negative than positive: 
“The 18 August 2007 Majilis election resulted from the early dissolution of the 
parliament elected in 2004 and followed the adoption of significant amendments 
to the Constitution and Election Law, including a new proportional 
                                                 
257 Ibid. 
258 Ibid. P.11 
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representation system. However, some of the new amendments are contrary to the 
1990 OSCE Copenhagen Document, marking a step backward in a number of 
provisions of the election legislation. Despite some progress in the process during 
the pre-election period and in certain aspects of voting, the election did not meet 
a number of OSCE commitments, in particular with regard to elements of the 
legal framework and to the vote count and tabulation.”259 
In this respect, comparing the conclusion of the Statement of the International Election 
Observation Mission, delivered right after the election, with the conclusion of the Final 
Report of the ODIHR, some confusion arises as the first report highlights “welcome 
progress” and the other highlights the election as “a step backward”. Why is this so? Why 
did the ODIHR agree on the language in the Statement of Preliminary Findings and 
Conclusions and than assess the election negatively in its Final Report? Although this essay 
subscribes to the viewpoint that election observation goes well beyond Election Day 
observation, including aspects such as voter turnout and the handling of complaints - it 
would be unrealistic to assume that the post election observation findings in Kazakhstan 
had such a negative affect on the overall election process, as to contribute to such a 
negative final conclusion of the election.  
As described earlier, election observers must consider how their assessments influence the 
overall democratic reform process in transition countries. Kazakhstan, a former Soviet 
satellite state, began its cooperation with the OSCE in the 1990s. Taking this into account 
and the fact that the election conduct was observed to contain both, positive and negative 
aspects, it surely makes sense to have had an encouraging rather than a discouraging 
assessment whilst in the spotlight of national and international media. Thus, an assessment 
which would motivate the Kazakh authorities to continue their cooperation with the OSCE 
and in particular with the ODIHR.  
The Final Report in turn, encompassing the findings of the Long term observation, the 
findings of Short term observation and the post election period, a document 33 pages long, 
constitutes the working document for the Kazakh authorities to address the shortcomings of 
the election.  
Finally, the observation of the 2007 extraordinary parliamentary elections in Kazakhstan 
highlights one particularly important fact: That in light of the continued cooperation 
between Kazakhstan and the OSCE, and its bid for chairing the organization, a degree of 
political pressure was present during the election observation. In particular on the OSCE 
                                                 
259 OSCE/ODIHR Election Observation Mission Final Report. Warsaw, 2007, p.1 
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PA and the Special Coordinator, when considering to what extent the positive or negative 
aspects of the election should be highlighted. Undeniably, it was more judicious to give an 
encouraging assessment than a discouraging assessment. A negative judgment and its 
subsequent international attention might have provoked the Kazakh authorities to 
discontinue their cooperation with the OSCE, particularly with the ODIHR and to abandon 
their democratic reform process.   
This election was not perceived to have been held in free and fair manner according to the 
norm outlined in Chapter two. Important shortcomings and problems were observed and 
reported in detail (see annex). However, Chapter two also stressed that it is inherently 
impossible to assess empirically whether an election had truly been held in a free and fair 
manner, as in fact, the notion of free and fair has become something of a misnomer through 
the course of the years.  
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Conclusion 
 
The election observation mission of the 2007 extraordinary parliamentary elections in 
Kazakhstan perceived the presence of both progress and problems. A number of OSCE 
commitments and Council of Europe standards were not met, in particular with regard to 
elements of the new legal framework and the vote count. The ODIHR Final Report noted 
that some of the new amendments (constitutional) were contrary to the 1990 OSCE 
Copenhagen Document, constituting a backward step in some provisions of the election 
legislation. However, progress was also noted, in particular an increased ability for political 
parties to convey their messages to voters, including through the media. The central 
election commission was also perceived to have worked transparently.  
On another note, the examination of this election observation mission demonstrates some 
important issues to be considered when reflecting on the nature of OSCE election 
observation. Most obviously that election observation must commence well before the 
Election Day along the comprehensive ODIHR methodology for Long term observation. 
Another aspect highlighted in the case study is the importance of the political role of the 
OSCE Special Coordinator. Having taken into account the findings of the Long term 
observers and the observation of the Election Day, he or she must determine the degree of 
positivity or negativity that the preliminary assessment should reflect (this is the dichotomy 
implied when evaluating an election according to the norm free and fair). This is 
particularly the case when elections contain evidence of both, progress and problems.  
Hence, the Special Coordinator, as an elected parliamentarian and appointed by the OSCE 
Chairman in Office, has the legitimacy for such a responsibility. In turn, when considering 
the level of international pressure surrounding the issue of the Statement of Preliminary 
Findings and Conclusions for the election observation in Kazakhstan, the Special 
Coordinator decided that an encouraging rather than discouraging message should be 
conveyed. Interestingly, as previously noted, the Madrid Ministerial Council decided to 
entrust Kazakhstan the OSCE Chairmanship in December 2007. 
Finally, having taken all these aspects into account, this paper subscribes to the opinion that 
OSCE election observation must be a complementary activity of the OSCE PA and the 
OSCE/ODIHR. Since the OSCE PA does not have the technical expertise of the ODIHR 
with regard to comprehensive election observation, it is reliant upon the findings of the 
ODIHR’s long term observation. The ODIHR in turn, as an unelected body is dependent on 
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the role of the OSCE Special Coordinator, who has the political legitimacy to make suitable 
judgments regarding the respective country’s democratization process. 
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Chapter Five: 
Conclusion 
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Conclusion 
 
 
Election observation during the course of the years became an important instrument in the 
broader domain of democracy promotion. Evidentially, when deliberating about the nature of 
democracy it become obvious that democracy cannot simply be reduced to the holding of 
periodical free elections. Democracy implies much more than this. The respect of 
fundamental human rights, the media freedom and the rule of law for instance, are likewise 
as important for democratic governance as the actual election of the political candidates. In 
turn, the deliberation about free and fair elections deduces an interesting relationship between 
elections and other regimes of democracy, such as media freedom, rule of law, party system, 
parliamentarianism etc. Hence, although democracy is much more than the holding of 
periodical elections, democracy also constitutes the preconditions for holding free and fair 
elections. Bearing this in mind and understanding election observation as the promotion of 
one particular democratic core value – free and fair elections - it becomes obvious why the 
same endeavor became over time a vital feature in a broader sense of democracy promotion. 
The 56 participating States of the OSCE committed themselves to the holding of free 
elections, as defined in the 1990 Copenhagen document. In this respect, OSCE election 
observers assess their findings along the participating States common commitments. 
Interestingly, the above outlined relationship of democracy and free and fair elections implies 
that election observers, once they deliver their assessment, cannot avoid considering how the 
election itself contributes to the more general democratic landscape of a country. Taking this 
into account, election observation, being the promotion of one particular democratic core 
value, implies components of development cooperation and of political pressure. This 
becomes especially evident once the assessment of the election observers becomes public. 
On another note, OSCE’s endeavor in election observation, rooted in the 1990 Copenhagen 
Document and in the Paris Charter creating the CSCE Parliamentary Assembly and the 
Office for Free Elections, established important components of its methodology according to 
the above mentioned relationship between elections and democracy. At this point it is 
important to point out that the Office for Free Elections, renamed into Office for Democratic 
Institutions and Human Rights at the 1992 Prague Ministerial, developed a methodology for 
observing elections, which intends the observation of a wide range of preconditions for 
democratic elections, such as the earlier mentioned aspects including those of media freedom, 
minority rights etc. This is carried out through the deployment of Long term observation and 
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election experts, who are members of the ODIHR core team. The autonomy of the Office 
was of central importance for the elaboration of such a methodology.  
Over the years a parallel structure in OSCE election observation endeavors has been 
established. As the oldest CSCE/OSCE institution, the Parliamentary Assembly has been 
active in deploying parliamentarians as election observers since the organization’s 
conception. The deployment of elected parliamentarians is perceived as the need to have real 
professionals on the ground, as only parliamentarians having fought elections themselves 
have the necessary experience.  
In this respect, since the institutionalization of the CSCE with the Charter of Paris and the 
rush for elections in a multitude of former soviet countries, the CSCE Parliamentary 
Assembly and the Office for Free Elections, renamed later as the ODIHR, engaged each 
other in election observation. This dual engagement had let to the establishment of parallel 
structures for the observation of OSCE participating States’ elections. With the same aim (the 
observation of the norm) both institutions deployed election observers along different 
methodologies. First the CSCE PA with the deployment of CSCE parliamentarians, later the 
OSCE/ODIHR with the deployment of long term and short term election observation. 
Particular attention should be paid to the chronology of events such as the 1994 Budapest 
Summit mandating the ODIHR for monitoring before, during and after the election and the 
1997 Copenhagen Ministerial Council endorsing the Cooperation Agreement between the 
OSCE PA and the OSCE/ODIHR. These two dates have had a considerable influence on the 
composition of what is today understood as OSCE standard application for election 
observation. Also, because of the parallel structures as pointed out above, OSCE election 
observation standards have encompassed this complementary activity (since 1997 formally 
endorsed) of both, the OSCE PA and the OSCE/ODIHR.  
Another factor necessitating this complementary activity is related to the relationship 
between election observation and democracy promotion, thus including components of 
international pressure. As election observers cannot avoid considering how the election 
contributes to the general democratic landscape of the country – because of the fact that free 
and fair elections are interlinked with certain democratic preconditions – their assessment 
automatically implies an evaluation of the countries democratic landscape. Taking this into 
account and reiterating the feature of election observation as an instrument for promoting 
democracy, the entire endeavor becomes more effective and credible to the host country, 
when its internal composition represents a democratic structure. Therefore, it was decided in 
the 1997 Cooperation Agreement that it should be a member of the Parliamentary Assembly, 
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appointed by the OSCE Chairman-in-Office, who is tasked to deliver the Statement of 
Preliminary Findings and Conclusion on behalf of the OSCE. Because this Statement in  
particular, which represents the preliminary assessment of various international institutions 
and is in the spotlight of national and international media,  it therefore contains the most 
important components of political pressure, which in turn is the main feature of election 
observation in democracy promotion. This was clearly reflected in the case study. 
It is important to note that this architecture of OSCE election observation missions, 
encompassing the comprehensive election observation before, during and after the election 
by the OSCE/ODIHR and the role of OSCE parliamentarians for both, Election Day 
observation and the political leadership of the mission, have been taken up as a model by 
other international institutions for their respective activities in election observation. Most 
prominently by the European Union, when deploying election observation missions outside 
the OSCE area.  
Interestingly, the elaboration of these standards, in particular the elaboration of ODIHR’s 
comprehensive election observation methodology, has proven to be effective and was ex post 
taken into account by participating States. Both, the autonomy of the OSCE PA and the 
OSCE/ODIHR, are essential in their complementary application for impartial election 
observation regarding how the norm is implemented in OSCE participating States.  
Today, a group of OSCE participating States are contesting these standards. Arguing that 
OSCE election observation missions are ‘only deployed east of Vienna’, they propose that 
election observation should henceforward be carried out with an agreed number of election 
observers for every mission and that the organizations Permanent Council rather than the 
Chaiman-in-Office should decide who heads the mission.  
This proposition would destroy OSCE standards which have been elaborated over the course 
of the years through practical application. Not only would the ODIHR be forced to abandon 
its established methodology, which has become the worldwide benchmark model for election 
observation missions, but also the democratic leadership role of OSCE parliamentarians 
would be denied as the Permanent Council would not select Parliamentarians for heading 
their missions. To date, the strategy among participating States believing in the importance of 
these established OSCE standards has been to support the implementation of such customs, 
choosing to adhere to the common commitments as set in the Copenhagen Document and in 
the Budapest Document, rather than opening negotiations for new principles in OSCE 
election observation, something which would ultimately throw all established OSCE election 
observation endeavors into doubt.  
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Although the cooperation between the OSCE PA and the ODIHR has been characterized by 
certain problems and constraints, the establishment of their parallel activities in election 
observation has proven to be effective when attributing their cooperation along their 
technical and political roles. Because election observation cannot simply be reduced to its 
analytical and technical aspects, or to its political aspects – it must equally encompass both of 
these components. Therefore, effective OSCE election observation must include the 
complementary activities of the OSCE Parliamentary Assembly and the Office for 
Democratic Institutions and Human Rights. 
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 Abbreviations 
 
 
CEC  Central Election Commission 
CIS  Commonwealth of Independent States 
CORE  Centre for OSCE Research 
CoE  Council of Europe 
EOM  Election Observation Mission 
EU  European Union 
EP  European Parliament 
IEOM  International Election Observation Mission 
IPA CIS Inter-Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe 
IPU  Inter-Parliamentary Union 
NATO  Nord Atlantic Treaty Organization 
NGO  Non Governmental Organization 
LTO  Long Term Observer 
STO  Short Term Observer 
PACE  Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe 
 
OSCE  Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe 
CSCE  Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe 
MC  Ministerial Council 
PA  Parliamentary Assembly 
CIO  Chairman-in-Office 
PC  Permanent Council 
ODIHR Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights 
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